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 ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I examine Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, his account of 
friendship and his understanding of human flourishing.  Through textual analysis, I offer a new 
way of interpreting the will to power, as the achieving of self-realization.  The process of 
achieving self-realization is undergirded by the satisfaction of seven existential needs that are 
rooted in the paradoxical human conflict between instincts and consciousness.  The existential 
needs are the need for a frame of orientation, the need for devotion, the need for unity, the need 
for rootedness, the need for stimulation, the need for effectiveness and the need for self-love.  
While there are a variety of ways in which these needs can be satisfied, I propose a norm of 
satisfaction: beauty.  I appropriate the ancient Greek concept of to kalon and claim that this 
notion of “action for the sake of the beautiful” is the primary normative standard that Nietzsche 
would advocate for how an individual ought to satisfy his existential needs.  I then turn to an 
analysis of friendship in order to demonstrate its supportive role in self-realization.  I claim that 
Nietzsche does in fact have an account of friendship, albeit one that must be pieced together 
from various middle works and that he presents genuine friendship as a mean condition existing 
between various sets of excessive and deficient vices that are constantly in tension.  Friendship is 
the virtue that, if authentic, can bear a mutually supportive relation with the will to power.  I 
argue that the will to power and the virtue of friendship are two primary elements that constitute 
human flourishing, but a particular kind of human flourishing that includes both happiness and 
unhappiness as siblings.      
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 Through the Nietzschean lens, what does it mean to flourish as a human being?  If human 
flourishing is possible, then what are the constitutive elements of such an existence?  What kind 
of happiness can we possibly hope to occupy in modernity, where our “new happiness” is not 
merely one of pleasure and comfort, but one that is representative of an excellent human life?  In 
order for us to properly understand what Friedrich Nietzsche’s conception of human flourishing 
is, we must question the traditional understanding of happiness.  This inquiry will involve an 
examination and a re-thinking of the will to power, which is one of the central themes in 
Nietzschean thought and one of the most often misunderstood.  Comprehension of what a 
Nietzschean picture of human flourishing is will also require us to think seriously about the role 
of friendship in our understanding of the “new happiness.”   
 In chapter two, I construct a Nietzschean picture of human nature, appropriating Erich 
Fromm’s characterization of humanity as a fundamental conflict between instincts and 
consciousness.  I offer a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power as the 
achieving of self-realization, a process which is constituted by the satisfaction of the existential 
needs arising from the instinct/consciousness inner split.  I then provide an assessment of the will 
to power in which I argue that such a process of achieving should not be understood as a moral 
phenomenon but as a psychological one.  I make an inquiry into what the true essence of power 
is and how it manifests itself in multifarious ways.  I then look into the relationship between 
power and wisdom, specifically as this relationship is presented by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.  The 
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second chapter concludes with a discussion of beauty, which I argue is the fundamental norm for 
the satisfaction of our existential needs.   
 In chapter three, I make a detailed analysis of each of the existential needs as they present 
themselves within the human condition.  First, we explore the existential needs for rootedness, 
effectiveness and excitation/stimulation.  Next, we delve into the existential needs for a frame of 
orientation, devotion and unity.  I pay special attention to the existential need for unity, since the 
kind of inner unity for which Nietzsche advocates is complex and idiosyncratic.  Upon 
improving our conception of this Nietzschean unity, we will also improve our understanding of 
selfhood.  I then attempt to untangle two related processes: the satisfaction of an existential need 
and the sublimation of a drive.  Finally, I examine the existential need for a relation of self-love, 
an existential need which I add to Fromm’s set.   
 In chapter four, I investigate the ontological status of the will to power and ask, “Does the 
doctrine of the will to power express a myth or is it a truth?”  In order to answer this question, I 
claim that we must first understand what Nietzsche takes to be the nature of philosophy: “Is 
philosophy an art or a science?”  Because the doctrine of the will to power lies within the realm 
of philosophical discourse, gaining insight into the broader sphere of philosophical inquiry will 
enhance our insight into this particular doctrine.  I then provide three models of achieving self-
realization in order to make more concrete the process of self-realization.  These three models 
are the saint, the artist and the philosopher; however, the first two models are in a sense merely 
steps toward the becoming of a philosopher, which serves as the ultimate model of an individual 
who exemplifies a will to power.  Drawing from Nietzsche’s discussion of higher selves in his 
essay, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” I argue that Arthur Schopenhauer actually serves as an 
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exemplar of the will to power, despite such a notion not being a part of his own philosophical 
perspective.   
 In chapter five, I claim that Nietzsche does in fact have an account of friendship, and I 
interpret his account of friendship as a mean condition, appropriating Aristotle’s notion of a 
mesotês [mean condition] lying between a plurality of vicious conditions.  I discuss and reply to 
a few objections that might be raised against such an account of friendship and also that might be 
raised against this virtue ethical approach more generally.  I then explain how the virtue of 
friendship supports the achieving of self-realization (i.e. the will to power) and reciprocally how 
exemplifying the will to power supports the activity of friendship.  I conclude this chapter with 
some distinctions between erotic love, neighbor-love and friendship.   
 My interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power provides new insight into 
Nietzsche’s understanding of selfhood and also offers a new way to think about the relation 
between power and the self.  My argument that, properly understood, the will to power is the 
achieving of self-realization shows Nietzsche to have anticipated and be a precursor to the 
recognition of the importance of selfhood in social psychology, analytical psychology and 
psychoanalysis in the twentieth century.  Exploring Nietzsche’s notion of the self, and 
particularly the higher self, throughout this project draws closer the link between philosophy, as 
an enterprise that promotes becoming an excellent human being, and psychology, as a discipline 
that investigates the human psyche.  In addition, my claim that Nietzsche does in fact provide an 
account of friendship provides a segue to viewing Nietzsche as a virtue ethical thinker.  Because 
Nietzsche wrote and thought more about friendship than any other virtue, our exploration of this 
virtue could enhance our inquiry into the nature of other forms of excellence, both as represented 
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by Nietzsche and by other thinkers.  Finally, the climax of this project lies in my claim that 
friendship is the virtue that best supports the process of self-realization, and it is this connection 
that illustrates just how the self-oriented aspect of the will to power and the other-oriented aspect 
of friendship are not only compatible but mutually supportive.  It is my hope that we can leave 
behind the conception of Nietzsche as the advocate of an Übermensch who is isolated and 
without companions and that we can improve our own understanding of how to possibly become 
real selves and how to genuinely engage in friendship.     
 
Human Flourishing: Rethinking Happiness and Unhappiness 
It is an error to conceive of unhappiness and happiness as metaphysical opposites.  We 
must first recognize the error of placing our faith in such metaphysical opposites.  In this inquiry, 
the two “opposites” that must be exposed as such are happiness and unhappiness.1  One 
dimension of happiness is the acceptance of two essential features of human existence in the 
natural world: suffering and death.  One must yield to the reality of the necessity of suffering in 
human existence and to its apparent senselessness.  To do otherwise and act on the impulse to 
place as much distance as possible between one’s existence and suffering opens the way for the 
tendency to create another world, absolutely free of suffering, that is more real than this one—
e.g. Christianity’s Kingdom of Heaven.  Such an attitude would only be conducive to the kind of 
(false) happiness that represents spiritual sickness and life-negation.  The second dimension of 
happiness is the acceptance of the absence of the objective (or absolute) meaningfulness of 
                                                            
1 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. Trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Volume I, Sec. 1.  See also 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. 
New York: The Modern Library, 2000, Sec. 2. 
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existence and the absence of objective values.  These two affirmations will likely involve a 
significant kind of unhappiness, perhaps even an engendering of an attitude of horror at the 
seemingly vast nothingness of existence.  However, there is “wisdom in pain,” especially this 
aforementioned kind of existential pain.  Of this painful sort of life-affirming attitude, Nietzsche 
says:  
[The bold seafarers’] expression is never prouder, more warlike, and happier than it is 
when a storm comes up; indeed, pain itself gives them their greatest moments.  This is the 
heroic type, the great pain bringers of humanity, those few or rare human beings who 
need the very same apology that pain itself needs—and truly, one should not deny it to 
them.  They contribute immensely to the preservation and enhancement of the species, 
even if it were only by opposing comfortableness and by not concealing how this sort of 
happiness nauseates them.2 
This pain should be understood as an existential kind and as one associated with the “stormy sea 
of existence,” for Nietzsche consistently uses the image of “the sea” to represent “existence” 
throughout the GS.  But there is a third dimension of this new happiness that one must consider: 
a recognition of the degree of danger within oneself in not confronting the inner demands placed 
on one by his needs and instincts.3  While there is a danger in not facing up to these inner 
demands, there is an even more pressing potential danger with how an individual can satisfy the 
collection of existential needs that may possibly conflict with each other or which may be hidden 
from one’s consciousness.   
So far, these dimensions of the new happiness appear to create a picture of happiness that 
is quite far from the more traditional conceptions of happiness.  The kind of traditional happiness 
that Nietzsche attacks consists of a splitting off and destruction (or quieting) of the affects and a 
single-minded promotion of the rational faculty’s hegemonic dominance.  Any conception of 
                                                            
2 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 
1974, Sec. 318. 
3 BGE, Sec. 198. 
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happiness that equivocates happiness with reason’s triumph over the appetites, desires and drives 
misunderstands the nature of humankind.  So, the Socratic idea of a happy soul being three 
entities fused into one—a many-headed beast (desires), a lion (the spirited element) and a man 
(reason) all contained within the image of a man—but where reason rules the other two parts, is 
not going to give due weight to the force that emotions and instincts have as constitutive 
elements in the human psyche nor to the integral role that they play in the process of self-
realization.4  Also, Nietzsche would find problematic any conception of happiness that is life-
negating.  Hence, the Kantian summum bonum, the exact correspondence of happiness with 
morality that can exist only in an eternal kingdom of God, which he claims we ought to strive to 
promote, along with its Christian forerunner would also be defunct.  For Nietzsche, the 
traditional account of happiness may appear to be tranquil, yet such sought-for tranquility denies 
the affective reality of humanity’s inner needs and destroys the possibility of harmonizing 
desires with reason, or of harmonizing instinct with consciousness.  The traditional conception of 
happiness finds expression in several thinkers in the Western tradition, a few of which will 
suffice to get an idea of Nietzsche’s target of attack.  For Nietzsche, the utilitarian promotion of 
the “happiness of the greatest number” implicitly assumes an equality between all human beings 
and portrays an idealized leveling of any possible greatness downward to mediocrity.5  As such, 
it is the opposite of the promotion of the kind of excellence and greatness associated with 
genuine selfhood.  As the classic utilitarian, John Stuart Mill’s general happiness principle is 
characterized by impartiality and disinterestedness for all, yet it advocates such dispositions 
without questioning the psychological possibility of being completely impartial and being 
                                                            
4 Plato. The Republic of Plato. Trans. Francis MacDonald. London: Oxford University Press, 
1945, [line numbers] 588-589. 
5 TSZ, “On the Higher Man,” Sec. 3, pp. 399-400.  See also BGE, Sec. 225. 
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completely disinterested.  The utilitarian’s conception of happiness also incorrectly features 
pleasure (and the absence of pain) as the defining criterion that constitutes happiness; however, 
this is a mistake, for according to Nietzsche it is the degree of self-realization, or the 
exemplification of a will to power, that is the central criterion for human flourishing.  As we will 
see, a self’s process of becoming is not essentially rational.  The process requires a certain degree 
of cognizance of the reality of the human condition.  It is possible that not everyone is capable of 
realizing a self.  And the traditional notion of happiness will have to be sacrificed in order to 
attain a higher measure of selfhood.   
Despite the long-lived promotion of such traditional notions of happiness, there is a 
dimension of hope and possibility for one who experiences the new happiness.  Nietzsche 
presents the idea that in order to discover and make “one’s own way” through the apparent 
meaninglessness of suffering and pain, that one should develop a personal relationship to one’s 
problems.  What is this uniquely personal problem?  I take it to be the problem of one’s own 
unique and personal suffering being “incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone.”6  
No one can with absolute certainty understand my suffering, nor can I with absolute certainty 
understand anyone else’s suffering.  The language that one uses to describe his state of suffering 
can be a distorting force that prevents him from reaching all the way down to such suffering.  In 
addition, because each action has a complex and unique history that can only be retrieved by a 
shared (and leveling) language, our actions are also are for the most part unknowable to others 
                                                            
6 GS, Sec. 338.  It is also the case that our most personal and profoundest joy is just as 
unknowable to our neighbors; however, Nietzsche emphasizes the unknowability of one’s 
suffering by another because such the most intense kinds of suffering feel more real to us.  Think 
of how our the suffering of one’s conscience has “more reality” when it experiences shame or 
regret as opposed to the “felt reality” of the joy of one’s conscience when it praises itself.  There 
is an asymmetry between the felt experience of suffering and joy, one of Schopenhauer’s insights 
that I take to be correct.     
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and for many human beings unknowable even to themselves.  Nietzsche correctly stresses this 
important sense in which we are unknown to each other.  He also underscores the idea that an 
individual must let his own suffering lie upon him in order to find his way:  
…if you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of annihilation, and 
as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor 
another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the 
religion of comfortableness.  How little you know of human happiness, you comfortable 
and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that 
either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together.7 
In this same passage, Nietzsche continually speaks of “one’s own way”, “my own way”, “living 
for yourself”—all as different expressions of one and the same goal.  The preceding thought 
about the necessity of affirming one’s own suffering as part of this new happiness presents the 
new happiness as the condition for the possibility of selfhood.  One loses one’s way toward the 
realization of one’s self either by feeling a “weakening pity” toward others whereby one sees the 
vulnerability and fragility of the other in oneself: realizing that the suffering of another could 
possibly be my suffering; or by feeling this “weakening pity” toward oneself in which one 
forgets that distress is “a sister to” happiness: unhappiness and happiness are siblings in that the 
presence of the former makes its active overcoming a possibility.  So the hallmarks of the new 
happiness that Nietzsche advocates are danger, distress, and the capacity for suffering but also 
risk, adventure and the possibility of creating a real self out of a destroyed apparent self.  One 
upshot of viewing happiness in this Nietzschean way is that the new happiness (and its 
accompanying sibling unhappiness) is a disposition one must already occupy that makes possible 
the exemplification of a will to power and the realization of a self.  It has been thought that such 
                                                            
7 GS, Sec. 338.  For a continued treatment of this “sisterhood” of happiness and unhappiness but 
one that expands upon and further problematizes the religion of pity into two different kinds of 
pity, pity “for the creature in man” and pity “for the creator in man,” see BGE 225. 
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Nietzschean enterprise is a solitary commitment, yet Nietzsche articulates a social dimension to 
the process of self-realization: the virtue of friendship. On my account, the will to power and the 
virtue of friendship are mutually supportive of each other in human flourishing.  A related upshot 
from adopting this view is that human flourishing cannot be interpreted as (or equivalent to) the 
traditional conception(s) of happiness.  The activity of flourishing, hence, is more closely 
associated with the Nietzschean notion of “new happiness,” which involves realized selfhood 
rather than the traditional notion of happiness.  Interpreting the relation between Nietzsche’s new 
happiness, the virtue of friendship and the will to power in this manner makes more intelligible 
his problematizing of what he refers to as the error of cause and effect and of his reversal of the 
moralistic and religious formula, “Do this and that, refrain from this and that—then you will be 
happy!”:  
In my mouth, this formula is changed into its opposite—first example of my “revaluation 
of all values”: a well-turned-out-human-being, a “happy one,” must perform certain 
actions and shrinks instinctively from other actions; he carries the order, which he 
represents physiologically, into his relations with other human beings and things.  In a 
formula: his virtue is the effect of his happiness.8 
Nietzsche postulates that humankind is not in a state of progress but is possibly in a state 
of decline due to our unquestioned faith in truth, the negation of this world for some other “true” 
world and the potential nihilistic consequences that may emerge from such post-Enlightenment 
historical events.  According to him, it is possible for a higher individual to internalize the 
existential grief felt in recognizing that humankind is not progressing but potentially in a slow 
state of deterioration, and it is in that internalized grief within a single individual that one can see 
and welcome a new kind of happiness to embody.  So even though Nietzsche claims that he does 
                                                            
8 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols: Or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer in The 
Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books, 1954, “The Four Great 
Errors,” Sec. 2. 
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not advocate a particular morality, he does appear to advocate a particular kind of egoism that 
makes the realization of a self possible.  The revaluation of the up-till-now devalued suffering, 
pain and distress just is the active condition of a “happy one.”  Some balance between self-
contempt (of one’s former failure to affirm life and self) and self-admiration (of one’s potential 
vis creativa drawn up from his vis contemplitiva) must be struck in order to work towards 
satisfying one’s existential needs.9  Such a precondition is the experience of “the sadness of the 
most profound happiness.”10  The adoption of this stance prepares the way for one to consciously 
tend to one’s existential needs.  It is the satisfaction of one’s existential needs, rooted in the 
internally agonistic nature between consciousness and needs—and between need and need—that 
constitutes the achieving of self-realization.  And it is through this achievement that one can 
exemplify a will to power.  I argue that friendship is the virtue that can best facilitate the 
exemplification of the will to power, where both the embodiment of the will to power and 
participation in genuine friendship are mutually supportive in attaining what Nietzsche considers 
to be “a new happiness.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
9 This thought thematically connects sections 213, 214 and 301 of the GS. 
10 GS, Sec. 183. 
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Chapter Two    
Bringing Forth a Self into the World: From Existential Needs to the Will to Power 
We begin with the question: What is the will to power?  A number of accounts have been 
undertaken to render this crucial Nietzschean doctrine intelligible.  As soon as one begins to 
inquire into what the will to power is, its elusive and ambiguous nature begins to reveal itself.  
But where does one even begin to inquire into this doctrine?  How has the will to power been 
defined?  Philosophers have characterized the will to power in various ways—as a drive, as a 
self-conscious myth, as a means to some further end, as the development of an activity pattern 
and as an activity of overcoming resistance.  Each of these views does not seem to accurately get 
at the heart of the will to power’s essence.  I define the will to power as an existential 
phenomenon: one that structures the satisfaction of our existential needs and that structures how 
we come to value activities, things and people in the world.  The will to power should be 
considered existential because it is grounded in the social conditions of human existence.  There 
are a number of ways to categorize the conditions in which we exist: aesthetic, political, social, 
meaning-laden, psychological, biological, physical, etc.  Conceiving of the will to power in only 
one of these fashions would be limiting because human existence is a comprehensive project in 
which our becoming occurs simultaneously in terms of all the above categories.  So while much 
of my discussion of the will to power is psychological, thinking of it as a merely psychological 
phenomenon would be incorrect.  The will to power should be defined as the following: a 
potential achieving of self-realization that is integral to the human condition but that is infinitely 
differentiated for each human being.  Two provisions to the will to power are that one can 
succeed or fail in achieving self-realization (hence it being potential) and that the process of 
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achieving is fundamentally insatiable, in that the striving for self-realization is an ongoing 
process and not an end-state (hence it being an achieving and not an achievement).  In claiming 
the will to power to be “infinitely” differentiated, I mean that it manifests itself or fails to 
manifest itself (with varying levels and degrees between a more complete manifestation and a 
less complete manifestation) in multifarious ways that are unique and particular to each human 
being.  Conceiving the will to power as infinitely differentiated does not mean that for each 
person there are an infinite number of ways in which it can manifest itself—where a person 
could act out of the will to power in any way he chooses.  As human beings we are conditioned 
by the limits that are imposed upon us by our contradictory nature: an instinctual life at odds 
with consciousness.  That contradiction generates existential needs that partially determine how 
we engage with the world, yet the conscious dimension of our selves-in-progress makes possible 
the capacity to choose how we will satisfy such needs and allows what we do to be evaluated 
through the normative attitudes of oneself and of others.  So, while there is an endless set of 
ways in which particularity manifests itself, any one individual’s particularity is conditioned by 
the structure of universally human needs.   
I will employ Erich Fromm’s description of the human condition—whereby we possess a 
complex and related set of existential human needs—in order to expound how the will to power, 
as the human potential, is the “energy” that compels us to satisfy such needs.  In focusing on 
those needs dealing with human relationships, I augment Fromm’s list with a new existential 
need—the existential need for self-love.  The satisfaction of this need bears upon how other 
social needs may or may not be successfully dealt with.  In chapter three, I reference Karen 
Horney’s account of the inner conflict between the despised self and the idealized self in order to 
explicate this dimension of the will to power.  An analysis of what Nietzsche says regarding the 
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will to power supports my conception of the will to power as the potential achieving of self-
realization that is integral to the human condition but that is infinitely differentiated with each 
human being.  So, all human beings possess the will to power, but it expresses itself in different 
forms.  Within each of those forms of expression, the will to power can present itself with 
varying levels of strength and weakness, depending upon the psychology and history of an 
individual and depending upon the social conditions in which she finds herself.   
Human beings are both part of the natural world and are creatures who strive to become 
more than mere natural beings.  We struggle to stay alive and remain sane, but with varying 
levels of success and failure.  We also have a drive to feel at home in the world in which we 
exist.  So we ask ourselves: what is our nature as human beings?  To answer this, I appropriate 
Fromm’s idea that we can only define humankind’s nature “in terms of fundamental 
contradictions that characterize human existence and have their root in the biological dichotomy 
between missing instincts and self-awareness.”11  Today we exist with an ever-decreasing 
determination of behavior by instincts and with an ever-increasing capacity for self-awareness, 
reflectivity and imagination.  Because of the growth of our brains (especially of the neocortex) 
and these capacities, we are aware of our frailty, our helplessness, our separateness, our 
powerlessness and our lostness.  We are aware of our contradictory nature, and it can sometimes 
generate a feeling of horror at its unintelligibility.  This problem of consciousness in Fromm’s 
thought strikingly echoes a Nietzschean line of thinking less than a century earlier in which 
consciousness can be a danger to humanity if it is not balanced with action guided by our 
instincts.   In the GS, Nietzsche pinpoints consciousness’ late arrival on the human stage:  
                                                            
11 Fromm, Erich. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1973, p.226.  See also Fromm’s The Sane Society. 
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Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence also what is 
most unfinished and unstrong.  Consciousness gives rise to countless errors that lead an 
animal or man to perish sooner than necessary, “exceeding destiny,” as Homer puts it.  If 
the conserving association of the instincts were not so very much more powerful, and if it 
did not serve on the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to perish of its 
misjudgments and its fantasies with open eyes, of its lack of thoroughness and its 
credulity—in short, of its consciousness; rather without the former, humanity would long 
have disappeared.12 
According to Nietzsche, our instincts have a kind of potency in guiding what we do, and that 
strength forms more of “our core” than our consciousness in virtue of the fact that it has been 
dominant for a longer period in our history.  Nevertheless, there is a new tension that exists 
between our instinctual life and our conscious life, and it is the very experience of that tension 
through our consciousness that gives credence to its force.  We feel ourselves pulled by an 
instinct, but through the hesitance felt by our reflecting on the instinctual pull, a multitude of new 
feelings of anxiety, guilt, shame and embarrassment can take the reins and be inhibiting forces 
preventing action.  Another way of describing this tension between instincts and consciousness 
lies in the transition from how we experience instinctual drives to our consciousness of those 
drives.  A distortion occurs in this transition because we are limited by language how to convey 
the idiosyncratic experiences of our instincts.  Since we exist as social and political beings, a 
need for communication presents itself—a need to communicate that which can be immeasurably 
difficult to communicate in an accurate and meaningful way.  Take the experience of fear that an 
individual may have.  One can say that he is “afraid of” someone or something, which results 
from his cognitive and affective experience of some phenomenon that threatens his mental 
stability, his bodily integrity or his life.  Nevertheless, the linguistic expression, “I am afraid of 
X,” is a distant approximation to what the experience of that fear feels like from the inside.  Even 
                                                            
12 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 
1974, Sec. 11. 
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providing a very detailed description of the subjective experience of some particular fear does 
not come close to actually representing the experience itself.  A similar problem presents itself 
with several other emotional attitudes, especially the supposedly more extreme ones that are 
designated by the words “love” or “hate.”  This disparity between the instincts (and needs) and 
our consciousness of such inner content causes our consciousness to continually attempt to 
render such instincts meaningful.  Thus, it is not incoherent for one to ask questions such as, 
“Why do you love the person that you love?” or “Why do you feel animosity toward someone 
that you hate?”  The fact that answering such questions through reason and language is so 
labyrinthine testifies to the inherent tension between instincts and consciousness.  I take this 
tension to be part of the contradiction that Fromm believes to define human nature, a notion that 
is already present in Nietzsche: 
…consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; 
that from the start it was needed and useful only between human beings… [ man] needed 
to “know” how he felt, he needed to “know” what he thought… Man, like every living 
being, thinks continually without knowing it: the thinking that rises to consciousness is 
only the smallest part of all this—the most superficial and worst part—for only this 
conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and 
this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness.  …Fundamentally, all our actions are 
altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of 
that.  But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be.13 
We are walking contradictions in that so much of our waking life is this struggle to make sense 
of and communicate the first-personal experiences to others.  Much of this “figuring out” one’s 
instinctual life is constituted by the manifold estimations that we make regarding our instincts 
and the valuations that are already in place and shaped by those instincts.  This complex 
relationship constituting the inner world of the soul—the battlefield between instincts and 
                                                            
13 GS, Sec. 354. 
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between one’s consciousness and one’s instincts—where meaning must be given to instinctual 
drives is the foundation of our existential needs.14   
The zenith of this overlap between Fromm and Nietzsche on humanity as a contradiction 
comes to the fore in Nietzsche’s examination of conscience in the second essay of GM.  There 
the contradiction between instincts and consciousness has been transformed into a contradiction 
between instincts and conscience in such a way that conscience is a more sharply evaluative 
combatant against the instincts.  Conscience, at least in its “bad” form, prevents one from acting 
on instincts properly and thus from acting on the will to power as it can exist in its most excellent 
form.  “Bad conscience” originates out of the internalization of the instinct to cruelty in man.15  
As we became civilized beings, the weaker were forced to live in conditions of “peace” and 
“security” by those beings with stronger natures.  According to Nietzsche, the inability to express 
one’s instinct to cruelty forced that instinct to turn inward, and the delight in selflessness, self-
sacrifice and self-denial secretly remained tied to the power felt by the cruelty done to oneself.  
One legitimates such behavior by disguising it with the feeling of guilt and justifying it in terms 
of punishment that one deserves.  The particular form of guilt associated with a “bad conscience” 
that is detrimental to the achieving of self-realization is the guilt experienced concerning the 
aspects of one’s character and one’s personal history over which one has no control.  Clearly not 
all forms of guilt work against the realization of a self, for one should feel a sense of guilt if one 
has placed oneself in a deed that is expressive of psychological sickness or of a life-negating 
attitude.  As we will see, operating under a “bad conscience” prevents one from satisfying the 
existential need of developing a relation of self-love.  The “bad conscience” therefore represents 
                                                            
14 See GS, Sec. 333. 
15 Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals in the Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Trans. 
Walter Kaufmann. New York: The Modern Library, 2000, Second Essay, Sec. 16. 
17 
 
a reactive response to an instinct that is stifled, and such reactivity does not allow for a more 
affirming attitude towards one’s instincts.  Nietzsche elucidates the bad conscience as an illness 
arising from discord between one’s evaluative consciousness and one’s instincts: 
But thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet 
recovered, man’s suffering of man, of himself—the result of a forcible sundering from his 
animal past, as it were a leap and plunge into new surroundings and conditions of 
existence, a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and 
terribleness had rested hitherto….on the other hand, the existence on earth of an animal 
soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, 
unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect of the 
earth was essentially altered.16   
Observe that Nietzsche leaves open the possibility of humankind working to transfigure the 
fundamental contradiction that defines it.  I argue that this transfiguration takes place when an 
individual achieves self-realization through the satisfaction of his existential needs.  While we 
may not be able to nullify our defining contradiction, we may be able to harmonize the internal 
agonistic structure between instincts and consciousness.  “The future” that an individual is 
potentially “pregnant with” is a realized self: a genuine human being who learns to live 
excellently with both his instincts and his conscience.  Despite the first impression one might 
adopt upon reading the Genealogy’s second essay, then, conscience is not an entirely bad 
phenomenon.  The “bad conscience” should be contrasted with the intellectual conscience.  As 
Nietzsche says in the GS, the intellectual conscience is the reflective ability to question one’s 
conscience, which has a pre-history in one’s instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences and lack of 
experiences.17  It is the conscience behind one’s “conscience,” itself capable of providing a 
reasoned account of one’s pros and cons, one’s valuations and one’s moral judgments.  The 
                                                            
16 GM, Second Essay, Sec. 16. 
17 GS, Sec. 335.  For a fuller understanding of the intellectual conscience, see GS 2, 319, 357 and 
374. 
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intellectual conscience is an active faculty that involves self-examination, self-discovery and 
self-creation—a turn inward that makes possible a reflective and evaluative attitude toward 
oneself.  This type of conscience is supportive of the project of “becoming who you are” while 
the “bad conscience” frustrates the achieving of self-realization.     
Based on this existential view of humankind, Fromm elucidates a set of existential needs 
that are common to all human beings, and he refers to them as “existential” because they are 
rooted in the very conditions of human existence—incorporating our multiple levels of existence 
from the biological to the social.  The following is a modified version of Fromm’s list of human 
existential needs containing the psychic needs that are outlined by Fromm and the need that I 
have added to it (the addition is italicized): 
 
 
1. Need for a frame of orientation         
2. Need for devotion 
3. Need for rootedness           
4. Need for unity              Achieving of Self-Realization  
5. Need for effectiveness            
6. Need for excitation and stimulation18 
7. Need for a relation of self-love 
 
                                                            
18 Fromm, pp. 230-242.  In addition to their presence in his Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, 
the existential needs are also elucidated in Fromm’s The Sane Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1955, pp. 27-66. 
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This comprehensive set of human existential needs sets the stage for us to become actors in the 
social conditions in which we find ourselves.  As we will see, there is a potentially infinite set of 
drives that are extensions of one or more of the more primal existential needs.  For example, in 
his On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche identifies an “instinct to cruelty” and a “will to 
truth,” and it might be argued that these should also be included in the set of existential needs.  
However, the instinct to cruelty is an extension of the need for effectiveness in that cruelty is one 
particular kind of effectiveness amongst many kinds and also an extension of the need for 
excitation in that cruelty is one particular form of stimulation.19  Similarly, the will to truth is an 
extension of the need for a frame of orientation and the need for devotion in that truth is one 
object of devotion amongst others insofar as one can be myth-oriented as opposed to knowledge-
oriented.20  I mention these two drives, as opposed to the existential needs, because they would 
be the first to be misinterpreted as existential needs in the Nietzschean corpus.  Later in chapters 
three and four, I will unpack this set of needs in some detail and decipher whether Nietzsche 
himself would endorse such a list.  Partitioning out the needs into groups will prove helpful in 
understanding how they relate to each other and how they structure the larger project of 
potentially achieving self-realization—and thus constituting the will to power.   
 
 
                                                            
19 Nietzsche discusses the instinct to cruelty (or really drive to cruelty) in GM, Second Essay, 
Sec. 16, 17 and 18.  In these sections, Nietzsche also mentions an “instinct to freedom.”  
However, the instinct to freedom should not be considered to be one of the existential needs.  
The “instinct to freedom” is another name for the will to power, or in my language, for the 
achieving of self-realization. 
20 Nietzsche discusses the will to truth in the third essay of GM but especially in Sec. 24 and 27 
of that essay.   
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Assessing the Will to Power 
We can respond to the constellation of existential needs in multifarious ways.  A good 
starting point to begin thinking about how we ought to satisfy our existential needs are the two 
distinct ways that Fromm describes in which one can cognitively and affectively respond to 
one’s existential needs.  Fromm believes that two general patterns of response show themselves, 
and he refers to them as syndromes: (1) the life-furthering syndrome, a productive orientation 
consisting of love, solidarity, justice and reason and (2) the life-thwarting syndrome, a 
destructive orientation consisting of sadomasochism, greed and narcissism.   
We ought to be suspicious about the neatness of these two syndromes, however.  The 
character-rooted passions may not be so easily compartmentalized into one syndrome containing 
nothing but supposedly positive values and emotions and an opposing syndrome containing 
nothing but supposedly negative values and emotions.  Fromm claims that love, solidarity, 
justice and reason are interrelated and that they are all manifestations of the same productive 
orientation that he calls the life-furthering syndrome.  Additionally, he claims that 
sadomasochism, destructiveness, greed, narcissism and incestuousness belong to the opposing 
life-thwarting syndrome.21  It is questionable whether in fact there is such a unity between love, 
solidarity, justice and reason, or whether there is such a unity between sadomasochism, 
destructiveness, greed, narcissism and incestuousness.  A single human being’s psychological 
interior could be fragmented in such a way that would not allow a neat unity of virtues or 
conversely a neat unity of vices.  The same worry holds for a single human life stretched out 
over time.  Could there be spheres of a person’s life where dramatically different aspects of a 
single person manifest themselves, yet all still belong to the same person?  It is possible for a 
                                                            
21 Fromm, p. 254. 
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person to be masochistic in his morbidly dependent personal relations but to sincerely work to 
promote social justice in his public life.  It is also possible for a person to be greedy in his 
dealings in the business world, considering his competitors to be nothing more than just that—
business competitors—and yet to be a loving father to his children to whom he can devote 
himself fully.  A good fictional (and conceptually possible) example of a character who 
exemplifies both the life-furthering and life-thwarting syndromes in different dimensions of his 
life is Dexter, from the Showtime drama of the same name.  As a serial-killer who is obsessed 
with and compelled to kill and dismember murderers, Dexter expresses the life-thwarting 
syndrome: he despises the fact that he cannot change the tragic and horrific death of his mother 
(the origin of his rage towards his experience of the senselessness of suffering), and he becomes 
a slave to his vengefulness, which is never sublimated but only intensified with each kill.  On the 
other hand, as a husband and father, Dexter expresses the life-furthering syndrome in his 
commitment to being a moral exemplar for those whose lives he desires to enhance in a life-
affirming manner.  Even though the example is somewhat extreme, it’s extremity is instructive in 
exposing the plurality of roles that one can fill and the discord that can exist within an individual.   
As our inquiry into the nature of the will to power moves forward, it is worth including 
BGE 23 in our analysis because it refigures the doctrine of the will to power as a psychological 
doctrine, in that it exists within the particular lived circumstances of human existence.  It is 
neither laden with metaphysical nor moral presuppositions.  The “development of the doctrine of 
the will to power” is performed under the rubric of psychology, “the queen of the sciences.”  
Nietzsche stresses that we should not look away from a truth because it is hard to swallow.  The 
main theme of this section is that good (physio-) psychology should not allow the moral 
prejudices to distort our picture of human needs and emotions.  We are conditioned to think of 
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our drives as “good” or “bad”, but we must look past such moral prejudices to see that our drives 
(and needs) are not good or bad in themselves.  The entities that can be “good” or “bad” at most 
are the complex affective and cognitive responses to our existential needs, and these needs 
condition the possible responses that do or do not result.  Nietzsche again attacks the faith in 
opposites in this passage:  
A proper physio-psychology has to contend with unconscious resistance in the heart of 
the investigator, it has “the heart” against it: even a doctrine of the reciprocal dependence 
of the “good” and the “wicked” drives, causes (as refined immorality) distress and 
aversion in a still hale and hearty conscience—still more so, a doctrine of the derivation 
of all good impulses from wicked ones.22 
Nietzsche gives a robust description of his account of the will to power in BGE 259, one 
that supports viewing the will to power as the potential achieving of self-realization, which is a 
psychological and existential process underlying organic human life.  Warning his reader to be 
receptive to “the bottom of the matter” even though our “heart” may experience a sentimental 
weakness in pondering what must be considered, Nietzsche says: 
…life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and 
weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, 
at its mildest, exploitation—but why should one use those words in which a slanderous 
intent has been imprinted for ages?23 
Here the will to power is depicted in terms of growth and development even if such growth and 
development is sometimes (but not always) at the expense of others.  Notice also that the terms 
in which he conveys the will to power are terms that already have a certain morally negative 
connotation and “slanderous intent” associated with them.  Something’s being difficult to accept 
about the nature of a thing is not an argument against it though, especially when that alleged 
                                                            
22 BGE, Sec. 23.   
23 BGE, Sec. 259. 
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argument is based on preformed moral prejudices.  Nietzsche further explains that for any 
individual: 
…it will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, 
become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and 
because life simply is will to power.24 
Here we again notice that the will to power is not moral in nature, but more importantly that it is 
not immoral in nature.  The process of striving to continually achieve a self that is more 
harmonized and realized is part and parcel of the 'who-we-are' of the human condition.  It is 
interesting that Nietzsche uses and reuses the word “exploitation” to describe one of the possible 
consequences of the essence of the will to power.  To exploit something or someone is to use 
them for one’s own growth and improvement, yet according to Nietzsche exploitation is not an 
immoral phenomenon:   
“Exploitation” does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs 
to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to 
power, which is after all the will of life. 
Another possible consequence of the essence of life is benevolence, or improving the condition 
of another out of love for her own sake.  Such a consequence would also assist in the process of 
self-realization. 
 
Manifestations of Power 
The section entitled “On the doctrine of the feeling of power” in The Gay Science is the 
first place in Nietzsche’s body of work where he explicitly frames the feeling of power as a 
doctrine.  Here he refers only to “power” and to “the feeling of power” and not to the more 
                                                            
24 BGE, Sec. 259. 
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specific “will to power,” but the exercise of one’s power is characterized as if it is an attempt to 
satisfy certain human existential needs.  As Nietzsche indicates, the preservation of our feeling of 
power (and of power itself) has a certain prefiguring priority over any moral phenomena or 
moral interpretations in that benefiting others or harming others are simply ways of exercising 
one’s power upon others.25  One feature to notice is that the desire for power is more basic than 
the moral phenomena of benevolence or malevolence.  The concept operates on the plane of 
human existence and of the existential conditions determining what we need to potentially 
progress as human beings and not on a moral register.  A second feature is that Nietzsche’s 
discussion of power is essentially involved with an individual’s relation to others and how we 
experience such relations to others.  There is a close relationship between how we view ourselves 
and how we view our relation to others.  A third feature of the doctrine as presented here is the 
idea that hurting others is a sign that we are still lacking power; hurting others reveals a sense of 
frustration in the face of this poverty.26  Harming others is rooted in a lack of power in the 
individual who acts destructively or thwarts the lives of others.  This may initially appear to be 
counterintuitive, yet if this is not the case, then Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler and Kim Jong Il 
would exemplify the highest forms of the will to power, having near completely realized selves.  
To further problematize the situation: if ability to dominate and control others is in fact the best 
way of achieving self-realization, then some of the most villainous characters from literature and 
film would also have to be Nietzsche’s exemplars of having the highest will to power. 
                                                            
25 GS, Sec. 13. 
26 Bertrand Russell radically misinterprets Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power along with 
most of Nietzsche’s themes.  He views the will to power as a feature of Nietzsche’s Übermensch 
expressed in the capacity to be mercilessly cruel to all weaker human beings.  See his chapter 
entitled “Nietzsche,” in his History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945, 
p. 766. 
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   How are we justified in viewing the domination and control of others—as the opposite of 
or as a failure to realize one’s will to power?  There are two phenomena that illuminate this 
claim: 1) an individual’s attitude toward revenge and mercy and 2) an individual’s attitude 
toward fate.  In terms of the first phenomenon, it is important to recognize that an act of revenge 
is motivated by the inability to erase the harms/wrongs done to an individual in his past.  He 
feels powerless to change his status as a victim or as one made to feel inferior, the fact that he 
suffered a trauma or harm as part of his history.  Furthermore, because of this past impotence and 
helplessness, he refuses to accept that part of his fate that he cannot possibly undo.  These 
internal schisms—between a person and his history and between that person and his unrelenting 
attempts to “equalize” his own past sufferings with the future suffering of others—seem to be the 
crux of the spiritual weakness underlying such an individual’s ability to undo that which is 
necessary, i.e. his own past.  Nietzsche draws an analogy between the individual and the 
community to contrast the revenge against fate that is made external when one harms others, and 
the transfiguration of that attitude into one of love and/or forgiveness (The idea warrants being 
quoted at length.):   
As its power increases, a community ceases to take the individual’s transgressions so 
seriously, because they can no longer be considered as dangerous and destructive to the 
whole as they were formerly…As the power and self-confidence of a community 
increase, the penal law always becomes more moderate; every weakening or imperiling 
of [the power and self-confidence of a community] brings with it a restoration of the 
harsher forms of [the penal law]…It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a  
consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it—letting 
those who harm it go unpunished.  “What are my parasites to me?” it might say.  “May 
they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!”…This self-overcoming of justice: 
one knows the beautiful name it has given itself—mercy; it goes without saying that 
mercy remains the privilege of the most powerful man, or better, his—beyond the law.27 
                                                            
27 GM, Second Essay, Sec. 10. 
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Here, the idea is that as a community develops and re-interprets its relationship to the past 
“crimes” done against it, the community can come to “discharge” the deeds of the criminal, 
relieving the resentful attitude it holds towards the past wrongs.  Like the community, the 
individual’s ability to endure its sufferings without seeking compensation for them becomes the 
“measure of his wealth.”  So, contrary to the view that domination and control of others is a sign 
of power, for Nietzsche it is in fact a sign of weakness that is grounded in odium fati.  The 
individual who increases his power and approaches the creation of a self operates on a new 
“principle”: he sublimates his odium fati into his amor fati.28  The growing wealth of the 
community parallels the growing wealth of the powerful individual.  Justice, understood as the 
discharging of every crime by punishment, overcomes itself and transforms into a higher, more 
enriched form of justice—justice as mercy [Gnade]: the active liberation of oneself from the 
imprisoning idea that all debts must be paid back or else every debtor must be punished!29 
When discussing how the sadist seeks power over others as the more barbaric form of 
domination and control, Fromm expresses a line of thinking that is not very different from the 
presentation of the will to power in the Genealogy.  Of the sadistic character-type, Fromm states: 
“He is sadistic because he feels impotent, unalive, and powerless.  He tries to compensate for this 
                                                            
28 The idea of amor fati is introduced in GS, Sec. 276.  The phenomena of revenge against one’s 
past and revenge against particular others are discussed in TSZ, Book II, “On the Tarantulas,” in 
which Nietzsche suggests that the overman will have delivered himself from  revenge.  This 
notion of the overman as overcoming revenge is connected to theme of amor fati in The Gay 
Science and the theme of power as mercy in the Genealogy.  For an alternative account of the 
will to power as a metaphysical phenomenon, see Martin Heidegger’s “Who is Zarathustra?”   
29 If we understand amor fati as a condition for the possibility of creating values and of creating 
meaning for oneself and odium fati as the condition that prohibits one from doing so, then a good 
example of this difference is shown by the two main characters from The Matrix trilogy: Neo and 
Agent Smith.  Neo adopts the attitude of amor fati that allows him to “see as beautiful what is 
necessary in things” and thereby some possibility of “choice” within necessity.  Agent Smith 
possesses the attitude of odium fati in which he only feels pure animosity toward the necessity of 
his past and in which he is thereby prevented from any possibility of choice.   
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lack by having power over others, by transforming the worm he feels himself to be into a god.  
But even the sadist who has power suffers from his human impotence.”30  Both Fromm and 
Nietzsche recognize the contradictory nature of the individual who acts on a will to power in a 
life-thwarting manner, yet which gives rise to apparent power as opposed to a will to power.   
 
The Self-Command of the Wise 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra provides a substantive look into the nature of the will to power as 
a potential achieving of self-realization in the section of TSZ entitled “On Self-Overcoming.”  
The section is addressed to “you who are wisest,” and Zarathustra says to the wisest that it is 
their whole will that is the will to power.  This might imply several things: that those who are 
unwise do not possess the will to power as their whole will; that the unwise do not recognize that 
the will to power is the will of life; or that those who are wise know that the will to power is the 
very heart of life but that they do not act out of and from the will to power.  Zarathustra’s three 
points regarding commanding and obeying may illuminate which implications we should accept.  
Those who are unwise are “the people”—the herd; the ignorant; those who have chosen to follow 
their conscience without identifying themselves with their intellectual conscience.  What does it 
mean that the unwise do not possess the will to power as their whole will?  I take it to mean that 
they are capable of obeying but not capable of commanding.  If one has the capacity to command 
oneself, then one has the capacity to command oneself to do something or to perform some 
action.  I am assuming that commanding and acting are closely intertwined such that it would not 
make sense to think of someone who would have the ability to command (herself or others) but 
                                                            
30 Fromm, Erich. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1973, p. 292. 
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not be able to act and place herself within the action.  Thus, the unwise are too impotent for 
genuine action.  The second implication also seems to be the case: not only are the unwise 
incapable of a full realization of their will to power but they also are not cognizant that the very 
heart of life is the will to power.  The third implication seems to be the most curious because in it 
we draw a contrast between wisdom and action.  Does the increase of wisdom inhibit genuine 
action?  Does genuine action preclude the possession of wisdom?  Neither of these seems to be 
true.  A certain amount of practical wisdom is needed in order to act well and to do so 
successfully: knowing when to act, with whom to act, how to act, and for what causes to act.  
Having the ability to command oneself, and thus to place oneself in one’s deed, is what is 
required for one to achieve self-realization in and through a deed.  When one takes one’s piece of 
wisdom, “that the heart of life is the will to power,” and places that wisdom and oneself in one’s 
action, then one has “overcome” one’s self, by bringing a self into reality and bringing that self 
out of one ’s mere wisdom.  Think of the way that an artist brings her idea out of her mind and 
realizes it on a canvas.  Thus, progress is made in achieving a more fully realized and more fully 
overcome self.  Interpreting self-overcoming as self-realization seems to be the most intelligible 
and coherent way of explicating the notion.31 
                                                            
31 It is not enough for Zarathustra’s disciples to be “believers” in Zarathustra.  As developmental 
learners of virtue, his disciples start out “believing” in Zarathustra, as those who imitate an 
exemplar without understanding why he acts in the ways that he does.  Nevertheless, it is not 
enough for his disciples to be mere “believers” in Zarathustra.  The disciples must first seek out 
and find themselves as a precondition of making any particular virtue “their own.”  Similarly, 
once one has realized a self and internalized an understanding of a particular kind of exemplarity, 
then and only then will the exemplar “return to you.”  See TSZ, “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” 
Sec. 3.   
29 
 
 There is one peculiar passage in “On Self-Overcoming” that further characterizes the 
nature of the will to power, yet this alleged definition of the will to power can be easily 
misinterpreted.  Life itself appears to provide its definitive stance on the will to power:  
Rather would I perish than forswear this; and verily, where there is perishing and a falling 
of leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself—for power.  That I must be struggle and a 
becoming and an end and an opposition to ends—alas, whoever guesses what is my will 
should also guess on what crooked paths it must proceed.32 
Bernard Reginster uses this as a definitive passage for his account of the will to power.  He 
argues, “Since the will to power is not simply a will to resistance [Widerstand] either, or the 
desire for a condition in which some striving is perpetually frustrated by resistance or obstacles 
to its fulfillment (there would be no ‘expansion, incorporation, growth’ unless the striving were 
eventually successful), we must conclude that the will to power is a will to the very activity of 
overcoming resistance.”33  Nevertheless, the will to power is not merely the activity of 
overcoming resistance as he claims it is.  Even though the will to power possesses the quality of 
insatiability, there is yet a directedness to its movement.  Reginster’s use of “resistance” is 
somewhat on track, but it is too vague to fully characterize Nietzsche’s doctrine.  What kind of 
resistance should an individual overcome?  There can be and often is resistance against the 
satisfaction of our existential needs, yet the needs do coalesce and aim at a kind of goal—that of 
self-realization.  If the will to power were equivalent to the activity of overcoming resistance, 
then one could be overcoming various forms of resistance but those instances of resistance could 
be completely unconnected.  In such a case there would be no unification of the diverse 
                                                            
32 TSZ, “On Self-Overcoming,” p.227. 
33 Reginster, Bernard. “The Will to Power and the Ethics of Creativity,” Nietzsche and Morality. 
Eds. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.36. 
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occasions of overcoming resistance, leaving out the importance of unity and failing to 
acknowledge the actual essence of the will to power, which is the realization of a self. 
 
Beauty: The Fundamental Norm 
The discussion above allows us to develop a more complex understanding of the norm 
operative in assessing manifestations of the will to power than Fromm’s simplistic understanding 
of ‘life-affirming’ and ‘life-denying’ assessments.  How should an individual satisfy his 
existential needs?  Is there a norm of satisfaction that guides one toward the goal a realizing a 
self?  The concept that plays this role in Nietzsche’s thought is beauty.  It is beauty that captures 
all of the dimensions of flourishing that we touched on in the preceding discussions.   
The norm of beauty addresses the complex and unsystematic dynamic between the 
existential needs and our responses to them.  First of all, the norm of beauty does not correlate 
with what is traditionally thought of as good.  We may have to rid ourselves of standard 
conceptions of “good” and “evil” and replace them with the more appropriate “beautiful” and 
“shameful”, two norms that might be considered opposites, but that both lie within the human 
world of experience.  Nietzsche presents this idea early on in the fifth book of Daybreak:  
As we go about in nature, with joy and cunning, bent on discovering and as it were 
catching in the act the beauty proper to everything; as we try to see how that piece of 
coastline, with its rocks, inlets, olive trees and pines, attains to its perfection and mastery 
whether in the sunshine, or when the sky is stormy, or when twilight has almost gone: so 
we ought to go about among men, viewing and discovering them, showing them their 
good and evil, so that they shall behold their own proper beauty which unfolds itself in 
one case in the sunlight, in another amid storms, and in a third only when night is falling 
and the sky is full of rain.  Is it then forbidden to enjoy the evil man as a wild landscape 
possessing its own bold lineaments and effects of light, if the same man appears to our 
eyes as a sketch and caricature and, as a blot in nature, causes us pain, when he poses as 
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good and law-abiding?—Yes, it is forbidden: hitherto we have been permitted to seek 
beauty only in the morally good—a fact which sufficiently accounts for our having found 
so little of it and having had to seek about for imaginary beauties without backbone!—As 
surely as the wicked enjoy a hundred kinds of happiness of which the virtuous have no 
inkling, so too they possess a hundred kinds of beauty: and many of them have not yet 
been discovered.34 
We discover an individual’s beauty “in the sunlight” or “amid storms” or “only when the night is 
falling.”  There is a vast range of different human beings that have the ability to exemplify 
beauty, and we ought not to seek such beauty only in the morally good.  Since we should be 
looking for “beauties with backbone,” it may very well be the case that the kind of beauty that 
should guide our satisfaction of existential needs will be associated with courage and 
fearlessness of some sort.  Even though we ought to look to individuals other than “the morally 
good” for this new standard of action, we also should not think that we are to only find this 
standard instantiated in “the evil.”  We should conceive of Nietzsche’s standard in the following 
terms: the existential needs should be satisfied not merely for their own sake but for the sake of 
the beautiful, and they ought not to be satisfied in a shameful way.   
In order to better understand what it means to act for the sake of the beautiful, we should 
try to get a handle on what kind of shameful existence people can occupy in modernity.  
Nietzsche uses the metaphor of nakedness to indicate how we tend to view ourselves as 
existential creatures stripped of our moral clothing.  We dress ourselves up with the notions of 
“duty, virtue, sense of community, honorableness, self-denial”—and yet the reason why we 
fashion ourselves in such a way is not to hide “human malice and villainy.”  The reason why we 
wear moral costumes is our sickness.  Nietzsche says that “it is precisely as tame animals that we 
are a shameful sight and in need of the moral disguise, that the ‘inner man’ in Europe is not by a 
                                                            
34 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. Trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Sec. 468. 
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long shot bad enough to show himself without shame (or to be beautiful).”35  Thus, our shame 
has its basis in a kind of psychological sickness—a sickness of “profound mediocrity, timidity 
and boredom with itself.”  One who is too weak to have a real effect on anything or who is too 
much a coward to begin the activity of self-realization experiences himself as impotent and 
naked, which causes him to adorn himself with the moral decorations of self-sacrifice and 
neighborly-love, for this is all that he is capable of.  This kind of other-oriented attitude that 
stems from a shameful weakness is precisely the kind of so-called “compassion” that Nietzsche 
rightfully derides.  Observe also that Nietzsche intimates that part of the reason for being “a 
shameful sight” is that “[the ‘inner man’] is almost an abortion, scarce half made up, weak, 
awkward.”36  The image of one being an abortion signifies the following: incompleteness, 
destruction before wholeness, lack of full development, premature resignation.  Similarly, the 
picture of being “half made up” conveys fragmentation and being unfinished work-in-progress.  
It is therefore reasonable to identify the primary source of shame as failing to realize a whole 
self—evident, for example, in the person who acts on cruelty rather than mercy. 
 With careful eyes and digging tools, we can unearth further evidence of the connection 
between beauty and selfhood in the section entitled “On Those Who Are Sublime” in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra.  Who are those who are sublime?  The sublime represent a type of people who are 
“ascetics of the spirit” and who have the capacity to make judgments—for we internally possess 
weights and scales and are inherently “weighers”—and to act on their judgments, yet who have 
withdrawn from transforming themselves into graceful beings.  Perhaps only those who have 
                                                            
35 GS, Sec. 352. 
36 GS, Sec. 352.  The “inner man” is used in a pejorative sense here and is not the same as the 
“higher self” that is sought and whose identification with is praised in “Schopenhauer as 
Educator” and HAH Sec. ???. 
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strong wills and the potential to be even stronger wills can embody the kind of gracefulness that 
Nietzsche closely associates with the great-souled person.  The beautiful serves as a telos for one 
for whom it is possible to achieve self-realization, a figure whom I believe takes on various 
labels for Nietzsche: the strong will; the great-souled person; the hero; the sublime one.  The 
core passage in this section is the following: 
To stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed will: that is most difficult for all of you 
who are sublime.  When power becomes gracious and descends into the visible—such 
descent I call beauty.  And there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from 
you who are powerful: let your kindness be your final self-conquest.  Of all evil I deem 
you capable: therefore I want the good from you.  Verily, I have often laughed at the 
weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws.37 
Such an account of what characterizes ‘beauty’ clearly echoes our earlier discussion of power in 
terms of the transition from cruelty to justice to mercy.  Thus ‘beauty’ refers to a particular 
manner in which power manifests itself.  Possessing the ability to “stand with relaxed muscles” 
but yet to stand with an “unharnessed will” is an apt description of one who has self-mastery and 
the discipline to harness one’s will in a purposive way.  Power only becomes beautiful when it 
transforms into graciousness and “descends” into concrete actuality (i.e. becomes “visible”).  
Kindness performed from the motive of over-flowing power serves as the pinnacle of beautiful 
action, or action done for the sake of the beautiful.  It’s interesting that perhaps only those who 
are capable of great evil are capable of sublimating such coarse acts into actions which are fine 
and beautiful.  The final sentence about “the weaklings” exhibits the same sense of shame that is 
present in the earlier discussion of GS 352, in that such weak wills are likely to be the ones who 
must mask their impotence with “moral” disguises.   
                                                            
37 TSZ, “On Those Who Are Sublime,” p. 230. 
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 Taking what we have gleaned from Zarathustra and The Gay Science, we discover a dual 
sense in which beauty serves as the normative standard for the Nietzschean project of satisfying 
one’s existential needs in order to achieve self-realization: an action’s virtue lies in its being 
done for the sake of the beautiful and a self becomes more fully realized as it makes itself a 
beautiful human being.  Both senses are present in Nietzsche’s thought and both senses of beauty 
bear a strong resemblance to the ancient Greek idea of to kalon that we find in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics.  As Aristotle says, we should start to understand the relation between 
beauty and excellence by first looking at particulars and then work our way toward the general 
conception of excellent actions as done for the sake of the beautiful.38  In Book III of the NE, 
Aristotle says that there are many things of which we are afraid—e.g., loss of reputation, 
poverty, disease, loss of friends, death, etc.—but that death is the most frightening thing to most 
people.  However, he suggests that the virtuous person is more afraid of shame and disgrace than 
dying a beautiful death, and that such a person has developed the kind of ethical perception to 
decipher what is genuinely to be feared and what not: 
…[the courageous person] will endure [frightening things] in the way one ought and 
keeping them in proportion, for the sake of the beautiful, since this is the end that belongs 
to virtue….So one who endures or fears what one ought, for the reason one ought, as one 
ought, when one ought, and is confident in similar ways, is courageous, since the 
                                                            
38 The difficulty of determining what the beautiful itself is was recognized by Aristotle’s teacher, 
Plato.  However, in the Greater Hippias, Socrates seems to provide clues as to what kind of thing 
we should be interested in when inquiring into the nature of beauty.  At 294d Socrates asks 
Hippias whether everything beautiful—“ customs and activities”—both are thought to be 
beautiful and are seen to be that way.  Putting aside the distinction between reality and 
appearance, it’s interesting that Socrates chooses customs and activities, rather than certain 
objects.  And at 298b Socrates questions whether the beautiful is what is pleasant through 
hearing and sight, but again the kinds of beautiful things that he wonders about are “activities 
and laws.”  Such a read may support the link found in Aristotle between virtue as an active 
condition and beauty.    
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courageous person undergoes things and acts in accordance with what is worthy and in a 
way that is proportionate.39 
A person who exemplifies courage has the ability to recognize those things that are worth 
defending or are worth achieving, and he has the ability to endure the frightening things that 
threaten that which has true worth.  Throughout his remarks on courage, Aristotle continuously 
contrasts a courageous activity as a beautiful thing with a cowardly activity as a shameful thing.  
Beauty thus serves as the determining feature of what is excellent, and shame serves as the 
determining feature of what is base.  The norm of beauty and its counterweight shame are not 
diametrically opposed poles.  Courage is an active condition that, when it done from the right 
motivation, will be performed for the sake of the beautiful, and one will situate oneself 
appropriately toward the emotions of fear and confidence.  Similarly, acting under the norm of 
beauty will then constitute the Nietzschean becoming of a person’s higher self.40   
We might wonder what the source is of norms of beauty and shame.  Richard Schacht 
claims that for Nietzsche the “Ur-source” of normativity is “the indisputably real historically 
engendered, culturally configured and socially encoded macro- and micro-forms of human life or 
broader and narrower Lebenssphären, (‘spheres of life’)…in which our human reality expresses 
and develops itself.”41  While Schacht speaks about normativity in general arising out of our 
                                                            
39 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Joe Sachs. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002, 
1115b11-1115b20. 
40 The notions of “the beautiful” [to kalon] and “what is shameful” [aischros] play a significant 
role in the discussions of courage   [1116a12; 1116a28; 1117a16; and 1117b9]; temperance 
[1119a19; 1119b16; generosity [1120a13; 1120a10; 1120a30; 1121a2; 1121b4; 1122a]; 
magnificence [1122b7; 1123a8; 1123a25]; greatness of soul [1123b20; 1124a4; 1125a27]; honor 
[1125b11]; “judgment in social relations”[1126b29; 1127a5]; and friendship [1155a15; 1155a30; 
1168a10; 1168a8; 1168a35; 1168b30; 1169a8; 1169a3; 1169a25; 1169b11; 1171a6]. 
41 Schacht, Richard. “Nietzschean Normativity,” in Nietzsche’s Postmoralism: Essays on 
Nietzsche’s Prelude to Philosophy’s Future. Ed. Richard Schacht. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 159. 
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forms of life, I believe the same can be said about the more specific norms of satisfaction of 
beauty and shame.  Their existence and reality qua norms goes no further than human existence 
and human reality.  Conceiving of normativity in this way creates a space in which Nietzschean 
norms can hold some degree of relativity between socio-culturally differentiated forms of life yet 
possess a kind of universal “what-it-is” that is shared by those varied instantiations.42 
 According to Aristotle, the norms of beauty and shame play a role in determining when a 
person exemplifies the active conditions of temperance, generosity, magnificence, greatness of 
soul, the nameless mean condition concerning honor, truthfulness [alētheia] about oneself, and 
friendship.  Concerning temperance, the virtuous person’s desires must be in harmony with his 
reason, “for the aim to which both look is beautiful.”43  With regard to generosity, Aristotle 
associates beauty with the activity of giving and says that “it is more characteristic of virtue to 
act well than to be acted upon well, and to do beautiful things rather than not do shameful ones, 
and it is not unclear that acting well and doing beautiful things go with giving, while being acted 
upon well or not doing what is shameful goes with getting.”44  This account of generosity 
resembles my account of the overflowing power of genuine self-realization, in which one desires 
to give out of an abundance of stored-up spiritual health.  Additionally, this account of 
generosity also resembles Nietzsche’s account of the gift-giving virtue.  Zarathustra says that the 
highest virtue is uncommon and useless and that it is gleaming and gentle in its splendor: “a gift-
giving virtue is the highest virtue.”  However, the work of art is more the generous person 
himself rather than what is given.  Thus, the gift-giver is selfish, but his selfishness “flows back 
                                                            
42 Schacht appropriates Wittgenstein’s “language games” to describe these “forms of life” and in 
a Nietzschean tone calls them “value games.”  I would take it a step further and refer to the kind 
of normativity that Nietzsche espouses as “aesthetic games” or “aesthetic-ethic games.” 
43 Aristotle. NE. 1119b15. 
44 Aristotle. NE. 1120a13. 
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out of [his] well as the gifts of [his] love.”45  Similarly with magnificence, Aristotle says that the 
work that is valued most is one that is great and beautiful and that the excellence of a work is in 
its grandeur.  The kinds of things that a magnificent person concerns himself with are on things 
shared in common, and “his gifts have some likeness to offerings devoted to the gods.”46  So the 
work of art which the magnificent/generous person creates for others will celebrate or honor that 
to which a community devotes itself: festivals, music, temples—or even a warship, which 
indicates that even justice may be something toward which an individual can devote himself.47   
Thus we must recognize that beautiful actions require the presence of others in most 
situations, and they do not merely require the presence of just any others but of others with 
whom the person of virtue shares his life in a graceful way.  The excellence lies in the giving and 
not the receiving, and the relation of artist to work of art is used by Aristotle to illustrate this: the 
parent as artist of her child and the poet as artist of his poem.48  However, some of these virtues 
are self-oriented, such as megalopsuchia and sôphrosunê.  Both Aristotle and Nietzsche realize 
that the virtuous person ought to strike a healthy balance between one’s attitude toward oneself 
and one’s attitude toward others, yet according to Nietzsche, giving style to one’s character 
seems to have a certain priority over one’s relations with others.  If done in an authentically 
virtuous manner, one will create oneself according to one’s own artistic plan.  This artistic plan 
involves a certain level of constraint and balance—knowing when to engage in playfulness but 
with a graceful spirit.  This mixture of gracefulness and playfulness ought to foreground a kind 
of self-legislation, a form of legislating that both Aristotle and Nietzsche advocate.  In one of his 
                                                            
45 TSZ, “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” Sec. 1, pp. 186-187. 
46 Aristotle. NE. 1123a5. 
47 This is contrary to what one might think of justice, as it is represented in the NE, for there is 
not a single mention of beauty or the beautiful in Book V on justice.   
48 Aristotle. NE. 1120b14. 
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concluding thoughts on how to associate with others, Aristotle states that “someone with a 
gracious and generous spirit will hold himself to such limits, being like a law to himself.”49  And 
similarly, Nietzsche partially explicates the thought of “giving style to one’s character” in saying 
that it will be the strong and domineering natures that will “enjoy their finest gaiety in such 
constraint and perfection under a law of their own.”50 
 One may object to such a comparison of Nietzsche with Aristotle and claim, for example, 
that the Aristotelian account of the rational nature of the virtues is incompatible with the 
Nietzschean irrationalism.  Alisdair MacIntyre claims that the power of Nietzsche’s position 
depends upon the truth of one central thesis: “that all rational vindications of morality manifestly 
fail and that therefore belief in the tenets of morality needs to be explained in terms of a set of 
rationalizations which conceal the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will.”51  This 
claim is mistaken.  Nietzsche does not completely abandon the value of reason as a constitutive 
element in living well.  Think of his notion of intellectual conscience discussed in the GS, or his 
praise of science and truthfulness in HAH.52  MacIntyre argues that Aristotle’s ethics and politics 
would have to rank with all those “degenerate disguises” of the will to power, yet it is not clear 
that this is actually the case.53  Firstly, according to Aristotle, the person who becomes virtuous 
(and thus possibly flourishes) undergoes an internal harmonization between the desiring part of 
the soul and the rational part, where “the aim to which both look is the beautiful.”54  This 
harmonization is not completely unlike the Nietzschean harmonization of opposing drives.  
                                                            
49 Aristotle. NE. 1128a32. 
50 GS, Sec. 290. 
51 MacIntyre, Alisdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984, p. 117. 
52 HAH, Sec. 237. 
53 MacIntyre, p. 117. 
54 Aristotle. NE. 1119b15. 
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Furthermore, choice is described by Aristotle as “either intellect fused with desire [dianoetic 
orexis] or desire fused with thinking [orektik nous], and such a source is a human being.”55  
Aristotle recognizes the opposition between desire and reason, and he sees the synthesis (or 
fusion) of such opposing parts of the soul as something to be accomplished by the virtuous 
person who strives to flourish.  What character type exists as such a unitary source of action 
whereby mind and desire are synthesized?—the lover of wisdom, the genuine philosopher.56  
And finally, both Aristotle and Nietzsche have a similar understanding that the end of a genuine 
ethical life is not merely contemplating the good: “Or, as has been said, is the end in matters of 
action not contemplating and knowing each of them but rather doing them?  Then it is not 
sufficient to know about virtue, but one must try to have it and use it, unless there is some other 
way that we become good.”57  It is not entirely clear whether Aristotle holds the purely 
contemplative life or a synthesized existence of contemplation and action to be the best kind of 
human life.  However, the former option of the contemplative life, which is only significantly 
discussed in chapters six through eight of Book X, is somewhat of an anomaly in the larger 
context of Aristotle’s ethic of virtue: in which the end is energeia [being-at-work].  The latter 
option of contemplation-fused-with-action gains support from the conclusive remarks at the end 
of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in Book IX, where human flourishing seems to be 
impossible without the presence of others.  The last three steps of that argument reach what 
seems to be a climactic conclusion about the conditions to be a eudaimon:  
So if being is choiceworthy in itself to a blessed person, since it is good and pleasant by 
nature, and that of one’s friend is very nearly the same, then a friend would also be 
                                                            
55 Aristotle. NE. 1139b5. 
56 Burger, Ronna. Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2008, p. 115. 
57 Aristotle. NE. 1179b. 
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something choiceworthy.  But that which is choiceworthy for him ought to be present to 
him, or he will be deficient in that respect.  Therefore, for someone who is going to be 
happy, there will be a need for friends of serious worth.58   
This strong connection between friendship and eudaimonia will be further examined later in this 
project when the relationship between realized selfhood, i.e. the will to power, and friendship is 
explored.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
58 Aristotle. NE. 1170b15. 
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Chapter Three 
 In this chapter we will analyze each of the seven existential needs whose satisfaction 
under the norm of beauty serves as the foundation for achieving self-realization, which is itself 
the exemplification of the will to power.  The first grouping of needs consists of the need for 
rootedness, the need for effectiveness and the need for stimulation.  The second grouping of 
needs consists of the need for a frame of orientation, the need for devotion and the need for 
unity.  My investigation of what kind of a need for unity arises from the human conflict between 
instincts and consciousness will be more thorough because it holds a considerably elevated status 
amongst the other needs.  The special kind of unity sought for—genuinely realized selfhood—
will be further explicated through an examination of how the process of sublimation handles the 
vast array of drives, which are extensions of the existential needs.  The chapter will conclude 
with an inquiry into the need for a relation of self-love and how self-love differs from self-
contempt and self-dissatisfaction.    
The Existential Needs for Rootedness, Effectiveness and Excitation/Stimulation   
 Three of the existential needs—rootedness, effectiveness and stimulation—illustrate how 
existence cannot be tolerated without an individual having a real effect on others in the world 
and without being “stimulated” by others in that world.  This group deals with the individual’s 
relatedness to the natural and the human worlds; these existential needs concern the inevitable 
separation from nature that occurs in infancy, and the problem of recouping the intimacy of the 
mother-child symbiosis.  Fromm claims that the source of the existential need for rootedness is 
the departure of the infant from his mother’s womb, “the situation in which he was still part of 
nature,” but unable to return to the security and protection of his mother’s womb, each individual 
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becomes aware of his separateness and needs to establish new ties with others.59  So this problem 
of separateness from nature and from others substantiates the need for rootedness.  In terms of 
drives, the separated individual has an intense drive for a new emotional condition of security 
and protection.  What would Nietzsche’s attitude be toward the need for rootedness?  Would he 
be an advocate of the existence of our desire for strong affective ties?  The manner in which we 
are speaking of rootedness mostly appears to be a drive to be cognitively and affectively planted 
in some social structure that provides some sense of security and protection.  It appears to be the 
feeling of separateness and isolation that we want to be secured against and protected from.  This 
need makes sense, yet this kind of rootedness, whether it is being rooted in a career, a family, a 
city, a religious group or a political organization, does promote the tendency to achieve the kind 
of happiness that Nietzsche negatively criticizes: the happiness of comfortableness, passivity and 
resignation.  Nietzsche would not endorse the satisfaction of the need of rootedness if it were 
responded to under the assumption that happiness and unhappiness—unhappiness as a complete 
absence of conflict and suffering—are opposites and that being rooted suffices for human 
flourishing.  In a bold condemnation of such a conception of happiness, Nietzsche states: 
If you, who adhere to this religion [of pity], have the same attitude toward yourselves that 
you have toward fellow men; if you refuse to let your own suffering lie upon you even 
for an hour and if you constantly try to prevent and forestall all possible distress way 
ahead of time; if you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of 
annihilation, and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity 
you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of 
pity: the religion of comfortableness.  How little you know of human happiness, you 
comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even 
twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together.60 
                                                            
59 Fromm, pp. 232-233. 
60 GS, Sec. 338. 
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It may be the case that a certain kind of “uprootedness” is necessary for the new happiness 
Nietzsche advocates.61  When one dislodges oneself from the security and protection of what is 
familiar—the existing customs and conventions of one’s local culture—one thereby opens 
oneself up to the possibility of intellectual conflict through exposure to new perspectives.  This 
often untraveled mode of living would further make possible the questioning of old values, their 
potential destruction and the occasion to create new values.  Nietzsche illumines this new mode 
of living in the following passage where he describes the preparatory courageous human beings 
that are capable of the new happiness: 
For believe me: the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the 
greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously!  Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!  
Send your ships into uncharted seas!  Live at war with your peers and yourselves!62 
Thus, we should be somewhat wary of the extent to which and the manner in which the 
existential need for rootedness plays a constitutive role in the more comprehensive need of 
achieving self-realization.  We ought to not entirely reject the need for rootedness, since one 
condition for the possibility of a constructively agonistic existence is the possession of peers (and 
by possession I mean “active engagement with”).  We should not just be at war with ourselves 
but spiritually at war with others as well.  There is usually a sense of community within which a 
free spirit embarks to find new “truths” on the sea of existence:  
                                                            
61 The idea and specific term of “uprootedness” was brought to light by a helpful conversation 
with Nicholas Barber. 
62 GS, Sec. 283.  The entire aphorism is one of Nietzsche’s best expressions of what kind of a 
person can possibly achieve the new happiness: a condition that depends upon the contestation of 
ideas (and perspectives) between the preparatory human being and others and one that depends 
on the contestation of ideas (and perspectives) within that individual himself.  This middle work 
is ripe with the theme of distinguishing a new happiness from the traditional conception of 
happiness (as complete freedom from pain and suffering and as the maximization of pleasure and 
restful tranquility).  The related notion of a “new justice” is also introduced in 289.  See also GS 
45, 56, 289, 301, 302, 318, 337, and 343. 
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At long last the horizon appears free to [we philosophers and “free spirits”] again, even if 
it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face 
any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, 
lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an “open sea.”—63 
In addition to the community-oriented tone of this passage, there is an emphasis on what the 
consequences might be from the death of God for “ourselves.”  Perhaps the destruction of the 
monolithic old truths of Christianity makes room for a richer and more diverse “sea” into which 
a free spirit travels.  Such diversity of perspectives would then have the opportunity to be 
harmonized in the unity that is required for self-realization.   
The existential need for effectiveness can be closely associated with the human fear of 
being powerless.  To exist in the world and to be unable to have any meaningful impact on other 
individuals or on any community in any way is to exist as if one were approaching a kind of 
nothingness.  Fromm expresses this concern when he says that “the sense of being condemned to 
ineffectiveness—i.e., to complete vital impotence—is one of the most painful and almost 
intolerable experiences, and man will do almost anything to overcome it, from drug and work 
addiction to cruelty and murder.”64  How has this need developed such an enormous intensity?  
Fromm is operating with a more refined sense of “effecting.”  He refers to the Latin of “to 
effect” which is ex-facere, meaning to bring to pass, to accomplish, to realize, to carry out, and to 
fulfill.  He stresses the weight of this need by considering it a kind of proof that one exists: I 
effect.  Therefore, I am.65  As a caution, we should not take this as formulaic or as prescribing the 
essence of humankind in its entirety.   I do not see Fromm making the same kind of move that 
Descartes made when he defined humankind to be essentially thinking, non-corporeal things: I 
                                                            
63 GS, Sec. 343. 
64 Fromm, p. 237. 
65 Fromm, p. 235. 
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think.  Therefore, I am.66  Fromm is merely acknowledging one dimension of a cluster of 
interconnected existential needs.  From an early age, we are forced to succumb to the necessities 
of nature, merely affected by others and tossed about in a sea of existence which we cannot 
control.  As infants we are virtually inefficacious.  Fromm makes an interesting claim: Because 
of such biological and social limitations, “it seems that man is profoundly attracted to move to 
the personal, social, and natural borders of his existence, as if driven to look beyond the narrow 
frame in which he is forced to exist.”67  Nietzsche would stand behind the existence of such a 
need, but he would not attest to the two overly streamlined patterns of response to this existential 
calling: life-furthering and life-thwarting.  As we discussed in chapter two, such categories are 
overly simplistic.  Specifically in the relationships to others, it is not simply a dichotomous 
matter of either effecting love or effecting fear and suffering; nor in the relationship to things is it 
clear-cut choice of either affecting constructively or affecting destructively.  Unfortunately for 
Fromm, his faith in opposites shows itself here and its presence creates an inappropriate 
polarization of possible responses to the need.  Consider the experience of love.  Though we tend 
to assume that it is purely altruistic and ‘life-affirming’ in the way Fromm discusses, love may 
just be the most ingenious expression of egoism, in which both love and greed are extensions of 
the same basic instinct: the drive for the feeling of conquest through possession.  Most forms of 
erotic and romantic love contain some measure of “avarice” in them, which is caused by the 
lover’s desire to be “supreme” and “supremely desirable.”  Being the loved one’s “all and 
everything” creates a feeling of pleasure in oneself: a feeding of the ego.  According to a 
Nietzschean line of thought, in addition to the other side of this self-oriented aspect of love, there 
                                                            
66 Descartes, Rene. Meditations on the First Philosophy in Descartes: Selected Philosophical 
Writings. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988, pp. 81-83. 
67 Fromm, p. 236. 
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is also the lover’s desire to exclude the whole world from his object of desire: “if one considers 
that the lover aims at the impoverishment and deprivation of all competitors and would like to 
become the dragon guarding his golden hoard as the most inconsiderate and selfish of all 
“conquerors” and exploiters,” we recognize that there is an element of destruction (the 
destruction of competitors) within the constructing of oneself as a lover that cannot be denied.68  
We could even go so far as to say that the lover wishes to affect fear and suffering in those who 
might steal away his precious beloved.  So, while Nietzsche would agree that there are different 
ways to satisfy the need for effectiveness (particularly in affecting others), we must move 
beyond the polarized responses characterizing Fromm’s account of what we are to do with our 
need for effectiveness.   
Another worry is that Nietzsche would likely not sanction this need as one for mere 
effectiveness but perhaps as one for a continuous enhancement of effectiveness.  Fromm may 
have this in mind in his explication of these existential needs, but he does not make it clear that 
our need to affect is a desire to affect more strongly, more excellently.  Under this consideration, 
Fromm ought to change his principle to this: I effect my effecting.  Therefore, I become.   
How does the existential need for stimulation serve as a constitutive element in the larger 
framework of self-realization?  Fromm draws from observations of daily life that show that the 
human organism (as well as the animal organism) is in need of a certain minimum of excitation 
and stimulation.  We are eager to respond to and seek excitation.  He rightly points out that the 
                                                            
68 GS, Sec. 14.  It is important to note Nietzsche’s recognition of the possibility that there is a 
kind of love where the “possessive craving” transforms itself into a higher form of possession—
namely, friendship.  It is not entirely clear in the case of friendship whether the drive is to 
possess the “ideal above them” or is to possess each other but in a different manner.  I refrain 
from going into a discussion of friendship here because I will give a detailed account of it in a 
later chapter.   
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list of excitation-generating stimuli is endless and that the difference between people (and 
cultures) lies only in the form taken by the main stimuli for excitation.69  This distinction 
between the forms of stimuli is where things get particularly stirring.  Fromm distinguishes 
between a simple stimulus and an activating stimulus.  The simple stimulus produces a drive: the 
person is driven by it.  Here is an apt description: 
If a man is threatened with danger to his life, his response is simple and immediate, 
almost reflexlike, because it is rooted in his neurophysiological organization.  The same 
holds true for the other physiological needs like hunger and, to a certain extent, sex.  The 
responding person “reacts,” but he does not act—by which I mean to say he does not 
actively integrate any response beyond the minimum activity necessary to run away, 
attack, or become sexually excited.  One might also say that in this kind of response the 
brain and the whole physiological apparatus act for man….Stimuli of the first, simple 
kind, if repeated beyond a certain threshold, are no longer registered and lose their 
stimulation effect.  Continued stimulation requires that the stimulus should either increase 
in intensity or change in content: a certain element of novelty is required.70 
As depicted simple stimuli engender a more reactive response, one in which there is not really an 
agent doing anything.  A biological/neurophysiological response merely happens.  There is no 
thought, no reflection and no time to alter one’s attitude toward the simple stimuli.  Most of 
contemporary existence functions on the level of simple stimuli: on the Internet, in the media, in 
office cubicles and unfortunately sometimes even within educational institutions.  A large 
portion of the economy operates on the level of simple stimuli.  The mechanisms of advertising 
and marketing within our economy utilize simple stimuli in order to sell a product, make a profit 
and continually work to produce those desires for such products within us.  Because it operates 
merely on the level of simple stimuli, commercials must reinvent themselves, advertisements 
                                                            
69 Fromm, p. 239. 
70 Fromm, pp. 239-240. 
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must be re-fashioned and each product has to generate the appearance of novelty.71  Otherwise, 
we become bored with the stimuli and consumerism breaks down.  Simple stimuli affect only 
one side of the existential split between instincts and consciousness: one merely instinctually 
responds to simple stimuli.  There is no conscious reflectivity or conscious thought present when 
one unquestioningly accepts some traditional moral theme of a sitcom or when one lusts after the 
newest model of I-phone (2G?  3G?  4G?) from a bombardment of advertisements.  To satisfy 
one’s need for stimulation and excitation through only simple stimuli is to allow only a mere 
semblance of satisfaction.   
On the other hand, the activating stimulus shows itself to possess a significantly different 
structure: 
Such an activating stimulus could be a novel, a poem, an idea, a landscape, music, or a 
loved person.  None of these stimuli produce a simple response; they invite you, as it 
were, to respond by actively and sympathetically relating yourself to them; by becoming 
actively interested, seeing and discovering ever-new aspects in your “object” (which 
ceases to be a mere “object”), by becoming more awake and more aware.  You do not 
remain the passive object upon which the stimulus acts, to whose melody your body has 
to dance, as it were; instead you express your own faculties by being related to the world; 
you become active and productive.72 
Activating stimuli are those which provoke critical thinking and aesthetic appreciation, while 
expressing and inquiring into the complex themes associated with human life.  A key feature of 
such stimuli is timelessness: no matter how many times you come back to it, there is always 
something new to discover.  Some personal examples are the ancient Greek tragedies of 
Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides; the Platonic dialogues; the essays of Montaigne; the 
writings of Nietzsche; the novels of Alduous Huxley; or, the contemporary rock music of Pink 
                                                            
71 I share this line of thinking with Fromm about the overabundance of simple stimuli in 
contemporary society.   
72 Fromm, pp. 239-240. 
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Floyd or Tool.  These are the activating stimuli that I find compelling, yet everyone should seek 
out those kinds of activating stimuli that are in closer proximity to her life and relative to her 
experience of the world.   
 What would Nietzsche’s position be concerning this existential need for stimulation?  I 
think that Nietzsche would attest to the existence of this need.73  Further, I think that he was 
already cognizant of the growing prevalence of “simple stimuli” in modern living, and that that 
partially formed his opinions about how we are becoming “the last men.”  So, he would approve 
of Fromm’s distinction between the two general kinds of stimuli.  Nietzsche would go further 
(and Fromm would likely be on board with this extension) and argue that we can produce simple 
and activating responses, just as there are simple and activating stimuli.  These two forms of 
response can be possibilities even within the same human phenomenon.  A good example is that 
of revenge and the attendant ambiguity of that concept.  Simple revenge (or “restitutional 
revenge”) is sought out of self-preservation: one only thinks of oneself in delivering the counter-
blow, not of the other and the harm done by the blow.  Another side of the motivation of the first 
species of revenge is fear—i.e. the fear of remaining in a seemingly inferior and powerless 
position.  On the other hand, activating revenge requires the passage of time and allows one to 
pre-meditatively reflect on how to direct the counter-blow:  
                                                            
73 The ‘activating/simple’ distinction that Fromm makes among stimuli is not strictly analogous 
to the ‘master/slave’ distinction that Nietzsche makes between types of morality, although we 
might wonder what kind of valuing is happening when an individual experiences simple stimuli.  
It is more obvious that some kind of valuing is being performed when one is exposed to 
activating stimuli.  It is not so obvious that valuing is happening at all in the former case of 
simple stimuli.  It is likely the case that a more crude form of valuation takes place when one is 
exposed to simple stimuli, and a more sophisticated form of valuation (and re-valuation) when 
one engages with activating stimuli.   
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One needs time if one is to transfer one’s thoughts from oneself to one’s opponent and to 
ask oneself how he can be hit at most grievously.  This happens in the second species of 
revenge: its presupposition is a reflection over the other’s vulnerability and capacity for 
suffering: one wants to hurt.  To secure himself against further harm is here so far from 
the mind of the revenger that he almost always brings further harm upon himself and very 
often cold-bloodedly anticipates it.74 
The motives by which revenge is sought stand in opposition to each other in the two species 
described here.  The simple form of revenge is rooted in fear and in self-preservation, with an 
orientation directed more toward the self.  The activating form of revenge is rooted in an absence 
of fear and in the drive to demonstrate a lack of fear (or to acquire the feeling of superiority).  As 
a concluding thought, the difference in types of stimuli and the difference in the types of 
responses to those stimuli highlight the complexity of the need for stimulation.  The more that 
one is exposed to simple stimuli and the more that one simply responds to stimuli in his 
environment, the less one will place himself inside his/her “deeds.”  However, the more that one 
is exposed to activating stimuli and the more one actively responds, the more he will put himself 
inside his actions: thereby contributing to the achieving of self-realization.  But what exactly 
does it mean to put oneself inside one’s deeds?  This process consists of some degree of 
contemplation about one’s potential future actions and the necessary solidification of that 
contemplation within one’s deeds.  This process can be further understood in terms of the nature 
of virtue and vice, for the interplay between one’s desire/emotions and the (rational and 
affective) response to them are an expression of the existing character and give rise to how that 
character can be shaped over time.  In Aristotelian terms, the right motives, the right reasons and 
the right desires must be internalized by contemplation but then externalized into action, but 
action in which there is no longer any hesitation but only pure willfulness.  What is this 
                                                            
74 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Wanderer and His Shadow in Human, All Too Human. Trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Sec. 33. 
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difference between the “pure willfulness” of the simple response differ from the pure willfulness 
of the active response?  Regarding the “pure willfulness” of simple responses would be present 
in the unrestrained person who acts purely out of his desires or out of his spiritedness, regardless 
of whether his desires happened to be good or bad and regardless of what his spiritedness is 
directed toward.  Such a figure’s “pure willfulness” is contrasted with the self-restrained person, 
who has bad desires but who does not act according to them.  Such an inner tension prevents any 
sort of pure willfulness.  However, the pure willfulness of the active response would be present 
in both the virtuous and the vicious persons, for both achieve a kind of harmony between their 
desires and their intellect.  Both choose to do what they do, and the difference between them then 
becomes action for the sake of the beautiful (for the virtuous person) and dissipated action (for 
the vicious person).   
Zarathustra claims that there is no reward for virtue and that virtue is not even its own 
reward, yet he does intimate that the “reward” for virtue, if there is any reward at all, is the 
realization of a self through genuine agency.  Speaking to that individual who is capable of 
virtue, Zarathustra says, “You love your virtue as a mother her child; but when has a mother ever 
wished to be paid for her love?  Your virtue is what is dearest to you,” and later in the same 
section states even more fervently, “Oh, my friends, that your self be in your deed as the mother 
is in her child—let that be your word concerning virtue!”75  Both images represent an artistic 
process of creation and discovery, except that what the mother of the virtuous deed discovers is 
the new self that is realized and embodied through such action.  There is a rough parallel 
between the process whereby the calm reflection of contemplation (i.e., deliberation about what 
to do and about what is valuable concerning each doing) transforms into the intense passion of 
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genuine action and the movement of beauty as it is associated with virtue.  Speaking to those 
who are only apparently “virtuous,” Zarathustra begins his teaching on virtue as the personified 
voice of beauty—but a beauty that undergoes a transformation:  
Slack and sleeping senses must be addressed with thunder and heavenly fireworks.  But 
the voice of beauty speaks gently: it creeps only into the most awakened souls.  Gently 
trembled and laughed my shield today; that is the holy laughter and tremor of beauty.  
About you, the virtuous, my beauty laughed today.  And thus its voice came to me: “They 
still want to be paid.” 
At first, the voice of beauty carefully and gently enters that soul who is capable of contemplating 
the nuanced differences between excellence and baseness.  Upon considering what the telos of 
one’s virtue should be, whether it should be some divine reward, honor, praise or its own end, 
beauty playfully begins to undergo the transformation from the contemplative activity into the 
somewhat ferocious realization of beauty into virtue and self.  Nietzsche’s Zarathustra mocks 
“the virtuous” who deem themselves to be so with the expectation that their virtue must be paid 
for.  Two ways of manifesting such apparent virtue would then be operating under the 
expectation that virtue sufficiently guarantees happiness and/or operating under the assumption 
that virtue grants one supernatural reward in an afterlife.  The hope for compensation undermines 
the true nature of the virtuous human being, whose actions are performed for the sake of the 
beautiful.  Zarathustra continues to describe the process by which beauty manifests itself:  
Alas, that is my sorrow: they have lied reward and punishment into the foundation of 
things, and now also into the foundation of your souls, you who are virtuous.  But like the 
boar’s snout, my words shall tear open the foundation of your souls: a plowshare will I be 
to you.  All the secrets of your foundation shall come to light; and when you lie uprooted 
and broken in the sun, then will your lies also be separated from your truths.76 
In this latter part of this movement of beauty, Zarathustra’s words, which are the voice of beauty, 
become fierce in the tearing open of souls as both the images of the boar’s snout and the 
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plowshare suggest.  The souls that are torn open are the souls within slave morality and the 
innards that are eviscerated are their conceptions of reward and punishment that they hold to be 
part of the foundation of slave morality.  In the above passage, it is beauty itself that is opposed 
to this aspect of slave morality, which praises virtues because of their utility—e.g., to 
compensate for one’s impotence and thus to compensate for an inability for active self-
consciousness—and which serve as pieces of the slaves’ “imaginary revenge.”  Nevertheless, 
beauty’s uprooting of the slave’s truths and lies (as activity of contemplation) makes possible the 
identification of the right desires and right motives with one’s virtuous action.  It remains a 
possibility that one embedded in slave morality can transcend his notions of “good” and “evil,” 
but such a transcendence would require an embodiment of beauty in one’s actions, a moving 
beyond good and evil.  Zarathustra’s image of a dying star possesses a two-fold meaning: as the 
“work” of true virtue, which again symbolizes a necessary death of oneself (as a slave who is 
“virtuous” because such virtue is useful) that gives birth to a light that continues to shine even 
after the work has been performed; and as a work of art, as a child is the mother’s work of art or 
as the play is the playwright’s creation.   
 In order to improve our understanding of the relation between virtue, deed and self such 
that we understand the nature of the existential need for complex stimuli, we ought to consider 
what the weaker (or false-images) of virtue are.  There are at least four ways in which virtue 
takes on an imposter-like form: when there is only a simple response with no reflection; when 
there is a mere absence of vice; when there is a negation of the natural world; and when there is 
no active condition present.  Concerning the viciousness of mere simple responses, Zarathustra 
says that “there are those for whom virtue is the spasm under the scourge.”  Such individuals 
merely react instinctively to some insult or injury performed unto them, yet their “virtue” 
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remains nothing more than a spasm and not an active condition.  Regarding the absence of vice, 
Zarathustra states that “there are others who call it virtue when their vices grow lazy,” but the 
mere incapacity to be vicious due to apathy is not sufficient for genuine virtue.  With respect to 
world-negation, Zarathustra says that there are others who are drawn downward by their devils, 
lust for their god and holler, “What I am not, that, that to me are God and virtue!”  Such 
individuals return to the faith in metaphysical opposites, placing vice in the realm of this world 
and virtue in the realm of some supernatural world (Heaven).  Finally, Zarathustra underscores 
the idea that genuine virtue is an active condition.  He says that “there are others who are like 
cheap clocks that must be wound: they tick and they want the tick-tock to be called virtue.”  
Such individuals only act “virtuously” because they adhere to the dogma of some doctrine and 
are like mechanical animals that fail to deliberate with themselves about what course of action is 
truly excellent.   
Here, as elsewhere in this project, I agree with Nietzsche that human action is the means 
by which intentions and desires are realized.  The same way that a virtue cannot merely be a 
disposition or a state of being (and as such would not be an active condition), when it comes to 
selfhood, the potential doer does not really know what it is that he wants or intends until an 
intention or a motive actually becomes embodied in a doer.  When discussing the nature of the 
self, Zarathustra makes an interesting link between the self and the body:  
Instruments and toys are sense and spirit: behind them still lies the self.  The self also 
seeks with the eyes of the senses; it also listens with the ears of the spirit.  Always the self 
listens and seeks: it compares, overpowers, conquers, destroys.  It controls, and it is in 
control of the ego too.  Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a 
mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name is self.  In your body he dwells; he is your 
body.77 
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This passage further illuminates what it means for someone to place himself in his deeds.  An 
individual’s intentions, desires and motives can only be concretized into a self through action.  
“Thoughts” and “feelings” must be embodied.  So, when Nietzsche’s Zarathustra says that the 
self “dwells” inside your body and then that he just is your body, he is expressing the idea that 
the embodiment of one’s intentions and desires in action is a condition of selfhood.  
  
The Existential Needs for a Frame of Orientation and Devotion  
Three of the above-mentioned needs—frame of orientation, devotion and unity—
foreground the urgency to make the world intelligible and to create purpose within a human life.  
People tend to align themselves with metaphysical, religious and political doctrines (just to 
mention a few) in order to generate a story within which they feel they appropriately belong and 
through which a life can be meaningful.  Having a purpose or having a set of purposes provides 
an individual with a goal or set of goals.  To use Fromm’s expression, human beings need “a 
map of their natural and social world,” and even if the map is wrong, it fulfills its psychological 
function of explaining as many phenomena as possible in order to serve the purpose of living.78  
Fromm claims that the sometimes irrational nature of doctrines and ideologies can be explained 
by this need for a frame of orientation.  This does seem to be the case in that the doctrine or 
ideology with which people align themselves does not have to get at the truth or be the right one.  
Rather, what is sought is the belief in the truth of the doctrine or the belief in the righteousness of 
the ideology.  Fromm notes that the more an ideology pretends to give answers to all questions, 
the more attractive it is; though its attraction lies in its ability to provide answers that are 
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intelligible to the individual or culture, not to answers that necessarily get the world right.79  
Nietzsche anticipates the need for a frame of orientation early in the GS: “Gradually, man has 
become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one more condition of existence than any other 
animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish 
without a periodic trust in life—without faith in reason in life.”80  Three clear examples of 
doctrines or ideologies in modernity that serve this life-promoting function are Christianity, 
liberal democracy and science.  One or all of these make the world intelligible for millions of 
people: they satisfy the need for a frame of orientation.  Christianity has invented the 
interpretation of the world in terms of “sinfulness” and the possibility of “redemption by God” to 
ease the pain of humanity’s impotence and helplessness.  This interpretation is a consolation that 
provides a map for the world: 
Christianity in particular may be called a great treasure house of ingenious means of 
consolation: it offers such a collection of refreshments, palliatives, and narcotics; it risks 
so much that is most dangerous and audacious; it has displayed such refinement and 
subtlety, such southern subtlety, in guessing what stimulant affects will overcome, at 
least for a time, the deep depression, the leaden exhaustion, the black melancholy of the 
physiologically inhibited.  For we may generalize: the main concern of all great religions 
has been to fight a certain weariness and heaviness grown to epidemic proportions.81 
Christianity thus provides an answer to the question: Why does man exist?  However, its answer 
is the possible redemption by God for the sinfulness of man.  Although the Christian perspective 
adopted by its priests may be ingenious, it causes psychological sickness and a life-negating 
attitude.  This is why Nietzsche considers Christianity to be a bad mode of interpretation, not 
primarily because it is constituted by false beliefs.   
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80 GS, Sec. 1.  See also GS 347. 
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The second example of a doctrine that provides a frame of orientation is that of the state.  
The two kinds of political state that Nietzsche criticizes most often are democracy and socialism.  
He points out that even though following such political ideologies as absolute doctrines may 
prevent individual autonomy and the realization of selfhood, they do provide the appearance of a 
strong framework of meaning:  
Every philosophy which believes that the problem of existence is touched on, not to say 
solved, by a political event is a joke- and pseudo-philosophy.  Many states have been 
founded since the world began; that is an old story.  How should a political innovation 
suffice to turn men once and for all into contented inhabitants of the earth?...[That people 
think that answers to existential questions might come from politics shows that] we are 
experiencing the consequences of the doctrine, lately preached from all the rooftops, that 
the state is the highest goal of mankind and that man has no higher duty than to serve the 
state: in which doctrine I recognize a relapse not into paganism but into stupidity.82 
A state ideology, whether it be democracy or socialism or some other form of government, can 
provide some kind of frame of orientation, yet one who conceives of such an ideology as absolute 
and as the ultimate goal of humankind ignores the potentially disastrous consequences of 
promoting the values of “equal rights for all” and “sympathy for all that suffers.”  They make 
less possible the existence of a self that exceeds the masses in courage, wisdom, creativity and 
autonomy.  Such a self would always have to fight the tide of “levelization” that both democracy 
and socialism bring with them.  According to Nietzsche, it is a mistake to think that meaning or 
purpose can be found in a political event or innovation.  He views selfhood as an individual 
project.   
A third example of a wide-spread and exponentially growing frame of orientation for 
people is science.  In science there is an absolute value placed on “objective” truth, and the 
scientist supposedly explains nature through empirical observation of natural processes and the 
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effects of natural “laws.”  Many people are inclined toward the scientific explanation of reality 
because it presents itself as offering just that: reality.  However, the absolute value of truth (and 
that it shows us reality independent from our subjectivity) is the very presupposition that is taken 
for granted in science.  Nietzsche explains how we still show a kind of reverence towards “the 
truth” as if it were a god itself: 
Thus the question “Why science?” leads back to the moral problem: Why have morality 
at all when life, nature, and history are “not moral”?  No doubt, those who are truthful in 
that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm 
another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this 
“other world”—look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, 
our world?  But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a 
metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we seekers after 
knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame 
lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of 
Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine.83   
Although Fromm combines the two together, I separate the need for devotion from the 
need for a frame of orientation because the need for devotion appears to be more focused, 
although not necessarily singular.  What does it mean to devote oneself to something?  In the 
sense that we are concerned with, devotion seems to be the activity of discovering and/or 
creating something to live for.  Fromm suggests that an individual can devote herself to “an idol” 
or to “an ideal” and that regardless of whether she devotes herself to a single goal or several 
goals she needs to possess purpose in her doings.  The object of devotion can be either the 
furtherance of life or its destruction.  It can be one or a cluster of virtues: courage, greatness of 
soul and justice; or it can be one of many allegedly lesser goods: wealth, fame and fortune.  This 
line of thinking implies that it is not possible for one to exist without striving to satisfy the need 
for devotion.  One might argue that it is possible for one to exist, maybe for only a short period 
                                                            
83 GS, Sec. 344. 
59 
 
of time, without being devoted to some goal or purpose and that such a possibility would refute 
the existence of this existential need.  Supporting Fromm, I would reply that even if a person 
ceases in her activity of devotion and goes without the guidance of an idol or ideal that she could 
only exist in such a way for a very brief period.  The “emptiness” of meaning characterizing this 
interim would be an even stronger impetus for this individual to begin a new project of satisfying 
her need for devotion.  Just as soon as one idol “dies,” the existential imperative to either find or 
create a new “god” takes over.  Such a thought calls to mind the way a person’s devotion can 
oscillate from a dead object of devotion to one that has sprung to life—e.g. a drunk’s devotion to 
booze as a method of coping with life transformed into her devotion to Alcoholics Anonymous; 
an atheist’s devotion to reason transformed into his devotion to being a Born-Again Christian; a 
Republican’s disappointed devotion to the established GOP’s conservativism transformed into 
his devotion to even smaller government as a Tea Party member.  Whatever the situation may be 
where one’s need for devotion is apparently killed or frustrated, that need re-emerges in a fairly 
immediate way.  Living without purpose, without meaning, potentially results in practical 
nihilism which can lead one to hopelessly succumb to mental and physical nothingness.   
I believe that Nietzsche would endorse both the need for a frame of orientation and the 
need for devotion.  The main theme of the third essay of the GM is how humankind responds to 
the problem of the senselessness of suffering.  Suffering pervades each human life, and each 
person ultimately ends in that which we find most unintelligible: death.  We might say that it is 
our awareness of our own mortality and the knowledge that one day we will not exist that causes 
the most tremendous suffering.  This dimension of the human condition remains unintelligible to 
most.  The fact that we do suffer and that such suffering appears meaningless to us intensifies the 
unintelligibility of the world.  The evidence that humankind seeks more than just life—that we 
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seek meaning for our lives—is provided by the various ascetic ideals to which we devote 
ourselves.  Nietzsche frames the idea in the following way:  
Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal, had no meaning so far.  His 
existence on earth contained no goal; “why man at all?”—was a question without an 
answer; the will for man and earth was lacking; behind every great human destiny there 
sounded as a refrain a yet greater “in vain!”  This is precisely what the ascetic ideal 
means: that something was lacking, that man was surrounded by a fearful void—he did 
not know how to justify, to account for, to affirm himself; he suffered from the problem 
of his meaning.  He also suffered otherwise, he was in the main a sickly animal: but his 
problem was not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, 
“why do I suffer?”84 
Regardless of whether the character type that one occupies is that of the priest, the scientist, the 
historian or whatever, the need for devotion presents itself and compels the individual to devote 
himself to that which gives meaning to what is meaningless.  In Nietzschean style, we address 
“the problem of our meaning” in and through the existential need for devotion and the existential 
need for a frame of orientation. 
     
The Existential Need for Unity 
The existential need for unity has an important status among the existential needs, since 
they can all be understood, in a way, as the need for unity.  After all, these needs arise out of the 
experience of a break or divide between consciousness and instinct.  But here we mean 
something more specific: as a striving to be a part of, or in some kind of union with (or 
connected to) the story that one builds for oneself through the satisfaction of the prior two 
existential needs…the successful achieving of which produces the experience of feeling at home 
in the world.  Fromm speaks of the need for unity as arising from a kind of existential split 
                                                            
84 GM, Second Essay, Sec. 28. 
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between the human world and the natural world, a split having generated a fracture even within 
humankind itself.  (It is not clear how helpful it would be to look at the manner in which the 
existential need for unity historically manifests itself on a kind of world-historical scale.  The 
primary sense of the need for unity—that between our instincts and our consciousness—arises in 
the face of significant historical events such as: the invention of agriculture during the Neolithic 
Revolution; the invention of religions during the first millennia B.C.E.; the dawn of philosophy 
in and around 6th century B.C.E; the European Renaissance; the Protestant Reformation; the 
Industrial Revolution; the construction of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons in the early 20th 
century; and the advent of the Age of Technology in which we now exist.)  As far as the 
appearances tell us, we find ourselves existing in the here and now having torn ourselves apart 
into mere pieces of a broken whole, but according to Nietzsche the existential split between our 
instincts and our consciousness was not so gradual.  In accounting for the evolutionary change of 
humankind from “semi-animals well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to 
adventure” to men “enclosed within the walls of society and peace,” Nietzsche describes the 
change as abrupt: “…suddenly all their instincts were disvalued and ‘suspended’,” and “[the 
forcible sundering from his animal past was] a leap and plunge into new surroundings and 
conditions of existence.”85  Perhaps because man’s new suffering of himself was such a radically 
different mode of existence from his purely instinctual mode of existence did Nietzsche feel the 
need to speak of this change in hyperbolic terms.  However gradual or swift the change was, we 
will put aside the question of just how consciousness historically emerged, and we will instead 
focus on the nature of the existential split between instincts and consciousness and our need for 
unity between these two dimensions of our existence.   
                                                            
85 GM, Second Essay, Sec. 16. 
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Fromm claims that there are three dimensions to the existential split: 1) the split within an 
individual human being; 2) the split between humankind and the natural world; and 3) the split 
between one human being and others.  Fromm offers some possible solutions to such splits, one 
solution having to do with the supposed common features of religions and the other solution 
requiring that we reverse our attitude from experiencing ourselves as things to recognizing 
ourselves as persons.  From the above list of historical milestones of humanity, Fromm chooses 
to focus on the creation of religions.  Drawing from origins of various religions and making a 
unifying move, Fromm’s first solution appears to be untenable and somewhat overly idealistic.  
He conceptualizes an amalgamation of world religions and makes the following claims: 
The great religions springing from the soil of these cultures taught that man can achieve 
unity not by a tragic effort to undo the fact of the split, but by fully developing human 
reason and love.  Great as are the differences between Taoism, Buddhism, prophetic 
Judaism, and the Christianity of the Gospels, these religions had one common goal: to 
arrive at the experience of oneness, not by regressing into animal existence but by 
becoming fully human—oneness within man, oneness between man and nature, and 
oneness between man and other men.86 
It is not clear whether we ought to take the advice of the so-called “great humanists” that are the 
founders of these religions.  It is not the case that the common mission of these religions is to 
develop human reason and love.  That is an oversimplification.  But even if it were, reason and 
love are not just valuable simpliciter—as Nietzsche has shown, a more complex understanding of 
what is genuinely ‘life-affirming’ is necessary than the overly positive vision that Fromm 
endorses.  This is evident, for example, in the fact that the nature of the love taught by at least 
some of the religions that he mentions, especially Christianity, do not fully acknowledge the 
need for self-love.  Further, this idea that the one common goal of religions is oneness within a 
human being, between humankind and nature, and between all members of humankind is 
                                                            
86 Fromm, p. 234. 
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misguided.  I will begin with the last form of oneness.  Oneness between all members of 
humankind is not psychologically possible, nor should it be desirable.  Conflict is part of the 
essence of the human condition.  We define ourselves by our struggles, our pain and our 
suffering, all of which originate in our head-butting attitudes about who should be in power, 
about who deserves what amounts of money, about who gets to use what resources and about 
who has the bigger “ego.”  Think of any great piece of literature, and you will see that cruelty by 
the antagonist is what makes him interesting and that the desire for justice/revenge is what makes 
the protagonist praiseworthy.  On an individual or a global scale, oneness between man and other 
men is a fantasy.  The second form of oneness between humankind and nature is also not 
(humanly) possible.  As a species we have changed things.  Not only have we changed things, 
but we have changed them forever!  There is no going back to a hunter-gatherer society.  We 
cannot return to some pre-technological or pre-industrial mode of living.  The schism between 
human beings and the natural world is only going to become more pronounced in the future.  So 
I am not sure what hope there is to be had for this kind of unity. The first kind of oneness within 
the individual is something that is possible to accomplish, but it is not clear that doing so guided 
by religious teachings is the best way.  Another problem with Fromm’s first possible solution is 
its omission of polytheism.  Why does he not include Hinduism or the worship of the Greek and 
Roman gods and goddesses on his list of “great” religions?  Perhaps his praise of the ideal of 
oneness shows a prejudice resulting from Fromm’s entrenchment in a monotheistic world.  It is 
possible that a more pluralistic but not necessarily fragmented interpretation of the world might 
be healthier than our demand for oneness allows, where by pluralistic I mean a pluralism of 
values, ideals and perspectives that do not share a one size fits all motif.87   
                                                            
87 See GS, Sec. 143.  Nietzsche contends that the greatest advantage of polytheism is the plurality 
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 If we reject Fromm’s emphasis on ‘oneness’, then how should we understand Nietzsche’s 
attitude toward the existential need for unity?  The answer to this question depends on what kind 
of unity we are considering.  I will put aside the unity between humankind and nature for the 
moment, as it will surface in chapter four’s analysis of what it means, for Nietzsche, for an 
individual to transcend nature.  The issue of unity between individual members of humankind 
will be considered in chapter five, where we discuss the nature of friendship.  Here, I will focus 
on the possibility of unity within a single individual, since this is the kind of unity with which 
Nietzsche is primarily concerned.  One aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophical project is re-
integrating humankind into nature: showing through metaphor and argumentation that human 
beings are part of the natural world despite our tendency to think of ourselves otherwise, and as 
such we must conform to natural processes and natural laws just as everything else does.  The 
part of the human being—the instincts, or “the will”—that is linked to the natural world in which 
we participate draws Nietzsche’s focus.  His critique of the absolute freedom of the will is one 
prominent example of this attempt to illustrate that “the will” is a piece of nature, not something 
that metaphysically or religiously transcends the human condition.  Nietzsche possesses a strong 
tendency toward naturalism for two related reasons.  He wishes to expose the errors of the 
supernatural and metaphysical views of humanity that are life-negating and that have helped to 
dissociate humankind from itself.  The supernaturalist (or metaphysician) has often proclaimed 
that that which is good, right, beautiful and virtuous are of the “real” world, of the world of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
of norms, which makes it possible for an individual to create and own his ideal.  This garners a 
certain sovereignty and freedom, first attributed to one’s god in relation to other gods, that one 
adopts as his own sovereignty and freedom to create his own values.  On the other hand, 
monotheism spawned the belief that there is only one normal type and ideal for the human 
species and that type is modeled after “the one true God.”  This advantage of polytheism is likely 
to be part of the explanation for why Nietzsche has such a peculiar reverence for Hinduism.  The 
other reason for his interest in the Hindu gods is possibly its rank ordering of society, which is 
antithetical to the equality of the liberal democracy of Western culture. 
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Platonic Forms, of the noumenal realm or of the Kingdom of Heaven.  Thus half of our values, 
and half of our constitution as esteemers, is banished from this world.  The other reason for 
needing to retain a naturalist position is that Nietzsche promotes the perfection of human beings, 
and this process of perfecting seems to require the promotion and affirmation of life—and life 
qua a part of the natural world is the only life that we have reason to think exists.  So looking 
into how we work as natural beings will require facing up to the reality and complexity of our 
humanness.   
 
Unifying the Self 
Nietzsche is interested in illustrating the complexity of the will, especially the way it is an 
“oligarchy” of drives that tend to “be at war” with each other.  His rejection of the I and his 
theme of self as multiplicity is prevalent throughout his corpus.  In BGE Nietzsche rejects soul 
atomism: “the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a 
monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science!”88 A few sections later in 
BGE, he expands upon this rejection of ‘the I’ with the idea that the will is a manifold thing 
where the synthetic concept “I” takes sides with the commanding element of the will:  
…our body is but a social structure composed of many souls—to his feelings of delight 
as commander.  L’effet c’est moi: what happens here is what happens in every well-
constructed and happy commonwealth; namely, the governing class identifies itself with 
the successes of the commonwealth.  In all willing it is absolutely a question of 
commanding and obeying, on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of 
many “souls.”89 
                                                            
88 BGE, Sec. 12. 
89 BGE, Sec. 19. 
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Nietzsche’s Zarathustra also rejects the unity of the I in saying, “‘I,’ you say, and are proud of 
the word.  But greater is that in which you do not wish to have faith—your body and its great 
reason: that does not say ‘I,’ but [performs] ‘I’.90  ‘The I’ lies not in mere language, but in action.  
Because of the lack of a singular subjectivity and because of the agonistic nature of multiplicity 
of drives, we could conceive of the will as continually in a state of discord or fragmentation—in 
other words, possessing a lack of unity.91  Achieving some sort of wholeness amidst 
manifoldness is one of Nietzsche’s ideals, a hierarchical ordering of drives that is perhaps led by 
some commanding drive.  The key to the kind of inner unity that Nietzsche praises consists of a 
continual improvement of the actual “waging of war” against oneself such that each of the 
warrior drives becomes more adept and skilled in response to his opponent.92  The air of paradox 
seems to draw near with this idea.  How can something simultaneously be whole and manifold?  
How can something simultaneously be unified yet discordant?  To shed light on this puzzle, 
Nietzsche appropriates the Heraclitean notion of unity amidst opposites.  Heraclitus states, 
“People do not understand how that which is at variance with itself agrees with itself.  There is a 
harmony in the bending back, as in the cases of the bow and the lyre,” and “Opposition brings 
concord.  Out of discord comes the fairest harmony.”93  Heraclitus metaphorically shows that 
without tension in a bow, which is created by the string, that the arrow could not find direction 
and hit its target.  Similarly with music, without tension in the strings of the lyre, notes in a 
harmonized arrangement could not be produced.  In both senses, there is simultaneously 
                                                            
90 TSZ, “On the Despisers of the Body.” 
91 This theme of the self as multiplicity and the rejection of the I are central not only in 
Nietzsche’s published works but also in his unpublished notebooks.  Because of the consistency 
between how this theme is presented in both published and unpublished works, this is one area 
where it would not be poor scholarship to cite from the Nachlass.   
92 See BGE, Sec. 200. 
93 Heraclitus. Heraclitus: The Complete Fragments: Translation and Commentary and the Greek 
Text. Trans. William Harris. Middlebury College, 1994, DK line numbers 51 and 8. 
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harmony and tension—or more precisely, tension is a condition for harmony.  Nietzsche uses 
these metaphors and applies them to the human being, turning what is often interpreted as 
metaphysical opposites into psychological opposites.  Without a certain kind of tension between 
the multiplicity of drives (or inner perspectives) in an individual, the resulting harmony could not 
possibly be attained.  When Nietzsche endorses the value of having enemies, there is a double 
meaning being conveyed.  He does value external others as enemies, but he also values the 
“internal enemy”:  
Here too we have spiritualized hostility; here too we have come to appreciate its value.  
The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition; one remains young only as 
long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire peace.  Nothing has become more alien 
to [we immoralists and Antichristians] than that desideratum of former times, “peace of 
soul,” the Christian desideratum; there is nothing we envy less than the moralistic cow 
and the fat happiness of the good conscience.  One has renounced the great life when one 
renounces war.94 
For he who realizes a self, the “hostility” of external opposition becomes internalized, and the 
“war” of the opposing enemies becomes “spiritualized”: a spiritual war.95  Keep in mind that 
while there may be a countless number of drives within any given individual, drives simpliciter 
must not be confused with the existential needs, which are basic and are rooted in human 
existence as a walking contradiction between instincts and consciousness.96  To further unravel 
                                                            
94 TI, Morality as Anti-Nature, Sec. 3, p. 488. 
95 Chuck Palahniuk’s character of Tyler Durden first expresses his hostility toward the external 
enemies of consumerism, corporations and “the ruling class” physically through fight club; 
however, that external expression of opposing forces is then internalized, and Tyler realizes that 
the true war is between internally opposed drives: his spiritual war. 
96 In her comparison and contrast of Nietzsche’s will to power and Carl Jung’s notion of Self, 
Lucy Huskinson claims that the “‘central organizing power’ [of psychological opposites] is the 
‘power of adaptation’, or the ‘Will to Power’: that power that increases the capacity for creation 
through the union of opposites” (33).  Huskinson’s view of the will to power is remarkably 
similar to my own; however, she fails to realize the existential priority of the seven existential 
needs that I have outlined over the wider spectrum of particular drives that seek to be expressed 
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the apparently paradoxical nature of this notion of unity, one needs to think of the unified whole 
not as a static ‘oneness’ but as an active dialogue—an inner spiritual war but one where the 
warriors possibly ascend to new heights.  In the GS Nietzsche describes this as a process of 
incorporation [Einverleibung] (or assimilation) of truth:  
A thinker is now that being in whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors 
clash for their first fight, after the impulse for truth has proved to be also a life-preserving 
power.  Compared to the significance of this fight, everything else is a matter of 
indifference: the ultimate question about the conditions of life has been posed here, and 
we confront the first attempt to answer this question by experiment.  To what extent can 
truth endure incorporation?  That is the question; that is the experiment.97   
Here is an example of praise for that thinker who is an arena where the drive to truth and the 
drive to live (grounded in preserving certain life-preserving errors) clash, but do so in such a way 
as to assimilate as much truth as possible or to consider as many perspectives as possible in order 
to arrive at a wholeness.98  Notice that both truth and error can each be life-preserving powers.  
The value of each depends on whether and to what extent each preserves and in turn enhances 
life.  As we amass more affects, drives and perspectives, the more complete does our 
“objectivity” become.99  Nietzsche uses Goethe as a prime example of a figure who approaches 
the ideal of unity:  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and to garner a response from an individual.  See her Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the 
Union of Opposites. New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2004. 
97 GS, Sec. 110. 
98 In the second to last section of the GS (382) entitled “The great health,” Nietzsche refers to 
those who embody this ideal of incorporating a manifold of “battling” perspectives within a 
whole as “premature births” [Frühgeburten].  Being a “birth” has a two-fold meaning: one is 
being born and simultaneously birthing oneself, and doing so “early” or “prematurely” signifies 
that one should undergo this process with care and caution.  Such a free spirit does not possess 
the great health which he needs to flourish but acquires it and re-acquires it over and over again 
in exploring uncharted boundaries and new territories.  We might say that the great health is 
paradoxically acquired by living dangerously—dangerously healthy! 
99 GM, III 12. 
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[Goethe] bore [the Renaissance’s] strongest instincts within himself: the sensibility, the 
idolatry of nature, the anti-historic, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary…  He 
sought help from history, natural science, antiquity, and also Spinoza, but, above all, 
from practical activity; he surrounded himself with limited horizons; he did not retire 
from life but put himself into the midst of it; he was not fainthearted but took as much as 
possible upon himself, over himself, into himself.  What he wanted was totality; he 
fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will…; he disciplined 
himself to wholeness, he created himself.100 
So according to Nietzsche, we are illusory I’s—sets of affects, drives, “wills”, perspectives, and 
feelings that continually tend to resist and overcome each other—that nevertheless still have the 
always-present capacity to become harmonized albeit with a certain tension into an integrated 
whole.   
There are problems with this picture though.  How does one achieve self-conscious 
unified selfhood when it seems that a self already needs to be present in order to achieve this?  
And even if we are valuing poorly, how can a mere sack of drives (or just one of those drives) 
perform the activity of valuation that would appear to require a self in place to do such?  There 
seems to be a huge tension between Nietzsche’s elimination of any substantial I and his 
dependence upon a substantial I as the ground of valuation.  Sebastian Gardner explicates the 
“fundamental, pervasive, and ineliminable” role of ‘the I’ in the following two ways: 
(1) First, the subject who values must understand himself—his self—as the ground of the value 
that he affirms. 
(2) Second, there is reciprocal relation in Nietzsche between valuing, self-creation, and self-
determination: to determine such and such to be of value is to determine oneself, and to affirm 
oneself by way of affirming what one values, and vice versa.101 
                                                            
100 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1982, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man,” Sec. 49. 
101 Gardner, Sebastian. “Nietzsche, the Self, and the Disunity of Philosophical Reason,” in 
Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Eds. Ken Gemes and Simon May. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 8-9. 
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Gardner points out that the sovereign individual of the second essay of GM and Zarathustra both 
speak and act as if there is already a unified self in place because this is what is needed to 
identify with and have a sense of ownership over what one values.  Gardner contends, 
“Elimination of this I in favour of thinkings ascribed to complexes of will to power or any other 
units within the psychological composite would produce a profound self-alienation and 
undermine the normative dimension of valuation, i.e., the possibility of its being thought that the 
valuation in any sense ‘gets things right’.”102  Gardner suggests that one possible solution to this 
problem (one that we might wonder why Nietzsche did not take) is for the Nietzschean to 
demarcate the boundary between legitimate transcendental claims for the necessity of the I-
representation and illegitimate claims regarding the constitution-in-itself of a corresponding 
object of this representation.  Just as certain individuals (free spirits; Übermenschen; realized 
selves) may artistically posit the existence of particular values as useful fictions, the 
transcendental I should be viewed as another “honest illusion,” one whose actual non-existence 
is forgotten in the normal course of everyday human life.103  This proposal would make sense out 
of how it is possible for one to be the ground of one’s valuations.  Being a transcendental self 
would then just be how one must experience the world and how one must experience the activity 
of valuing.  In his Critique of Pure Reason (in the “Transcendental Deduction”), Kant elaborates 
the nature of the transcendental I:  
                                                            
102 Gardner, p. 9. 
103 Nadeem Hussain interestingly uses the notion of “honest illusions” to explain how we can 
create values and act according to those vales even though we “know” that values do not exist 
out there in the world.  This would be a beautiful and life-affirming kind of forgetting that makes 
living well possible.  See Hussain’s “Honest Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche’s Free Spirits,” in 
Nietzsche and Morality. Ed. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007, pp. 168-173. 
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We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all 
representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition 
of the possibility of all representations.  For in me they can represent something only in 
so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least 
capable of being so connected.  This principle holds a priori, and may be called the 
transcendental principle of the unity of all that is manifold in our representations, and 
consequently also in intuition.104 
And somewhat later in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” where Kant argues that we cannot 
know or prove that the soul possesses substantiality, simplicity, personality or ideality, he states: 
Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition 
of all unity, and itself is unconditioned.  We can thus say of the thinking ‘I’ (the soul) 
which regards itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at all times, and as 
the correlate of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred, that it does 
not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories, and through them all 
objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so through itself.  Now it is, indeed, 
very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I must presuppose in order to 
know any object, and that the determining self (the thought) is distinguished from the self 
that is determined (the thinking subject) in the same way as knowledge is distinguished 
from its object.105 
Despite the appeal of this suggestion, simply positing a transcendental self is insufficient 
for the exemplification of the will to power.  The will to power is the achieving of self-
realization.  The self that is realized to a more full degree—one that nearly approaches 
wholeness—is not the same as a mere transcendental self.  As a necessary condition for the 
possibility of human experience (and of valuation), a transcendental self could still be wildly 
fragmented in terms of conflict between needs and drives, yet all the while think of itself as “a 
self.”  So the Kantian solution to this problem of how the existential need for unity could be 
satisfied does not give us a complete answer.  The individual who comes to exemplify the will to 
power will not merely have to operate under the assumption that she is a unified self-conscious 
self.  She will have achieved the privilege of being a unified self-conscious self.   
                                                            
104 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. Boston: Macmillian 
& Co., 1965, A116. 
105 Kant, A402. 
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 But the process of achieving self-realization is still a process, and until one becomes a 
unified self-conscious self, how is it possible for “him” qua one of his strongest drives to 
genuinely value what he takes to be valuable?   In other words, is it intelligible to say that ‘my 
drive for companionship’ values and loves my friend?  Until I am a fully realized self, do I say 
that my ‘drive to sex’ is what is lusting after some potential lover?  This does sound strange 
indeed.  No, even in the earlier phases of self-realization, the experience that I have from the 
inside is that I value and love my friend and that I value and lust after my potential lover.  
Remember that the criticism against Nietzsche is that valuing as a unit within a psychological 
complex would produce a “profound self-alienation” and “undermine the normative dimension 
of valuation,” and those early valuations might be necessary steps in the development of a more 
fully realized self.  In the case of the genuine philosopher undergoing the process of becoming 
who he is, such an individual must not “let himself go” or “let oneself drop,” but he must “find” 
his greatness in “his range and multiplicity, in his wholeness in manifoldness” and how much 
responsibility he can bear to unify himself.106   
In our analysis of the will to power, we should not fall into the tendency of being overly 
systematic or of stripping out all normativity.  John Richardson falls prey to these tendencies in 
his work on Nietzsche’s “System.”  Richardson proposes a systematic account of the will to 
power where “a drive wills power by trying to develop its activity pattern” and “each such 
activity pattern wills its own ‘self-overcoming’ [Selbstüberwindung]: it wills to rise toward a 
new and higher level of effort—perhaps indeed a level at which its internal ends are also 
                                                            
106 See BGE, Sec. 212 for these references and notice how Nietzsche defines “greatness” as 
“being capable of being as manifold as whole, as ample as full.”  Where the genuine philosopher 
must arrive is at his realized self: that self in which he feels at home [zu Hause] with himself and 
at home in the world. 
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overcome and replaced by descendants—one that will then have to be overcome in turn.”107  
Richardson tends to speak of drives as opposed to persons, and he along with Nietzsche 
considers persons as collections of drives.  For Richardson, the will to power neither seeks the 
objects of desires nor desires themselves.  What the will to power seeks is the improvement of 
the activity pattern of each desire—to enhance through sublimation [Sublimierung] or 
spiritualization.   There is a continual process of one mastering drive integrating other “weaker” 
drives into the service of the mastering drive’s end, thereby “enhancing” how that drive actively 
pursues its end, thus increasing its power.  Richardson’s power ontology is a worthy attempt to 
systematize the doctrine of the will to power and integrate it with Nietzsche’s values and his 
perspectivism, but this ontology falters in several respects.  According to Richardson, each drive 
seeks to improve (and enhance) its own pattern of activity, which requires each drive to already 
have an end in place, to pursue that end, to pursue the opposition to that end and to pursue 
overcoming the opposition to that end—all of this stemming from the will to power, which is the 
essence of all drives.  There are some problems with this schema.  Firstly, Richardson’s account 
appears to claim that the will to power is an already-existing phenomenon that is at work, 
developing activity patterns and enhancing those integrative processes, for all drives, and I take 
it, for all human beings.  If this were the case, then any and every drive would originate from the 
will to power, yet needs and drives which are satisfied in a base or vicious manner, and not 
satisfied under the norm of beauty, cannot be constitutive of a realized self and thus also not 
constitutive of a will to power.  Secondly, Richardson seems to place too much personified 
autonomy on a single drive.  Even if it be fictional, or a necessary condition for human 
experience (in Kantian language), some kind of transcendental self must be posited for the 
                                                            
107 Richardson, John. “Nietzsche’s Power Ontology,” in Nietzsche. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, pp. 158-159. 
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possibility of realizing a self which exemplifies a will to power.  We do hold that there is a 
movement from existing as a mere disorganized collection of drives toward some sort of a 
unified self, yet just who is doing the unifying (one particular drive or some already-existing self) 
does not have a clear answer for us.  Richardson does foreground the difficulty in determining 
just what the relation is between a drive and the individual in which it inheres.  There is an 
ambiguity in his claim that a drive itself seeks or wishes to increase its own pattern of activity.  
There is a sense in which each drive has the “aim” of enhancement, but this is only a partial 
account of what is “the goal” of a collection of drives.  The enhancement of each drive’s activity 
pattern aims at the achieving of self-realization.  Realizing a unified self is the ultimate target 
toward which any set of drives takes aim.  What does it mean for a drive to want to enhance its 
pattern of activity?  A drive cannot intend or want anything because it is just a part of a larger 
whole, the larger whole being that collection of drives that is striving for some kind of further 
unification.  An individual can identify himself with his most dominating drive, as a nation might 
identify itself with its strongest class of citizens, yet the drive cannot do or desire anything 
outside of its relation to the whole collection of drives.  Further, the sustained emphasis on what 
the drives are striving for makes it difficult to makes sense of how the relationships between 
individuals develop.  Does a set of my drives bear some attitude?  Can drives (or a drive) do this?  
No, it is an individual who loves another or an individual who is attempting to understand the 
psyche of another.  Nevertheless, it is possible that such an individual qua oligarchy of drives 
and affects may not yet be a realized self.  Thirdly, positing that the will to power is the essence 
of all drives (the basic stuff of the world) and holding that the ultimate goal of that essence is the 
ongoing development of each drive’s “activity pattern” do not allow us to discover when we 
have actually succeeded in performing a genuine action.  It is the case that the will to power is 
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insatiable, and as such “development” never really has a stopping point; however, at what point 
can an individual recognize that he has reached a successful level of development (or that he has 
successfully performed an action)?  I contend that it is when a more fully realized self has been 
brought forward into existence, one that is more whole than a cluster of completely non-
integrated drives.   
This issue leads into my third worry: there is nearly no social or intersubjective aspect to 
Richardson’s power ontology.  Richardson defines human beings as drives early in his account 
when he states that the “ ‘will to power’ is most basically applied not to people but to ‘drives’ or 
‘forces’, simpler units which Nietzsche sometimes even calls ‘points’ and ‘power quanta’.”108  
This seems rather simplistic to consider us to be only or basically drives.  While drives may be 
part of how we are psychologically and conceptually structured, we are more than just that: we 
are human beings and are striving to become whole selves.  There is a more holistic kind of 
unity, even if incomplete or incompletely unified that is already somewhat present in a human 
life.  Finally, Richardson makes Nietzsche a value monist where his supposed principle would be 
the following: “act so as to maximize power in general” and because of this crude reductionism 
the relationship between the will to power and our other values is strained.  If the above were our 
sole principle to act on, then one could not value a friend for his own sake because he would 
have to value him for the sake of increasing one’s own power.  Richardson does address the 
question of “whose power” each ethical agent should be maximizing, but his answer of “power 
egoism” is not quite accurate.109  He views agents very atomistically and ignores our social 
nature, especially the fact that we look to select an other (or a group of others) for their honor 
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and admiration, and more especially to notice when they show disgust or indignation toward 
some act that we have done.  Richardson gets to an impasse between Nietzsche’s idea that each 
agent ought to maximize her own power and Nietzsche’s apparently counter-idea that each agent 
ought to maximize the power of the overman.110  One possible resolution of this impasse 
involves not thinking of the overmen as some distantly future individuals for whom we are 
supposed to devote our lives here and now.  Conceiving of our lives purely instrumentally makes 
little sense.  Who exactly am I living my life for?  When is this future overman supposed to 
arrive on the scene?  Aren’t I supposed to be improving my relationship with myself?  Nowhere 
do we find explicit textual support for the idea that the overman as this separate figure in some 
distant future that Nietzsche thinks we ought to promote.  That is often an assumption that is 
upheld prior to an analysis of the figure of the overman.  The imagery that Zarathustra uses to 
characterize the overman is rendered more intelligible if we conceive of the overman as a 
realized self, one that any free spirit can bring into existence.  For example, Zarathustra portrays 
the overman as a lightning bolt coming forth from a thundercloud, but if we place this image 
alongside Nietzsche’s conception of a genuine philosopher “who is perhaps himself a storm 
pregnant with new lightnings” and who is “a being that often runs away from itself, often is 
afraid of itself—but too inquisitive not to ‘come to’ again—always back to himself,” then the 
image can be understood as the process of achieving self-realization.111  A second image that 
Zarathustra uses to portray the overman is the sea.  He says that man is a polluted stream and that 
one must be a sea in order to be able to receive such a polluted stream without becoming 
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111 For the images of the overman as a lightning bolt, see TSZ, Prologue, Sec. 3, Sec. 4, and Sec. 
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unclean.112  Zarathustra states that the overman is this sea, which represents a complex entity that 
may potentially be at-odds with itself but which has the ability to take in “polluted streams” (un-
sublimated instincts), being conscious of these flowing streams, and transform them into rich and 
variegated “sea” (a fully realized self or overman).  Such a reading especially makes sense if we 
think of how Nietzsche uses the image of the sea qua existence in the GS, but as an existence that 
comprises both danger and hopefulness.  The overman is even pictured as “a supreme 
achievement” in Nietzsche’s reflections in Ecce Homo.113  If we think of the overman as a 
potential higher self that may be discovered/created within each free spirit—and it is possible 
and likely that not everyone is capable of realizing his higher self or being a free spirit—then we 
can have a rough schema about self-realization—one that is partially egoistic, but also one that 
holds the self to potentially include certain others, and thus is partially other-oriented.     
 Recall that in order to better understand the existential need for unity (of the self), we 
should extrapolate the notion of the will to power as it is expressed in Nietzsche’s primary 
works.  Moving on to how Nietzsche expounds the will to power in Beyond Good and Evil, we 
discover new insight into the doctrine mainly in the first part of the work, “On the Prejudices of 
Philosophers,” and in the ninth part, “What is Noble.”  In BGE 13 Nietzsche connects the final 
thought concerning the will to power from the section “On Self-Overcoming” in TSZ with the 
introduction to the doctrine in BGE.  The main distinction is that self-preservation is not the 
cardinal instinct of an organic being but is only one of the indirect and most frequent results of 
the will to power.  The almost exact same idea is also expressed in GS 349.  Here again it is 
important to recognize that Nietzsche is making a claim about the human condition, yet his 
                                                            
112 For the images of the overman as a sea, see TSZ, Prologue, Sec. 3. 
113 EH, “Why I Write Such Good Books,” Sec. 1. 
78 
 
remarks about the will to power will be best understood if correlated with his remarks about the 
complexity of the human psyche and how concepts about the inner world of an individual need 
to be reinterpreted.  One example is the soul-hypothesis: the concept of the soul as something 
indestructible, eternal, indivisible, monadic and atomic does not necessarily have to be thrown 
out, but merely reconceived as “mortal soul,” and “soul as subjective multiplicity,” and “soul as 
social structure of the drives and affects.”114  Nietzsche appropriately acknowledges the 
complexity of the inner world of human willing which involves various (and various kinds of) 
sensations, thinking, a ruling thought, and an affect—the will is a manifold thing, and the word 
“will” cannot capture all that happens in human willing.115  The thought that willing is really 
always composed of a social structure of many “souls” should be an accompanying provision to 
the will to power.  This meets the objection that the notion of the will to power is overly 
simplistic.  Nietzsche has to use language to discuss the will to power as the central motive-force 
behind human existence; yet he is mainly concerned with human beings insofar as they are 
meaning-users and value-creators.  So he is not going to spend time with the vast array of 
physical, biological and chemical processes that occur at the micro-level of human willing.  
There is complexity even at the level of meaning, thought and affect—and it is this dynamic 
configuration of “moving parts” that substantiate human willing.   
In order to resolve this difficulty, we ought to think of the process of achieving self-
realization as a transcendental self sublimating drives into a realized self.  As we will discuss in 
the following section, the process of sublimation makes room for the existence of becoming a 
self and for the potential achieving of self-realization by that becoming self—sublimation 
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provides a middle position between a completely naturalistic picture of “selves” as sacks of 
conflicting drives and a Christian metaphysical picture of “selves” as eternal and indestructible 
souls.   
 
The Satisfaction of the Existential Needs and the Sublimation of a Thousand Drives 
How might a mere collection of animosity-laden drives possibly begin a process of 
cohesion?  Is there a specific name for such a process?  Nietzsche is the first to recognize and to 
begin to explicate the nature of this complex internal psychological activity: its name is 
sublimation (also often referred to as spiritualization).  As we have seen, unity in the traditional 
sense of perfect harmony between parts may have to be rethought.  Is some kind of unity 
possible within an individual even if there is enmity between the drives?  When there is a 
conflict between two drives, the more powerful drive will not completely squash the other into 
oblivion.  It would do better to sublimate the weaker drive into the service of the reigning drive.  
The phenomenon of sublimation arises out of the internal agonistic nature of the drives that 
constitute a human being.   
Even though we must use the Nietzschean notion of sublimation to account for this 
possibility, we must make a departure from his restriction that sublimation can only occur 
beneath consciousness.  It seems that someone can become aware of an instance of sublimation 
(even one that occurred over a period of time) that has occurred in his past.  Becoming aware of 
the sublimation of one particular drive into new channels may make future potential instances of 
sublimation more successful.  Even though most instances of sublimation occur on an 
unconscious level and without our “choice” in the matter, it is possible for such a process to enter 
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into consciousness.  How does this happen?  A first and primary step is self-examination of one’s 
drives, desires, affects, etc.  As discussed earlier, the intellectual conscience can be a tool in 
evaluating a particular “vehement” drive and possibly sublimating that drive through conscious 
thought and action.  There does not have to be complete mutual exclusivity between the 
unconscious and the conscious. 
When Nietzsche refers to an individual being made up of “many mortal souls,” such is a 
metaphor for drives.  In order to demonstrate how sublimation is required for the beauty and self-
mastery characterizing genuine self-realization, we must look at some examples of how the 
process of sublimation works.  It has been argued that neurotic repression occurs in what I am 
calling the failure to achieve self-realization, whereas sublimation occurs in what I refer to as the 
successful achieving of self-realization.116  In other words, those who do not exemplify a will to 
power repress drives that are not so much socially unacceptable, but drives that are unacceptable 
to the free spirit’s vision of itself.  On the other hand, sublimation occurs in those who succeed at 
self-realization and thence do exemplify a will to power—i.e. the drives are not repressed but 
given appropriate expression.  Because, prima facie, sublimation appears to be a mysterious 
process, we will now focus on how sublimation might underwrite the achieving of self-
realization. 
Nietzsche outlines essentially six different methods of how one might possibly combat 
the vehemence of a drive.  Since we are speaking the languages of drives [der Triebe], it is 
important to enhance our understanding of what kinds of drives we have in mind and to do so 
from thinking about the drives that we find in experience.  Ranging in intensity from weakness to 
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ferociousness, some of the more-or-less common drives are the following: the drive to sexual 
enjoyment, the drive to murder for revenge, the drive to steal money, the drive to commit 
suicide, the drive to restfulness, the fear of disgrace, the drive to love, the fear of humiliation, the 
fear of ineffectiveness, the fear of shame, the drive to possess, the fear of failure, the fear of 
purposelessness, the drive to cruelty and the drive for praise.117  For all intents and purposes, this 
non-exhaustive list is comprised of some of the basic drives of the human psyche.  Some of the 
drives refer to “fears” because they are best conceived of in terms of a strong aversion to or a 
forceful pulling away from something that causes one’s humanity to disintegrate or that causes 
one’s self to shrivel down to nothing.   
The first method of sublimation that Nietzsche considers is to avoid opportunities for 
gratification of the drive with the intention of weakening the drive and making it wither away.  
The second method is to implant regularity into the drive which encloses its ebb and flood within 
firm time-boundaries again with the intention of exterminating the drive.  However, these two 
methods are ultimately forms of repression, which are likely to result in neurotic behavior and a 
stunted development of a self.  Nietzsche includes them to contrast the more unhealthy methods 
of combat with the healthier ones.  The third method is to deliberately give oneself over to the 
wild and unrestrained gratification of a drive in order to generate disgust with it.  This method is 
similar to the first two in that it is likely to result in a failure to extinguish the intensity of the 
drive, like “the rider who rode his horse to death and broke his own neck in the process.”118  The 
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fourth method of combating a drive is to associate its gratification in general so firmly with some 
very painful thought that the gratification of that drive comes to be experienced as painful.  This 
method is slightly more sophisticated because it does not seek to destroy the vehement drive.  
Instead, it associates the vehement drive with imagined or potentially real bad consequences that 
would arise from its continued existence.  Its sophistication lies in its “intellectual artifice.”  
Nevertheless, this method is still akin to the first three because it is an unconscious attempt to 
eliminate the vehement drive.  All of these methods assume that it is possible to completely 
extirpate one of the more vehement drives.  While it may be possible to entirely extirpate a drive, 
it nevertheless would seem to require a great deal of spiritual effort.  Even though it is possible to 
fully rid oneself of a drive, it may not be possible to destroy the existential needs, which have a 
certain foundational primacy underneath an individual’s diverse set of drives.  The force of each 
of these drives is rooted in the “chemistry” of our existential needs: we are compounds made up 
of instincts, imagination, reason, consciousness—all or any of which may be masked drives 
themselves.  In other words, there is a certain quantum of energy behind one’s reason, behind 
one’s intellect, behind one’s imagination and behind each of the “faculties” of our inner 
experience.  Because of this forcefulness of each of these faculties, we can say that they are the 
skeletal framework fleshed out by developed and developing drives.  Let us jump to the sixth 
method which is to generally weaken and exhaust the entire bodily and physical organism, 
thereby weakening the vehement drive.  This method is less than ideal because of its more 
comprehensively life-negating quality.  To sacrifice one’s body simply in order to combat a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
horse is a lover of moderation [sōphrosunē] and shame [aidōs]; and the black horse is a lover of 
pride [hubris] and boasting [alazoneia].  It is interesting to notice that it is the two horses that 
ultimately control the movement of the charioteer, not the other way around.  All that the 
charioteer can do is to “rein in” the “vehemence” of his horses.  The charioteer cannot destroy 
his horses, or he would surely “break his own neck.” 
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single violent drive would be to sacrifice the possibility of self-realization.  The body plays too 
integral a role in the process of self-realization to give it up.119   
Nietzsche’s fifth method of combating a vehement drive is the one involving actual 
sublimation and works in the following manner:  
…one brings about a dislocation of one’s quanta of strength by imposing on oneself a 
particularly difficult and strenuous labor, or by deliberately subjecting oneself to a new 
stimulus and pleasure and thus directing one’s thoughts and plays of physical forces into 
other channels.  It comes to the same thing if one for the time being favours another 
drive, gives it ample opportunity for gratification and thus makes it squander that energy 
otherwise available to the drive which through its vehemence has grown burdensome.120 
The vehement drive, disapproved and unaccepted by the individual and society, transforms itself 
into a new drive that can be approved and accepted.  The channels into which the overly violent 
drive flows may retain some semblance of the pre-sublimated drive: cruelty sublimated into 
punishment; sexuality sublimated into art; possession sublimated into love; “evil” actions 
sublimated into “good” actions.121  The distinction between the existential needs and the drives, 
                                                            
119 In “On the Despisers of the Body,” Zarathustra states, “Behind your thoughts and feelings, 
my brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage—whose name is self.  In your body he 
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his recognition that he is the higher self to which the ego, the reason, the sense and the spirit all 
aim.  Of these instruments, the higher self says they are: “A detour to my end.  I am the leading 
strings of the ego and the prompter of its concepts.”   
120 D, Sec. 109. 
121 See HAH, Sec. 107 for another set of related thoughts on the error of belief/faith in opposites.  
Even though the central theme of this section is that humankind is a part of nature and that 
everything that occurs in nature happens out of necessity, Nietzsche does still hold that genuine 
freedom is possible.  Three passages reveal this: 1) Nietzsche’s metaphor that mankind is a 
butterfly that wants to tear itself out of its cocoon ends with it beholding the light, which he 
refers to as “the realm of freedom.”  2) Nietzsche suggests that the belief that that “everything is 
necessary” is itself necessary, but its necessity seems more like a necessity for humanity to reach 
some goal and not a strictly epistemic necessity.  3) Regarding the domain of morality, Nietzsche 
claims that despite the mutability of all moral “phenomena” (interpretations), “everything is also 
flooding forward, and towards one goal.”  This goal is either genuine freedom, the realization of 
real selves, or perhaps some combination of the two in which fully realized selves exemplify the 
will to power and do so with genuine freedom.   
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which are all extensions of the more basic needs, should be recognized here.  The sublimation of 
some inner entity implies an attempt to annihilate that entity upon its sublimation where the 
entity in which it transforms itself replaces the former one.  An individual’s drives are what are 
sublimated, for the drives are entities that can be, and sometimes ought to be, extinguished.  On 
the other hand, the existential needs are the raw materials of what we are—walking 
contradictions between our instincts and our consciousness—and they cannot be extinguished, 
for to do so would be to cease to be human.  Despite this distinction that complexifies our picture 
of the psyche, the process of sublimation does appear to play a crucial role in the realization of a 
self.  The more refined the processes of sublimation are—the closer will an individual be to 
achieving self-realization: this is the primary sense of what it means to exemplify the will to 
power.  Bear in mind that the fundamental norm of need-satisfaction is that it is performed for 
the sake of the beautiful and that acting for the sake of the beautiful involves some kind of self-
mastery, especially the conscious self-mastery over one’s instincts and needs.  Both the elements 
of beauty and self-mastery appear to be inextricably linked to sublimation.  When an individual 
manifests the most elevated form of the will to power, such a refined activity of sublimated 
drives finds itself as a process beautification. 
   
The Existential Need for a Relation of Self-Love  
The notion of the self as multiplicity (or at least as duality in which the self “sees” and 
“relates” to itself) and this continual return to the self’s complex inner world has influenced me 
to add a further existential need to Fromm’s list: the need for a loving relationship to one’s self.  
The need to form a loving relationship to one’s self ought to be added because the previous 
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needs do not sufficiently address the “many mortal souls” that exist within a single individual 
and how those souls quarrel and potentially can coexist without internal discord.  The kinds of 
inner discord that we are most concerned with result from feelings of impotence, self-contempt 
and resentment that have the potential to be externalized toward others.  Christine Swanton says 
that self-love is a solid bonding with oneself expressing strength, vitality and energy, one that is 
devoid of the resentment of the threatened, vulnerable, hostile and envious.122  Such harmful 
feelings turn inward when the human needs remain present yet when these existential needs 
cannot be satisfied (and hence when the self undergoes dissolution).  It seems that the various 
forms of self-hate and self-contempt that frequently arise in the face of this discord prohibit a 
real self from being fully realized.  Whether it be of the whole or of a part of oneself, self-hatred 
causes further fragmentation in which there is inner distance between the parts of a self but no 
communication between such parts.  Similarly, certain forms of self-contempt that do not allow 
healthy growth and development stifle the possibility of realized selfhood.  Along with 
Nietzsche’s idea that thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier, simpler, 
I assume that the affects possess a primacy over cognitions.123  This being the case, the affect 
oriented toward oneself that best exemplifies beauty is that of love.  All of the existential 
needs—including that of self-love—coalesce into a kind of harmony between instincts and 
consciousness which makes possible the achieving of self-realization, and it is this undertaking 
that I take the will to power to be.   
First, how does one go about developing self-love?  It might be useful to provide some 
examples of how one can fail to love oneself.  Imagine a vindictive person—let’s call him Mr. 
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V—who must humiliate and triumph over everyone with whom he comes into contact.  Mr. V 
glorifies that aspect of himself in which he does have a high degree of power, perhaps in logical 
acuity and conceptual analysis.  His superiority in intellectual games and abstract theoretical 
analysis spills over into how he sees his whole self, causing him to feel superior in toto to others.  
However, in focusing his efforts on showing his felt superiority over others through humiliating 
and shaming them in their intellectual deficiencies, he simultaneously represses his inability to 
care for others and develop strong emotional attachments to them.  Mr. V may feel contemptuous 
towards his inability to enter into romantic relationships and thus tends to be especially rude to 
intelligent women, who threaten his glorified self.  The relationship that Mr. V has with himself 
is one of self-contempt and self-hatred: he hates himself for not being more physically attractive, 
for lacking the ability to be intimate and for being the primary source of his own loneliness and 
solitude.  I draw the example of Mr. V from what Karen Horney calls the arrogant-vindictive 
type, which is merely one of three sub-types (the narcissistic, the perfectionistic and the arrogant-
vindictive type) in which the despised self is repressed and the individual identifies himself 
completely with his idealized self.124 
 A second example of a failure to develop a loving relationship to oneself is that of a 
person who undergoes a shrinking process where everything is sacrificed in order to achieve love 
from others.  Imagine a person that we can call Mrs. E who views all manifestations of 
selfishness and aggression as taboos.  Mrs. E experiences herself as mostly helpless and as not 
having many talents or even the resources to develop the few talents that she possesses.  Because 
of her inability to be effective or to have any sway over those who are ambitious, she idealizes 
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the image of herself into “a composite of ‘lovable’ qualities, such as unselfishness, goodness, 
generosity, humility, saintliness, nobility, [and] sympathy.”125  The character traits of a subdued 
self become virtues to be praised for Mrs. E.  Such an individual bears a strong resemblance to 
the individual experiencing ressentiment in Nietzsche’s Genealogy, where an imaginary revenge 
takes place against those who are strong and powerful.126  The key to why the self-effacing 
neurotic solution prohibits the development of building a relation of self-love is that the self 
approximates to a point that approaches self-annihilation.  Because Mrs. E sacrifices everything 
to be loved by others, one of things that she has sacrificed is herself.  This is counter to some of 
Nietzsche’s suggestions that faith in oneself can only be acquired through a dialogue between the 
skeptic and the doer both inside an individual, and it is by way of good, beautiful and great 
actions that the doer can overcome the skeptic, thereby achieving and maintaining a love for 
oneself.127   
 A third example of how one might fail to develop a relation of self-love is by resigning 
from active living.  Let’s call our third neurotic Mr. R.  This individual has settled for a peace 
which is merely the absence of conflicts, and the direct expression of this neurotic solution is his 
being an onlooker at himself and his life.  Mr. R does not strive to achieve anything and has an 
aversion to effort, influence, pressure, coercion, ties of any kind or change—he has resigned 
from the conflicts between the pride of the idealized self and the inner “should’s” of the despised 
self.  Mr. R experiences himself as having achieved a freedom from his inner conflicts and a 
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88 
 
freedom from human attachments.  His idealized image is a composite of self-sufficiency, 
independence, self-contained serenity, freedom from desires and passions, stoicism, and 
fairness.128  The space where Mr. R hides, or “has freedom from,” the world is on his couch 
watching hours and hours of television and living vicariously through the doings of fictional 
characters, only to wake up one day and realize that he has spent his entire life, not in the whoop 
and whirl of life, but as a resigned couch potato.129  Because Mr. R never does anything, he 
cannot be praised for doing anything and there is then no self there to love. 
 Thus it appears that the three modes of neuroses—the appeal to mastery, the appeal to 
(neighborly) love and the appeal to freedom—make a relation of self-love impossible.  The 
absence of the satisfaction of this existential need prohibits the possibility of achieving self-
realization.  To get a better picture of why the satisfaction of the existential need for self-love is a 
requirement for the overall possibility of achieving self-realization, we ought to think of what the 
opposite sort of relation to oneself might produce.  What is going on inside one who undergoes 
self-hate, and what are the consequences of this relation?  Horney outlines six modes of 
operation (or expressions) of self-hate: relentless demands on the self, merciless self-accusation, 
self-contempt, self-frustrations, self-tormenting and self-destruction.130  The common 
phenomenon in all of these modes of operation is “the should” and the pride system tyrannizing 
the real self.  Neurotics are driven to reach beyond themselves and do so by setting absolute 
values to be the measuring rod by which they measure themselves.  The neurotic must be as 
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charitable as possible, the best lover possible, the most successful businessman, the most selfless 
as she can possibly be…all of which become oppressive demands because they are unreasonable 
or even impossible to meet.  The neurotic’s pride is then damaged by the inability to “measure 
up” to the created absolute dictates.  He then feels contempt, hatred, and/or frustration toward 
himself.  He despises his powerlessness.  The potential results are a stunting of the growth and 
development of the real self and potentially even self-destruction.  What is the end game for one 
who sets goals/values that are impossible to meet?  There is no end game.  There is only the 
continual and progressive tormenting of the self by the self, even if this occurs on an 
unconscious level.   
 This kind of self-contempt is not the same attitude as that of self-dissatisfaction.  On the 
one hand, to feel contempt towards oneself is necessarily pejorative and such an attitude is 
caused by some deficiency or excess in one’s life.  That to which one directs a contemptuous 
attitude is perceived as worthless and hopelessly vile, or at least so much so that such would not 
be worthy of an attempt at redemption.  But does self-contempt always result in a failure to make 
headway in the process of self-realization?  One might argue that there is sometimes a need for 
self-contempt, or ask the question: How do we distinguish between the self-contempt that 
contributes to producing a realized-self, or ‘who I am,’ and the self-contempt that does not?  Or 
with my distinction: How do we distinguish between self-contempt and self-dissatisfaction?  
Nietzsche may help provide an answer.  In the GM, he describes the attitude that someone with a 
bad conscience possesses toward himself: someone who fails to satisfy his need for effectiveness 
and internalizes this need due to one of many forms of external restraint imposed by society and 
civilization:  
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This secret self-ravishment, this artists’ cruelty, this delight in imposing a form upon 
oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material and in burning a will, a critique, a 
contradiction, a contempt, a No into it, this uncanny, dreadfully joyous labor of a soul 
voluntarily at odds with itself that makes itself suffer out of joy in making suffer—
eventually this entire active “bad conscience”—you will have guessed it—as the womb 
of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to light an abundance of strange 
new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself.—After all, what would be 
“beautiful” if the contradiction had not first become conscious of itself, if the ugly had 
not first said to itself: “I am ugly”?131 
The norm of beauty here plays a role.  If an individual with an attitude of self-contempt results in 
the lowering of humankind or some portion of it, then he chooses a disfiguring mode of need-
satisfaction.  However, if an individual possesses self-contempt (or self-dissatisfaction) and 
recognizes the contradictory nature of the bad conscience, then such a self-conscious soul might 
give birth to beauty.  In other words, self-contempt can be viewed as an incurable cancer or as a 
pregnancy, just as there are two primary ways of viewing the bad conscience.132  The former fails 
to move beyond the internalization of its instinct for freedom, while the latter imagines a 
possibility of realizing the instinct for freedom.  Keep in mind that Nietzsche equivocates the 
“instinct for freedom” with the will to power, and hence, by “instinct for freedom” I mean the 
achieving of self-realization.  Where self-contempt is a purely negative stance towards oneself, 
self-dissatisfaction is simultaneously a negative and a positive stance towards oneself.  Robert 
Pippen describes this state of self-dissatisfaction in the following terms:  
All action involves a negation of a sort, an alteration of what would have remained the 
same without one’s intervention, but Nietzsche appears particularly interested in a kind of 
inward-looking self-negation, a transformation of what had been a subject’s restraints, or 
commitments, basic desires or passions, all in a way that makes possible a new kind of 
outward-looking relation to the world.  In those paradigmatic cases (where, especially, 
                                                            
131 GM, Third Essay, Sec. 18.  One might argue that the “instinct to cruelty” should be on the list 
of existential needs.  This is incorrect.  The instinct to cruelty is an extension of the more basic 
need for effectiveness, or more precisely, cruelty is one mode of response to this need.    
132 See GM, Third Essay, Sec. 19. 
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the direction and course of one’s whole life are at stake), he often focuses our attention 
on what he calls a “tension of the spirit” that allows a genuine “self-overcoming.”133 
So, Pippen’s claim that self-dissatisfaction allows self-overcoming and genuine agency coincides 
with my claim that self-dissatisfaction allows the achieving of self-realization. 
Another mode by which self-hate might exist is when an individual acts under the 
assumption that he has not set any values to guide his existence.  Even though it appears that 
such a person is “beyond value,” he is still valuing the feeling of power derived from harming 
others.  For example, the profiteering hedge fund manager (or the Modern Blond Beast) whose 
primary goal is to greedily make as much money as possible through whatever means of 
manipulation and deception, does what he pleases regardless of who it harms.  He acts only to 
satisfy his greed (and any number of figures could replace him: the corrupt politician, the 
insurance salesman, the banker, the CEO of B.P. Oil, etc.).   This figure’s conscience may never 
come to recognize his vices; however, such a figure may possibly come to experience self-hate if 
he were to realize his identification with his idealized self, i.e. the epitome of capitalist wealth 
taken to the extreme without restraint.  In a general sense, feelings of guilt, shame, remorse and 
regret are the sparks that ignite the warring factions within a self.  It is more than just a 
decentralization of drives.  It is a desire to extinguish that which cannot be destroyed (the self) 
and a desire to extinguish the self without justification, at least in the cases in which absolute 
values have become tyrannical.  In the case where it is simply the wrong values that are being 
tyrannical (greed or apathy), it is possible that the desire to punish the self may become coercive 
instead of being directed towards self-improvement or moral education.  As far as our social 
existence goes, the problem with self-hate is its strong tendency to be externalized toward our 
                                                            
133 Pippen, Robert. Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2010, p.112. 
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interpersonal relationships.  Horney echoes a thought that is already present in Nietzsche: “We 
have cause to fear him who hates himself, for we shall be the victims of his wrath and his 
revenge.  Let us therefore see if we cannot seduce him into loving himself!”134  This hatred of 
others further minimizes the possibility of others being genuine companions of any sort, a 
deficiency of rootedness which thereby diminishes the possibility of self-realization.  We will 
return to this issue of the relatedness between a self and others in the discussion of friendship in 
chapter five. 
 Another kind of self-hate is that which is promulgated by Christianity’s dogmatic view 
that humankind is sinful and that we are forever in need of redemption from our sinful nature.  If 
we are sinful by nature and if hatred is one of the common passions felt by sinners, then we are 
also hateful by nature.  But how could one ever develop a relation of self-love under such a 
picture?  Nietzsche suggests forgiveness as a means of transforming this self-relation from one of 
guilt and shame into one of love:  
If, as Pascal and Christianity maintain, our ego is always hateful, how could we ever 
allow and accept that another should love it—whether god or man!  It would be contrary 
to all decency to let oneself be loved while being all the time well aware that one 
deserves only hatred—not to speak of other defensive sensations. —‘But this precisely is 
the realm of clemency.’ —Is your love of your neighbor an act of clemency, then?  Your 
pity an act of clemency?  Well, if you are capable of this, go a step further: love 
yourselves as an act of clemency—then you will no longer have any need of your god, 
and the whole drama of Fall and Redemption will be played out to the end in you 
yourselves!135 
This passage seems to be the beginning of a new movement of argument present in Daybreak, 
one inquiring into the possibility of self-love and the possibility of loving others.  Under the 
Judeo-Christian moral guise, we appear to need forgiveness for how we exist from God and 
                                                            
134 D, Sec. 517. 
135 D, Sec. 79. 
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neighbor, yet if are waiting for divine forgiveness or forgiveness from other selves (neither of 
which can possibly know us), then we will be waiting for an eternity.  If these are the conditions 
for self-love, then self-love becomes impossible to attain.  However, if one re-focuses on 
developing a relation of self-love with oneself—as an attitude of amor fati perhaps136—then it is 
possible to recognize the nonexistence of one’s “sinful nature” imposed from God and neighbor.  
Not that every feeling of guilt or shame is inappropriate, but the mere acknowledgement that 
many of such self-negating feelings are self-imposed is a small step toward inner integration. 
 Does Nietzsche have a positive account of self-love?  Yes, there is an account of self-love 
in Nietzsche’s works, but it must be pieced together from various sources.  In the section entitled 
“The Spirit of Gravity,” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra characterizes self-love as something not simply 
possessed by all human beings but as something that one has to learn.  Thus begins the 
ambiguous status of whether self-love (and love in general) is something that can be taught and 
learned at all.  Zarathustra proclaims the following good news:  
But whoever would become light and a bird must love himself: thus I teach.  Not, to be 
sure, with the love of the wilting and wasting: for among those even self-love stinks.  One 
must learn to love oneself—thus I teach—with a wholesome and healthy love, so that one 
can bear to be with oneself and need not roam.  Such roaming baptizes itself “love of the 
neighbor”: with this phrase the best lies and hypocrisies have been perpetrated so far, and 
especially by such as were a grave burden for all the world.  And verily, this is no 
command for today and tomorrow, to learn to love oneself.  Rather, it is of all arts the 
subtlest, the most cunning, the ultimate, and the most patient.  For whatever is his own is 
well concealed from the owner; and of all treasures, it is our own that we dig up last: thus 
the spirit of gravity orders it.137 
Two curious thoughts present themselves in this passage.  The first is that self-love is not 
something to which everyone should aspire.  If one possesses a poor character that is “wilting 
                                                            
136 See GS 276 for Nietzsche’s initial account of amor fati and EH, “Why I Am So Clever,” Sec. 
10 for further thoughts on the attitude. 
137 TSZ, “On the Spirit of Gravity,” Sec. 2. 
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and wasting,” then one should not love oneself, for there is not anything there that is lovable.  
However, if one possesses a more free-spirited character whose love is “wholesome and 
healthy,” then such a person ought to work to develop the relation of self-love.138  The second 
curious thought is that Zarathustra teaches those who can fly “to learn to love oneself” and yet he 
also says that this command, “to learn to love oneself,” is not a command for today and 
tomorrow.  Rather than completely negate itself, this further suggestion that Zarathustra’s 
teaching is not a command for the present and for the future may indicate that self-love is not 
something that can be learned.  It is either present but concealed within an individual, or it is not 
present and will never be so.  Instead of being learned, perhaps self-love is something that is 
realized through one’s actions both toward oneself and toward others.  Such a process of 
realization would be one that requires “subtlety”, “cunning”, and “patience,” for the instinct-
consciousness split can be a source of self-deception.  Insofar as one’s instincts (and existential 
needs) are frustrated or are not satisfied for the sake of the beautiful, there is the possibility that 
those coarsened instincts will be unconsciously disguised often by moral masks that glorify 
passivity, humility and compassion.  Disgusted by his own weakness, an individual will turn a 
blind eye toward himself, as a mere set of frustrated instincts, and the individual qua frustrated 
instincts will hide from himself as consciousness.  Such is the dimension that is “concealed from 
his owner”—one does not conceal what is beautiful; one conceals what is ugly, deformed and 
frustrated.  The “treasure” that we may potentially “dig up” at last is not a treasure that one 
simply and purely discovers, like a treasure on a deserted island.  The digging up of the treasure 
of selfhood is more a realization, which is a blend of discovery and creation.  Digging up a self 
                                                            
138 This distinction is similar to the one Aristotle makes in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics 
that a person who performs beautiful actions should love himself while a corrupt person who 
follows base passions should not love himself.  See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Joe 
Sachs. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002, 1169a10-1169b1. 
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takes work!  This is the sense in which a subtle inner-look, a cunning seeker and a patient creator 
are all required for the activity of self-realization.   
 The ambiguity between whether love is learnable or not learnable continues in Book Four 
of the GS.  Here Nietzsche compares learning to hear a figure and melody in music to learning to 
love.  He seems to go back to the idea that it is possible for love to be learned, especially love for 
oneself.  He says: 
In the end we are always rewarded for our good will, our patience, our fair-mindedness, 
and gentleness with what is strange; gradually, it sheds its veil and turns out to be a new 
and indescribable beauty.  That is its thanks for our hospitality.  Even those who love 
themselves will have learned it in this way; for there is no other way.  Love, too, has to be 
learned.139 
There is a sense in which everything outside of oneself is strange and perceived as other.  
Nietzsche highlights this strangeness of otherness that at first causes trepidation but that a 
person’s beauty may become familiar despite its former unknown quality.  It is interesting that 
Nietzsche ends this passage with the thought that self-love must be learned in this way: the 
overcoming of beauty’s strangeness.  The object of love must possess beauty, which continues 
the argument begun on self-love in TSZ.  However, there is a kind of blurring between the 
possession of beauty and the fashioning of beauty.  Should one adopt a truthful attitude or an 
artistic attitude toward the fatalistic dimension of one’s existence?  Well, one ought to be capable 
of doing both, depending which facets of one’s existence are being attended to.  David Owen 
claims that Nietzsche’s idea of self-love is the valuing of the disposition of amor fati.140  By 
“valuing,” he seems to mean that self-love is the “adoption” of the disposition of amor fati.  
                                                            
139 GS, Sec. 334. 
140 Owen, David. “Autonomy, Self-Respect, and Self-Love: Nietzsche on Ethical Agency,” in 
Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Eds. Ken Gemes and Simon May. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009, pp. 212-220. 
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Owen is on the right track here, for there is an element of artistic illusion toward those aspects of 
one’s existence that could possibly prevent one from living well and there is also an element of 
truthfulness that is required to “face up” to the aspects of one’s existence that cannot be altered.  
One caution to Owen’s conception of self-love is that seeing parts of one’s fate as beautiful may 
potentially slip into a form of self-deception.  One who makes himself a “poet of his life” will 
likely have the ability to discriminate between those fatalistic qualities which cannot be changed 
and those fatalistic qualities that can possibly be improved upon.   
The theme of self-love is expressed in the section of the GS entitled “One thing is 
needful,” yet one will easily misunderstand the main idea if one does not ruminate properly.  The 
passage opens with the line, “To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art!”  This 
begins the explanation of how strong and weak natures differ in the aesthetic attitudes they bear 
toward themselves.  The subjective constraint of style will be loved by strong natures who can 
bear what fate has given them, but the constraint of style will be hated by weak natures who 
cannot stand the sight of what fate has thrown at them.  What is it that is often so misunderstood 
though?  The one thing that is needful is not the giving of style to one’s character.  Something 
else must be gained before that.  Near the very end of this same section, Nietzsche expresses the 
salience of the existential need of self-love: 
For one thing is needful: that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself, 
whether it be by means of this or that poetry and art; only then is a human being at all 
tolerable to behold.  Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for 
revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight.  For 
the sight of what is ugly makes one bad and gloomy.141 
One cannot be anyone else other that who he is.  One is spit into the world as a being that has not 
and cannot possibly have freely given the world permission to thrust one into existence.  We are 
                                                            
141 GS, Sec. 290. 
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responsible for fostering the kind of affective attitude that we have towards our own existence 
though.  Nietzsche considers self-satisfaction to be the mode of self-orientation that is performed 
for the sake of the beautiful, while “dissatisfaction” with oneself is a mode of self-orientation 
which can manifest itself in vengeful actions toward oneself or be externalized into shameful 
actions committed against others.  Nietzsche claims that the relation one ought to have with 
oneself is that of satisfaction [Zufriedenheit]—a relation that he also speaks of in terms of self-
love.  Where the weak characters “hate” [hassen] the constraint of style, it can reasonably be said 
that the strong characters love the constraint of style.  Adopting a loving attitude toward “the 
style” that is presented to oneself by one’s own inner dialogical nature seems to be nearly 
identical to self-love: a love of one’s fate to be who one is.   
Nietzsche’s theme of self-love continues into BGE where self-love presents itself as a 
mark of distinction of the noble soul.  He solidifies the thought that not everyone is capable of 
nobility of soul.  Those who seek it are separate from those who simply possess it.  The closeness 
between faith, reverence and love for oneself is also further explained:  
It is not the works [of a noble soul], it is the faith that is decisive here, that determines the 
order of rank—to take up again an ancient religious formula in a new and more profound 
sense: some fundamental certainty that a noble soul has about itself, something that 
cannot be sought, nor found, nor perhaps lost.  The noble soul has reverence for itself.142  
 Through an exploration of what constitutes the seven existential needs and the salient 
ways in which we as human beings can satisfy these needs, we have gained a new understanding 
of how an individual can undergo and achieve self-realization.  When a self is realized under the 
norm of beauty, as discussed in chapter two, one does in fact exemplify the will to power.  In the 
next chapter, we will look more closely at the ontological status of the will to power.  I have 
                                                            
142 BGE, Sec. 287. 
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described it as a human achievement that is conditioned both by one’s already existing relation to 
happiness/unhappiness and by one’s social and political setting.  We will consider the possibility 
that the will to power is a self-conscious myth that merely expresses Nietzsche’s values.  Upon 
replying to this worry, we will look at types of human beings who serve as models that 
exemplify the will to power, in order to apprehend a more concrete picture of who a fully 
realized self would be.   
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Chapter Four 
The Status of the Will to Power: Myth or Truth?...The Status of Philosophy: Art or 
Science?   
What is the ontological status of the will to power?  What mode of existence does it 
occupy?  Properly understood, the will to power is a specific kind of human achievement—i.e. 
the realization of a self.  Because it is an achieving of self-realization, it is a mistake to conceive 
of the will to power as a metaphysical phenomenon.  It cannot be reduced to a metaphysical first 
principle, nor can it simply be reduced to a moral first principle.  The reductionist account of the 
will to power holds that all “quanta of force” are manifestations of a single primary drive—they 
are reducible to the drive for power.143  The reductionist view is sometimes framed to include not 
just human drives (the weaker reductionist view) but all drives in the universe (the stronger 
reductionist view) and is read as some kind of metaphysical view of the world.  This common 
misunderstanding is put together from passages usually taken willy-nilly from Nietzsche’s 
unpublished Nachlass such as the following:  
And do you know what “the world” is to me?  Shall I show it to you in my mirror?  This 
world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of 
force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms 
itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but 
likewise without increase or income;…this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-
creating, eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the two-fold voluptuous delight, 
my “beyond good and evil,” without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; 
without will, unless a ring feels goodwill towards itself—do you want a name for this 
world?  A solution for all its riddles?  A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, 
                                                            
143 Thomas Hurka is one scholar who holds this view.  See his “Nietzsche: Perfectionist,” in 
Nietzsche and Morality. Ed. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu. New York: Clarendon Press, 2007, 
pp. 9-31. 
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most intrepid, most midnightly men?—This world is the will to power—and nothing 
besides!  And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!144 
We should not look to unpublished notes to decipher the meaning of the doctrine of the will to 
power, especially when Nietzsche clearly expresses his distaste for metaphysical pictures of 
reality.  As an opponent of metaphysicians and anti-naturalists, we might think of Nietzsche as 
an anti-anti-naturalist.  He was concerned with re-integrating man back into nature.  He 
recognized and attempted an upheaval of the errors of ancient Greek metaphysicians such as 
Parmenides and Plato, the long tradition of Christian metaphysics, and the transcendental (and 
seemingly metaphysical) notion of the will that held center stage in German philosophy in the 
century and a half before him.  The grandiose and other-worldly metaphysical systems that were 
conceived by Parmenides, Plato, Aquinas, Leibniz, Schopenhauer or Hegel were too far reaching 
into that which was “unknowable” and more importantly into that which was “unimportant” 
(beyond what is human, all too human).  In the chapter entitled “Of First and Last Things,” he 
says: 
For one could assert nothing at all of the metaphysical world except that it was a being-
other, an inaccessible, incomprehensible being-other; it would be a thing with negative 
qualities.—Even if the existence of such a world were never so well demonstrated, it is 
certain that knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledge: more useless 
even than the chemical composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of 
shipwreck.145 
The weaker reductionist view that all human drives are expressions of the will to power implies 
that no drive could be opposed to any other drive because there is really only one drive ever at 
work, the drive for power, even if it wears different masks.  If all human drives were reduced to 
one drive, then it seems that the doctrine would not capture the internally conflicting nature of 
                                                            
144 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1967, Sec. 1067. 
145 HAH, Vol. I, Sec. 9. 
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the drives present in human psychology.  Such a view would be an oversimplification.  An even 
more pressing problem for the weaker reductionist view is that it presupposes that the will to 
power is already operative in everything that we do—whether we are expressing a drive for sex, 
a drive for a sense of belonging in a community, a drive to have as much wealth as possible, a 
drive to social prestige, a drive to dominate or possess another person, or whatever.  If 
formulated in this manner, everyone would have access to the will to power because everyone 
would already always be operating under its sway.  Such a proposal makes it difficult to explain 
the magnitude of apathy, sloth and boredom that exist for us as human beings.  Such vicious 
conditions seem to have only become more pervasive in modernity with the exponential rise of 
industry and technology.  How is the absence of a desire to do anything a manifestation of the 
will to power?  Or how is not having the desire to desire anything a manifestation of the will to 
power?  The reduction of the will to power to a fundamental meta-drive underlying all human 
drives that is already in  existence further distances the possibility of the will to power that we 
are interested in (and that Nietzsche was interested in) from its birth, in and out of our existential 
needs, and its connection to genuine autonomy and unified selfhood.  In addition, the doctrine of 
the will to power should be understood as applying only to human beings.  Although we operate 
under the assumption that we are moral beings, we need to be careful in what way we can 
possibly be normatively evaluated.  Our existential needs are not moral phenomena, but there 
will be a sense in which we can morally praise or blame the will to power.146  It is a human 
potential that, depending on the degree of success or failure of the achieving of self-realization, 
                                                            
146 We might also refer to the needs that I will be discussing as “biopyschosocial” needs.  I think 
that referring to them as “existential” captures this multi-dimensional essence of needs.  Further, 
I take “need” to be somewhat of a basic term: the compulsion to fill an emptiness; an inner force 
of striving toward something.   
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determines what kind of character one will develop and how that character will exemplify 
strength or weakness, virtue or vice, and excellence or baseness.   
Moving beyond the absolute metaphysical and moral conceptions of the will to power, 
we must further ruminate on the curious status of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power.  The 
one passage in BGE that serves as a potential threat to my account of the will to power is section 
36, the only place where Nietzsche actually provides an argument for the existence of the will to 
power.  In a sense the entire aphorism composes “the argument” for what the nature of the will to 
power might possibly be, but the core of Nietzsche’s line of reasoning lies in the last paragraph 
of BGE 36:  
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the 
development and ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to 
power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this 
will to power and one could also find in it the solution to the problem of procreation and 
nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to determine all 
efficient force univocally as—will to power.  The world viewed from inside, the world 
defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to 
power” and nothing else.— 
As Maudemarie Clark has argued in her writings on the will to power, the problem is that the 
argument is given in the subjunctive tense and not in the declarative.147  So she claims that 
Nietzsche merely makes the supposition that all organic functions are rooted in the will to power.  
If that supposition were true, then we would have gained the right to determine all efficient force 
univocally as the will to power.  Then, Nietzsche’s conclusion is that the world would then be 
will to power and nothing else (and not that is actually is.)  Does the argument here tell against 
interpreting the will to power as a doctrine that is Nietzsche’s actual position?  Is Nietzsche 
being ironic?  Is he suggesting that the doctrine is a mere expression of something that he values 
                                                            
147 Clark, Maudemarie. “Nietzsche’s Doctrines of the Will to Power,” Nietzsche. Ed. John 
Richardson and Brian Leiter. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 145-146. 
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and not saying something about the actual nature of human life?  Clark claims that he is.  We 
must specifically show why Clark’s account of the will is incorrect if we are to view the will to 
power as humanity’s potential achieving of self-realization and not a mere expression of 
Nietzsche’s values.     
Clark claims that Nietzsche in fact espouses two doctrines of the will to power: an 
ontological doctrine and a psychological doctrine.  According to Clark, the ontological doctrine 
of the will to power is that the concept is a self-conscious myth giving us a picture or image of 
reality which is not intended to provide knowledge, but is supposed to play a role in the 
interpretation of experience and the furtherance of life.148  On the other hand, the psychological 
doctrine of the will to power is that it is “the most life-affirming drive in the sense that the 
satisfaction of this drive, a sense of power, of the ability to enforce one’s will, is necessary for 
the affirmation of life, whereas a sense of powerlessness induces depression and a tendency to 
passive nihilism.”149  Clark claims that the ontological doctrine of the will to power is a product 
of Nietzsche’s viewing philosophy as an art and not as a science, and she draws this thought 
from his early notebooks.  Clark believes that because Nietzsche conceives of philosophy as an 
art, it cannot be something that is true or false but is the conceptual representation of a myth—a 
self-conscious myth that creates the world in the image of what Nietzsche happens to value.150   
This conception of the ontological doctrine is misguided.  The supposed two doctrines, 
ontological and psychological, are one and the same.  There is no doctrine of the will to power 
whose ontological status is that of a self-conscious myth.  There is only one doctrine of the will 
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149 Clark, p. 148. 
150 Clark, pp. 142-143. 
104 
 
to power that can be defined as the achieving of self-realization, which is psychological in nature 
and which engages in a dialogical relationship with our existential needs.   
Why reject Clark’s proposal that the will to power’s ontological status is a self-conscious 
myth?  First, the textual evidence for the ideas that Nietzsche considers philosophy to be an art 
and that he intends the will to power to be a myth come from early notebooks which were not 
published.  This renders the material somewhat dubious as to what degree it represents the core 
of Nietzsche’s thought on the nature of philosophy.  The material in his early notebooks is a 
collection of notes, not polished reflections on the human condition, the nature of philosophy and 
the will to power.  Even though it may not be the best source to solidify Nietzsche’s thought; 
however, it may still be consulted to support the primary material found in the published texts.  If 
we do venture to use the ideas expressed in the early notebooks, we discover that philosophy 
exists somewhere in the space between art and science—and even that philosophy, while 
distinct, still has something in common with both.  Drawing from the same notebooks that Clark 
uses, we find textual support for the idea that philosophy exists at a distance from the myth-
making of art yet shares something both with it and with the enterprise of science:  
The philosopher must recognize what is necessary, and the artist must create it.  The 
philosopher must empathize with universal suffering most strongly, just as each of the 
ancient Greek philosophers expresses a need: it is there, in that gap, that he places his 
system.  He builds his world into that gap.151 
There are somewhat different activities that the philosopher and the artist perform.  The 
philosopher is moved by his drive for knowledge and by his drive for truth, and the artist is 
driven by his drive to create, to use illusory representations to depict the world and make 
beautiful what is not, to make digestible what is indigestible.  As a lover of wisdom, on the other 
                                                            
151 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Writings from the Early Notebooks. Trans. Ladislaus Löb. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, Notebook 19, Sec. [23].   
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hand, the philosopher must have the courage to face up to the necessity of universal human 
suffering in order to honestly inquire into this problem of existence.152  Not just the necessity of 
it, but the salience and undeniable force that suffering has on us, especially emotional suffering.  
The philosopher is a figure who is supposed to seek out and potentially reveal what kind of 
attitude we ought to have toward the reality of our suffering and our mortality.  Although the 
philosopher operates partially under an aesthetic sensibility, he does possess a limitation on his 
aesthetic activity, one by which the artist is not so constrained.  Neither Salvadore Dali’s surreal 
images of his The Metamorphosis of Narcissus nor his Burning Giraffe are limited by reality, nor 
are M. C. Escher’s mathematically impossible images of his Relativity or of his Waterfall 
constrained by what is logical or even what is possible.  This however is not the case for the 
philosopher, as understood by Nietzsche.   “What is necessary” not only limits the philosophical 
activity, but it also serves as a condition that makes possible the ultimate goals of living well and 
realizing a self.  Gaining insight into what is necessary requires a higher level of consciousness 
toward oneself and the world.  In the particular case of self-realization, a precondition is that one 
must consciously recognize that there are a set of existential needs at one’s core.  It is only with 
such recognition that it is then possible to satisfy those needs in a manner that will realize a true 
self.  At another point in Notebook 19, Nietzsche says: 
How does the philosophical genius relate to art?  There is little we can learn from his 
direct behavior.  We must ask: what in his philosophy is art?  Work of art?  What remains 
                                                            
152 It is interesting that Nietzsche characterizes the philosopher must possess a particular kind of 
empathy: one for universal suffering.  What does Nietzsche mean by the analogous relation 
between empathy of suffering and the expression of a need by the ancient Greeks?  In D Sec. 
142, Nietzsche claims that the source of empathy is in mankind’s timidity: man is the most timid 
of all creatures on account of his subtle and fragile nature.  The fear of something that strange 
and/or dangerous is “the instructor in empathy.”  I think that the mention of empathy in the 
above passage from his notebook accentuates one particular example of “what is necessary” and 
therefore something that must be truthfully recognized by the philosopher.   
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if his system is destroyed as science?  But it must be precisely what remains that restrains 
the drive for knowledge, i.e. the artistic quality.  Why is such a restraint necessary?  For, 
scientifically considered, it is an illusion, an untruth, that deceives and only temporarily 
satisfies the drive for knowledge.  The value of philosophy with regard to this restraint 
lies not in the sphere of knowledge, but in the sphere of life: the will to existence uses 
philosophy for the purpose of a higher form of existence.153 
Here we should notice that part of the philosophical activity of the philosophical genius is artistic 
and that part of his activity is scientific.  The part that is artistic merely “restrains” the scientific 
part: that drive which wants to create is only tempered by that drive which wants the truth—or 
vice versa, we might say that that drive which wants the truth is tempered by that drive which 
wants to create.  The drive to create does not extinguish the drive for truth, nor does the drive to 
truth exterminate the drive to create.  Quoting again from two final passages in Notebook 19, we 
find a further deepening of the notion of philosophy as both science and art: 
There is no philosophy apart, separate from science: in both, thinking occurs in the same 
way.  The reason why unprovable philosophizing still has a value, indeed usually a 
greater value than a scientific proposition, lies in the aesthetic value of such 
philosophizing, i.e. in its beauty and sublimity.  Even if it cannot prove itself as a 
scientific edifice, it is still present as a work of art.  But is it not the same in scientific 
matters?—In other words: it is not the pure drive for knowledge that decides, but the 
aesthetic drive: the poorly supported philosophy of Heraclitus has greater artistic value 
than all the propositions of Aristotle.154 
For instance, Heraclitus wonderfully describes the randomness of the events of the world when 
he states, “Time is a child moving counters in a game; the royal power is a child’s.”155  On the 
other hand, even though we should admire Aristotle for his insight and philosophical rigor, we 
do not generally find such alluring imagery; rather, we find rational arguments.  Further along in 
the same notebook: 
                                                            
153 WEN, Notebook 19, Sec. [45]. 
154 WEN, Notebook 19, Sec. [76]. 
155 Heraclitus, DK line number 52. 
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Philosophical thinking belongs to the same species as scientific thinking, but it relates to 
great things and concerns.  But the concept of greatness is variable, part aesthetic, part 
moral.  It restrains the drive for knowledge.  That is its cultural significance.156   
The structure of thinking in philosophy resembles the structure of thinking in science, and it is 
neither the pure drive for knowledge nor the pure drive to beatify that constitutes the practice of 
philosophy.  The aesthetic drive may take a certain primacy in decision-making based on what is 
valuable and what is not, but it is the consideration of the authority of the values themselves that 
makes the path to ‘hard-to-swallow” truths laden with artistic imagery.  It is the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of “what is great” that “restrains,” yet does not extinguish, the drive for philosophical 
knowledge.  A more appropriate word for philosophical knowledge might be “wisdom,” which is 
often conceived of as being a necessary virtue for living well and for the corresponding 
possibility of realizing a self in a life well-lived.  An individual who attains such wisdom would 
be someone who realizes the interdependence of truth-seeking rationality and beauty-seeking 
intuition.  Nietzsche suggests that an existence that embodies only one or the other would be 
incomplete:  
There are eras in which rational man and intuitive man stand side by side, the one fearful 
of intuition, the other scornful of abstraction.  The latter is just as irrational as the former 
is inartistic.  Both desire to dominate life: the former by knowing how to meet the 
greatest needs with foresight, prudence and regularity, the latter by being an ‘over-joyous 
hero’ who does not see those needs and who regards life as real only when it is disguised 
as make-believe and beauty.157 
Notice that both the irrationality of the intuitive man and the absence of artistic ability of the 
rational man are deficiencies of a figure that ought to seek to possess the capacities of each.  In 
order to succeed at life, the rational man needs to develop the ability to perceive “the greatest 
                                                            
156 WEN, Notebook 19, Sec. [83]. 
157 Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873),” in Writings from 
the Early Notebooks. Trans. Ladislaus Lob. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 
263-264. 
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needs” as beautiful and form a loving attitude toward such pieces of fate.  Similarly, for the 
intuitive man to flourish, he must honestly recognize “the greatest needs” as real even through 
the “make-believe” veil that he has strewn over them.  This early instance of Nietzsche working 
through the nature of truth and falsity reaches its more finessed conclusion with the notion of 
amor fati in the GS.  This essay also prefigures the refinement of Nietzsche’s ideas of the 
genuine philosopher and the will to power in the middle work of BGE.   
 After drawing primarily from Nietzsche’s early notes, Clark uses Beyond Good and Evil 
as her main point of reference in order to build her argument that the will to power is a self-
conscious myth, and she continues to defend her conception of the ontological doctrine by 
focusing on a misinterpretation of the idea that philosophers “create the world” in their own 
image.  She begins with an analysis of BGE 9 and contends that Nietzsche is comparing himself 
to the Stoics in the sense that as the Stoics interpreted nature “according to the Stoa,” similarly 
Nietzsche himself (has confessed that he) interprets nature “according to Nietzsche.”158  
However, in this section Nietzsche is not merely placing his interpretation of nature side-by-side 
with the Stoic interpretation of nature and then just saying that philosophers pick and choose 
however they wish to conceive of the natural world.  No, not all interpretations of the world are 
equally life-affirming.  There are better and worse interpretations.  He is claiming that the Stoics 
“see nature the wrong way” because they imposed their morality on nature: claiming virtue as 
that which is in accordance with nature.159  Does not Nietzsche impose his morality on nature in 
the same way?  No, he does not.  If the will to power is thought of as a psychological 
phenomenon in a dialogical relationship with our existential needs and if the will to power is 
                                                            
158 Clark, p. 144. 
159 Diogenes Laertius [I 179a; I 555; III 4] in Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Trans. J. von Arnim. 
Leipzig, 1905-24. 
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properly thought of as applying only to human beings, then we do not impose any moral ideal (or 
any morality) on nature.  Nietzsche describes nature and then explains our contentious 
relationship to nature, while still being a part of nature in the first paragraph of BGE section 9.  
He construes nature as it is from the human perspective, as “wasteful beyond measure, 
indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, 
fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time.”160  Without human beings involved, nature 
is not wasteful.  It is indifferent, without purpose and without meaning, without our constellation 
of values ranging from mercy and forgiveness to justice and punishment.  It is only when human 
beings arrive on the scene, that we—natural beings though we are—want to rip and tear 
ourselves away from nature and transform ourselves into something unnatural.  We want to be 
good, to be beautiful, to be moral, to be one of God’s children, to be free, to be holy.  Nietzsche 
expresses this idea when he asks, “Living—is that not precisely wanting to be other than this 
nature?  Is not living—estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be 
different?”161   
Nietzsche is portraying nature as it actually is here in this early passage in BGE.  But 
such an interpretation renders the last short paragraph of section 9 to be somewhat perplexing, 
for it is here that Nietzsche formally introduces the notion that the philosopher “creates the 
world” in his own image.  The section ends with the following:  
                                                            
160 BGE, Sec. 9. 
161 Hannah Arendt shares a similar thought as she describes mankind’s awareness of being part 
of nature (and the necessities that go along with being a part of the natural world) is a condition 
for the possibility of his freedom: “Man cannot be free if he does not know that he is subject to 
necessity, because his freedom is always won in his never wholly successful attempts to liberate 
himself from necessity” in The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958, p. 121.   
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But this is an ancient, eternal story: what formerly happened with the Stoics still happens 
today, too, as soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself.  It always creates the 
world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise.  Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, 
the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world,” to the causa prima.162   
If this last passage is taken as the final conclusion to section 9 and as the final conclusion of 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on who a philosopher is, then the activity of “creating the world,” which 
appears to be the essence of what a philosopher does, lends credence to Clarke’s argument that 
there is an ontological doctrine of the will to power and that that doctrine is a self-conscious 
myth.  But without more clarification, it remains a mysterious activity.  How is it possible for 
someone to create the world, even for a philosopher?  I suggest that the introduction of this idea 
is actually the beginning of a larger argument regarding who and what a philosopher is.  The 
themes that appear in any single work of Nietzsche are presented cyclically, and there is a kind 
of movement of the argument that unfolds with each return to any one theme.  For instance, the 
question “What is the nature of a genuine philosopher?” is one of the themes that Nietzsche 
begins to address in section 9 of BGE but that he unravels at further points in the body of the 
work.  The two points of further development of the nature of the philosopher occur later in BGE 
in sections 211 and 292.  In section 211 Nietzsche makes a strange distinction between 
“philosophical laborers” and “genuine philosophers” where the former merely press previous 
positings of values into universal formulas that apply for all (Kant and Hegel being the examples 
Nietzsche gives) but where the latter create values that are somehow unique to the self which 
creates them.  Nietzsche transfigures the idea of “creating the world” into the idea of “creating 
values” in his description: 
Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, “thus it shall 
be!”  They first determine the Whither and For What of man, and in so doing have at 
                                                            
162 BGE, Sec. 9. 
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their disposal the preliminary labor of all philosophical laborers, all who have overcome 
the past.  With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all that is and has been 
becomes a means for them, an instrument, a hammer.  Their “knowing” is creating, their 
creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power.163   
In this second movement of the development of the notion of a genuine philosopher, what has 
become the mark of distinction for such a figure?  The genuine philosopher now possesses a 
range of features: an orientation toward the future; a compulsion to find the greatness of man; the 
capacity to create values; an evaluative stance toward the virtues of his time; and a being whole 
in manifoldness.164  While any philosopher, from the ancient Greeks to contemporary figures, 
does some analysis of already existing values, it seems that the genuine philosopher “creates 
values” with an “eye to the future” by placing himself in certain values that already exist: the 
new product being ‘the appropriation of an old value transfigured into a new philosopher.’  The 
presence of one’s active self within the “created” value gains a new emphasis and is brought to a 
level of completion near the end of “What is Noble.”  The genuine philosopher now exists and is 
portrayed as the following: 
a human being who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams 
extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as from outside, as from above 
and below, as by his type of experiences and lightning bolts; who is perhaps himself a 
storm pregnant with new lightnings; a fatal human being around whom there are constant 
rumblings and growlings, crevices, and uncanny doings.  A philosopher—alas, a being 
that often runs away from itself, often is afraid of itself—but too inquisitive not to “come 
to” again—always back to himself.165 
In this final movement of the development of the genuine philosopher, Nietzsche adds action and 
a newfound intimacy with one’s self.  Thus the philosopher who has placed himself in his values 
now puts those values into his “doings”, which brings them into a more realized state from mere 
                                                            
163 BGE, Sec. 211. 
164 These features are found not only in section 211 but also in sections 212 and 213—these three 
being the last three sections of “We Scholars” in BGE. 
165 BGE, Sec. 292. 
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intentions or desires.  This figure has also developed an attitude of honesty and truthfulness 
toward himself and is always willing to return to his own self—to understand who he is and what 
possibilities lay before him as to who he may become in his future.  So, the first movement’s 
notion of world-creation has transformed into the second movement’s notion of value-creation 
which in the third movement is transformed into self-creation.   
 Is this line of thinking concerning the nature of the genuine philosopher a digression?  
No, it is not.  Clark argued that Nietzsche himself was a philosopher who treated philosophy as 
art and thus “created the world” in his own image, divorcing philosophy from the drive to 
truth… or more precisely the drive to truthfulness.  We now see that Nietzsche’s complete theme 
of the nature of the genuine philosopher is complex, and that complex “becoming” can be 
applied to Nietzsche himself.  This interpretation does rest on the assumption that Nietzsche 
considered himself to be a genuine philosopher, even if he does not explicitly state this outright.  
We have reason to think that this is the case though.  Nietzsche’s most reflective work on 
himself—on who he is—is Ecce Homo.  In this piece of writing, Nietzsche provides the meaning 
of philosophy, stating, “Philosophy, as I have so far understood and lived it, means living 
voluntarily among ice and high mountains—seeking out everything strange and questionable in 
existence, everything so far placed under a ban by morality.”166  He does recognize himself as 
“living” philosophy by examining that which appears most worthy of investigation, especially 
that which may at first induce in one the state of aporia.  Philosophy swings away from the pole 
of art (with its value of creation) and toward the pole of science (with its value of rational 
discovery) when Nietzsche once again reaffirms the heart of philosophy: “How much truth does 
                                                            
166 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is in the Basic Writings of 
Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: The Modern Library, 2000, Preface, Sec. 3. 
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a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare?  More and more that became for me the real 
measure of value.”167  Nietzsche does in fact capture what the activity of philosophy is: 
questioning one’s own feelings and thoughts toward oneself, toward others and toward the world 
and having the will to entertain without completely absorbing the feelings and thoughts of your 
interlocutor (whether he is alive or born posthumously).   
Even though this is the characteristic activity of the genuine philosopher, the possible 
achieving of self-realization need not be strictly limited to the sphere of philosophy.  Multiple 
external perspectives can take up temporary residency within an individual, each perspective 
becoming a “drive” or “instinct” that must adapt to the drives that oppose it inside that same 
individual.  Nietzsche contrasts the Christian desideratum of “peace of soul” with his naturalized 
morality: “Our attitude to the “internal enemy” is no different: here too we have spiritualized 
hostility; here too we have come to appreciate its value.  The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in 
internal opposition; one remains young only as long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire 
peace.”168  Pure untamed hostility that may have been previously felt toward some perspective 
would seek to crush it out of existence, yet the spiritualization (or sublimation) of that hostility 
makes possible the creative tension between opposing drives.  This theme of incorporating as 
much truth as possible is given further expression in Nietzsche’s notes:  
In contrast to the animals, man has cultivated an abundance of contrary drives and 
impulses within himself: thanks to this synthesis, he is master of the earth.—Moralities 
are the expression of locally limited orders of rank in his multifarious world of drives, so 
man should not perish through their contradictions.  Thus a drive as master, its opposite 
                                                            
167 EH, Preface, Sec. 3.  This is a continuation of the theme of philosophy as experimentation 
explored in The Gay Science.  There the incorporation of as much truth as possible also served as 
the measure of value.  See GS 110. 
168 TI, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” Sec. 3.  See also TSZ, Prologue, Sec. 5 for Zarathustra’s 
demand for “chaos in oneself.” 
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weakened, refined, as the impulse that provides the stimulus for the activity of the chief 
drive. 
The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest 
strength that can be endured.  Indeed, where the plant “man” shows himself strongest one 
finds instincts that conflict powerfully (e.g., in Shakespeare), but are controlled.169 
So, for example, take an ethical and political question that has increasingly become more urgent 
over the last five hundred years: Should all citizens of a nation have access to universal 
healthcare?  Such is a question about the nature of distributive justice.  The “un-spiritualized” 
man will simply occupy his own perspective and mistakenly believe that his perspective is true, 
whatever his position may be.  The “highest man” who has undergone spiritualization will retain 
and consider a multiplicity of perspectives.  Such an individual will be a contest of the following 
opposing perspectives: 1) Unlike our “natural” rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, 
there is no such thing as a natural right to universal health care; 2) Every citizen should not have 
access to universal healthcare because such an enterprise would unfairly deprive those people 
with more wealth and property of their liberty; 3) Every citizen should not have access to 
universal healthcare because some people do not deserve healthcare; 4) If Jesus Christ said that 
the sick and the poor are blessed and that we should heal their illness, then they more than 
anyone else should have access to universal healthcare; 5) Having a social rule that all have 
access to universal healthcare will maximize happiness, and so there ought to be such a social 
welfare program; 6) If all free, equal and independent persons would agree to a rule that 
guaranteed universal healthcare, then all such persons should abide by such a rule that promotes 
social cooperation; 7) Every human being should have access to universal healthcare in virtue of 
the dignity that they possess by partaking in the rational autonomy of humanity; and 8) Each 
individual should have access to a universal healthcare program because such a program would 
                                                            
169 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1967, Sec. 966. 
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be created by the virtuous person and would promote human flourishing.  The man who has 
become complacent and found “truth” in just one of these perspectives fails to aim at unified 
wholeness.  The synthetic man who makes an experiment of himself with the incorporation of as 
much “truth” as possible exemplifies the greatest strength attainable in a measured control over 
diverse perspectives.  Even the refinement of the weaker perspectives contributes to the overall 
creativity of truth-incorporation. 
    
A Question of Interpretation 
Certain instances where Nietzsche expounds upon his notion of the will to power demand 
a more scrupulous degree of interpretation and analysis.  BGE 22 may seem to be an obstacle to 
my account of the will to power in that Nietzsche exposes one mode of interpretation of nature as 
being a democratic interpretation, and then he sets up his own will to power interpretation of 
nature right alongside the democratic one.  The democratic mode of interpretation is one in 
which the presuppositions of ‘equality amongst all parts of nature’ and ‘equal obedience to law’ 
are already in place and are unreflectively projected onto the world or some facet of it.  We see 
that both are interpretations and neither matters of fact.  Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that both interpretations are equally good.  Nietzsche presents the problem evocatively yet 
with subtlety:  
Forgive me as an old philologist who cannot desist from the malice of putting his finger 
on bad modes of interpretation: but “nature’s conformity to law,” of which you physicists 
talk so proudly, as though—why, it exists only owing to your interpretation and bad 
“philology.”  It is no matter of fact, no “text,” but rather only a naively humanitarian 
emendation and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions to 
the democratic instincts of the modern soul!...and somebody might come along who, with 
opposite intentions and modes of interpretation, could read out of the same “nature,” and 
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with regard to the same phenomena, rather the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless 
enforcement of claims of power—an interpreter who would picture the unexceptional and 
unconditional aspects of all “will to power” so vividly that almost every word, even the 
word “tyranny” itself, would eventually seem unsuitable, or a weakening and attenuating 
metaphor—being too human—but he might, nevertheless, end by asserting the same 
about this world as you do, namely, that it has a “necessary” and “calculable” course, not 
because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and every power draws 
its ultimate consequences at every moment.  Supposing that this also is only 
interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the 
better.170 
It is not problematic for us, qua interpretive human beings, to gain understanding about the 
reality of the human condition, as long as we realize that everything is interpretation.  Just 
because all of human experience of the world is perspectival does not mean that all perspectives 
(or interpretations) are equal and valid.  There are worse interpretations and there are better 
interpretations.  In BGE 22, Nietzsche calls the democratic mode of interpretation a “bad” mode 
of interpretation.  This at least implies that the will to power interpretation is a better mode of 
interpreting nature, for it considers as many perspectives as possible and attempts to incorporate 
as much truth as possible.  At least, that appears to be part of the project of BGE: truth is 
perspectival and there is more truth where there are more perspectives taken into account 
regarding any question or inquiry.  If we are in the genuinely philosophic mode when attending 
to how we experience ourselves and how we experience the world, then we will be operating 
both artistically and scientifically.  More precisely, as genuine philosophers we operate in the 
space in between art and science, a space whose existence we have uncovered.   
 In BGE 22 Nietzsche appears to be claiming that the democratic interpretation is bad 
because it designates too specific a political regime as the essence of things.  However, 
democratic regimes are fairly new in the history of humankind.  People have existed for a far 
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longer period of time under monarchies, dynasties, oligarchies, totalitarian regimes and even 
under no formal government if we trace our evolution back far enough.  While we are political 
animals, a better interpretation is one that gets to our more basic psychological constitution, 
which interestingly enough is the approach that Nietzsche takes in the very next section (23) of 
BGE.171   
Keeping in mind that “man is the great esteemer” and as such our estimations pervade all 
of our “judgments,” to get hold of “the most objective truth” about the drives and needs of 
humankind we have to fight against the values under which we are conditioned.  Because the 
heart works against the more truth-incorporating interpretations, an ongoing dialogue must occur 
between a person and his heart—a dialogue that can be described as between a self and his 
values.  This idea is very much present in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for Zarathustra is 
participating in a dialogue with his heart and not with his mind: the heart being that which loves, 
                                                            
171 In his article entitled “Nietzsche: Perfectionist,” Thomas Hurka incorrectly expresses a 
political interpretation of Nietzsche’s perfectionism, which thus results in Hurka’s attributing a 
“maximax” view as Nietzsche’s perfectionist dictum: Society ought to maximize the well-being 
of the best-off individuals.  One passage that Hurka utilizes to support his view is BGE 258, 
where Nietzsche says: “The essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy, however, 
is that it experiences itself not as a function (whether of the monarchy or the commonwealth) but 
as their meaning and highest justification—that it therefore accepts with a good conscience the 
sacrifice of untold human beings who, for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete 
human beings, to slaves, to instruments.”  If that passage is taken in isolation, then, yes, it seems 
as though Nietzsche is making a political claim.  However, the section begins with the notion of 
psychological “corruption,” but Nietzsche is interested in describing how a corrupt and 
“potentially anarchical” individual exists: “Corruption as the expression of a threatening anarchy 
among the instincts and of the fact that the foundation of the affects, which is called ‘life,’ has 
been shaken: corruption is something totally different depending on the organism in which it 
appears.”  Through metaphor of a political aristocracy, Nietzsche then illustrates what an 
aristocratic or noble soul looks like.  The good and healthy aristocracy spoken is then really a 
good and healthy noble individual who qua a small collection of ordering drives experiences 
himself as the meaning and highest justification of all weaker affects and instincts.  With a good 
conscience, the noble soul accepts the sacrifice of weaker drives which, for the sake of the few 
commanding drives, must reduced and lowered to sublimated drives, which are used as 
instruments to achieve self-realization. 
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hates, fears, envies, and undergoes all the more nuanced emotions in between such extremes.  A 
free spirit has the ability to release his heart from old values, carefully investigate each value’s 
worth, and allow his heart to be free, for Zarathustra loves “him who has a free spirit and a free 
heart: thus his head is only the entrails of his heart, but his heart drives him to go under.”172  We 
should view the process of “going under” [Untergang; untergehen] as the struggle for the free 
spirit to become one with his free heart, or achieve a fully-realized self.  This process may be 
painful because of the tension that exists within it: old values pushing and pulling against the free 
heart’s endeavor to create new values.   
A final point about “the truth” of what Nietzsche says about the will to power in this 
section: we ought to be interpreting the human condition with a certain measure of honesty—
being honest towards the object of inquiry and towards ourselves.  We could correctly say that 
Nietzsche is adopting the stance of an “honest realist” with his investigation into human 
existence, as opposed to an ascription of “idealism” that might be pinned onto Nietzsche.  The 
last sentence of BGE 259 expresses the idea of truth as honesty: “If this should be an innovation 
as a theory—as a reality it is the primordial fact of all history: people ought to be honest with 
themselves at least that far.”173  As such, one mark of distinction for a free spirit is an ability to 
endure and incorporate as much “truth” as possible.174 
Clark’s conception of Nietzsche’s alleged second doctrine of the will to power, the 
psychological doctrine, is that “the will to power is the most life-affirming drive in the sense that 
the satisfaction of this drive, a sense of power, of the ability to enforce one’s will, is necessary 
                                                            
172 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche. Ed. and Trans. 
Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books, 1982, Prologue, Sec. 4. 
173 BGE, Sec. 259. 
174 See BGE, Sec. 39; GS, Sec. 110. 
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for the affirmation of life, whereas a sense of powerlessness induces depression and a tendency 
to passive nihilism.”175  I disagree with Clark that the psychological doctrine of the will to power 
is the other context in which Nietzsche speaks of the will to power (in addition to the ontological 
doctrine).  This is because there is really only one mode of existence for the will to power: as the 
achieving of self-realization.  As I have shown, the ontological status of the doctrine of the will 
to power is not that of a mere self-conscious myth expressing what Nietzsche values; rather, it is 
the realization of such a self.  However, the view that the will to power is the highest drive 
among many, the drive that is most conducive to life-affirmation, does not capture the primacy 
that the drive to power has over the rest of our needs and drives.  The way to improve Clark’s 
view would be to consider the will to power as the goal to which our drives aim—or which is 
constituted by the satisfaction of our existential needs.  The affirmation of one’s own life or the 
affirmation of life as it is lived from one’s first-personal experience can exist as a norm of 
development that can guide an individual toward the achieving of self-realization.176  Accounting 
for the will to power as the striving to achieve self-realization grounds the reorientation from 
conceiving of life-affirmation to self-realization, but without completely cancelling out the 
former.  In the end, one experiences the world either as pieces, fragments and limbs or as a fully 
realized self…but such a traveler can be either fragmentary or unified; he can be either a shadow 
of a human being or a real human being. 
 
   
                                                            
175 Clark, p. 148. 
176 Christine Swanton’s two norms of development in her Nietzschean virtue ethics are “health” 
and “life-affirmation.”  See her “Nietzschean Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics: Old and New. Ed. 
Stephen M. Gardiner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 179-192. 
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Models of Achieving Self-Realization: Saint, Artist and Philosopher 
Philosophy exists as an activity of self-creation in the gap between science and art, but it 
serves as an activity that borrows elements from both.  The genuine philosopher serves life, 
individuated in his own process of becoming, by using an aesthetic mode of interpretation to 
elucidate what is necessary.  The aim of science is truth.  The aim of art is beauty.  The aim of 
philosophy is to bring forth a higher form of existence.  Does Nietzsche give any concrete 
examples of those who are genuine philosophers?  The providing of a model of the genuine 
philosopher would significantly improve our understanding of the scaffold of art, science and 
philosophy that we find in Nietzsche’s early notebooks.  What lies ahead in this section is an 
analysis of three such models as they are presented in Nietzsche’s early essay, “Schopenhauer as 
Educator”: the saint, the artist and the philosopher.177  However, the relation between science, art 
and philosophy does not directly map onto these models who achieve self-realization, for the 
character types that serve as models of self-realization are “goals” of philosophy which are 
different than the essence of philosophy itself.  These goals are going to be individuated pieces 
of nature, ones that become their own ends.  As Nietzsche says in two notes written shortly after 
the completion of this essay, “In three forms of existence only does man remain as an individual: 
                                                            
177 In a letter to the Danish scholar and literary critic Georg Brandes with whom Nietzsche 
corresponded, he writes, “[Schopenhauer als Erzieher] serves me as a signal of recognition: the 
man to whom it says nothing personal will probably not be further interested in me.  It contains 
the basic scheme according to which I have so far lived; it is a rigorous promise,” in Selected 
Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche. Ed. and Trans. Christopher Middleton. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1969, p. 292.  This confession shows the how much this essay 
represents the relationship between the activity of philosophy and its personal import in 
Nietzsche’s life.  Despite his remark in Ecce Homo that this essay “speaks only of [him],” I 
contend that the essay’s themes of the relationship between philosophy and life, the purpose of 
culture and the models of achieving self-realization have broad applicability to human beings (or 
at least a certain class of higher human beings) more generally.  It’s possible that Nietzsche 
himself was too close to his own thoughts to see their potential broader applicability.  See D, 
Sec. 438. 
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as philosopher, saint and artist,” and that “If everybody’s purpose is in somebody else nobody 
has a purpose of existence in himself; and this ‘existence for one another’ is the most comic 
comedy.”178  These thoughts corroborate the theme in “Schopenhauer as Educator” that the 
project of self-realization is individualistic in nature but that the selves that are being realized 
will bear a peculiar relation to humanity as a whole.  Thus our exploration of these models will 
begin with an introductory look at how the genuine philosopher, the artist and the saint are 
models who come to exemplify the will to power in BGE, and then we will segue into a thorough 
analysis of those models in Nietzsche’s third untimely meditation. 
More specific pictures of the will to power occur in BGE 51, BGE 213 and BGE 211 in 
that they refer to a particular character type as acting out of a higher form of the will to power—
respectively, the saint, the artist and the genuine philosopher.  The saint is hinted to be some kind 
of “superior force” who possesses an uncanny “strength of the will,” yet Nietzsche here 
highlights the “will to power” of those who worship the saint, not the will to power of the saint 
himself.  He intimates that the artist must create of necessity, with a feeling of freedom, of 
subtlety, of “full power,” of creative placing, of disposing and of forming that reaches its peak, 
yet here in BGE there is still some ambiguity as to how exactly such a character type exemplifies 
the will to power.  In BGE Nietzsche somewhat explicates the nature of the genuine philosopher, 
but there are still not concrete examples of figures who have achieved such a level of human 
existence.  In order to clarify what kind of a human being might serve as a model a self-
realization, it would be beneficial for us to think more about whether Nietzsche offers (in earlier 
works) any idea of character-types who serve as models of realized selves.  Nietzsche believes 
that those who best exemplify the will to power (and thus achieve a high measure of self-
                                                            
178 WEN, Notebook 3, Secs. [63] and [64]. 
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realization) are the goal of culture.  In “Schopenhauer as Educator” the purpose of culture is the 
creation of the genius, and the three models for the highest types of genius for any culture are the 
artist, the saint and the philosopher.179   
The character-types of the philosopher, the artist and the saint serve as models for the 
kinds of individuals (and the kinds of activities that such individuals perform) that best illustrate 
how the highest form of the will to power can be exemplified.  The line of thinking begins with 
the fact that as human beings we are entrenched in nature: we are nothing but mere animals who 
flounder about in confusion and horror at our animality.  As such we see life as a kind of 
punishment for being animals, the sense of being punished originating in the enormous amount 
of suffering that we experience and the seemingly pervasive senselessness of our suffering.180  
Nietzsche supposes that because man is the highest representative of nature (the latest and ripest 
fruit) that nature has “pressed toward,” that nature “intimates” that man is necessary to redeem 
himself “from the curse of the life of the animal.”181  Isn’t the attribution of such an apparently 
outright teleological purpose of nature merely to slip back into the kind of metaphysical 
interpretation of the will to power that we exposed to be an error?  Perhaps it is not necessarily 
the case that nature as such actually “presses and urges” toward “that final and supreme 
                                                            
179 Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Schopenhauer as Educator,” in Untimely Meditations. Trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Sec. 3, p. 142 and Sec. 5, p. 160. 
180 This discussion of humankind’s attitude of horror at the senselessness of its suffering serves 
as a precursor to the Third Essay of the Genealogy, which explores various forms of asceticism 
that have arisen in response to  the problem of human suffering.  The entire essay is a kind of 
footnote to the citation from TSZ: “Unconcerned, mocking, violent—thus wisdom wants us: she 
is a woman and always loves only a warrior.”  Who might possess the wisdom, or at least this 
one piece of wisdom, that we must create meaning for our suffering?  I believe that it is the 
philosopher, the artist and the saint.  Because wisdom “wants us,” we ought not to merely strive 
to promote other potential philosophers, artists and saints, but as Nietzsche says here, we ought 
to strive to procreate these potential figures within us.   
181 UM, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 5, p. 157. 
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becoming-human.”  Regarding the metaphysical understanding of human existence, Nietzsche 
claims that the supposition that the bodies of animals contain the guilt-laden souls of men has 
arisen in more than one part of the earth.182  It is not that nature in itself has a purposiveness that 
pushes toward some goal.  Because as human beings we possess the existential need for a frame 
of orientation, it is the case that we must make sense out of that which appears senseless—e.g., 
suffering and meaninglessness itself.  So according to Nietzsche, our understanding of ourselves, 
as part of nature, is the source of the metaphysical significance that is projected onto nature.  
Does this get Nietzsche off the metaphysical hook?  Almost, but not entirely.  As the highest 
representative of nature (or as one who potentially can realize a true self), Nietzsche says that as 
an individuated representative of nature who begins to make himself a true human being 
(“nature’s goal”), one must realize that he has to unlearn having goals.  In other words, the 
“goal” of nature is for the ones who have become philosophers, artists and saints to enlighten 
themselves and recognize that they themselves are the creators of goals.  The metaphysical 
disposition is a step in the process of self-enlightenment aiming at self-realization.   
When nature has transfigured herself into the goals of the philosopher, the artist and the 
saint, such figures are then capable of creating meaningfulness out of life and suffering—e.g. 
metaphysical, religious, philosophical, etc.  The capacity to synthesize both contemplation and 
action is the mark of a true human being.  Accordingly, they do not abide by the dictum, “Know 
thyself,” but such active successful natures give themselves the commandment, “Will a self and 
thou shall become a self.”183  As Nietzsche indicates of the contemplatives, such an individual 
                                                            
182 UM, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 5, p. 157. 
183 D, Sec. 366. 
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has the “creative power” to keep creating his life.184  A merely active life is insufficient, for this 
character type is like an actor who must follow the script and (in a loose sense) obey the cues of 
some director.  This insufficiency implies that true creativity, especially that power to create 
oneself, depends upon “contemplative power.”  This appears to be a rather enigmatic claim: 
Creative power depends on contemplative power.  Is it impossible to possess this kind of 
creativity without being contemplative?  Well, in order to make a true human being out of 
oneself, yes, it is impossible.  One must be both the director, the screenwriter and the actor of 
one’s life, in which one has “the ability to look back upon one’s work” and the ability to 
thoughtfully see and hear immeasurably more than those who simply do as mechanical animals.  
The climactic conclusion of this line of thought presents itself as follows: 
Here I have arrived at an answer to the question whether it is possible to pursue the great 
ideal of the Schopenhauerean man by means of a practical activity.  One thing above all 
is certain: these new duties are not the duties of a solitary; on the contrary, they set one in 
the midst of a mighty community held together, not by external forms and regulations, 
but by a fundamental idea.  It is the fundamental idea of culture, insofar as it sets for each 
one of us but one task: to promote the production of the philosopher, the artist and the 
saint within us and without us and thereby to work at the perfecting of nature.185 
While it is difficult to ignore the profundity of this conclusion, at least one question presents 
itself as to how Nietzsche has arrived at this destination.  Why is this merely the ideal of “the 
Schopenhauerean man”?  Isn’t the perfecting of nature supposed to be the ideal of all 
humankind?  If we return to the fourth section of “Schopenhauer as Educator,” we see that the 
argument ending with ‘the perfecting of nature’ as the ideal began with the question of who is to 
set up “the image of man” that is to serve as an exemplar for humanity.  Nietzsche answers by 
                                                            
184 GS, Sec. 301. 
185 UM, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 5. 
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providing three images, which together form a tripartite progression toward the goal of all 
culture: the man of Rousseau, the man of Goethe and the man of Schopenhauer.   
 The image of the man of Rousseau represents pure action and the desire to return to 
nature.  According to Rousseau, humankind is, in some strong sense, good by nature but our 
natural goodness is distorted by the societal constructs of property, wealth and inequality.  In his 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, he states that it is certain “that compassion [pitié] is a 
natural sentiment, which, by moderating in each individual the love of oneself, contributes to the 
mutual preservation of the whole species.”186  For Rousseau the two basic instincts of humankind 
are amour de soi [self-love] and pitié [compassion], but these two drives are corrupted 
continually throughout human history as we move farther and farther away from whatever 
natural state of existence we might have formerly occupied.  This problem manifests in the 
political sphere, where one of the primary problems is the identification of the individual will 
with the general will.187  The general will can only be justified if it is the embodiment of all 
individual wills that constitute it; yet, how is it possible for such a “general will” to actually 
exist, considering that there will always be a minority “will” that does not identify itself with the 
“general will” (that of the majority or of the government).  Given this very brief synopsis of 
Rousseau’s moral and political thought, why does Nietzsche characterize the first image of 
modernity as the man of Rousseau?  Of this first image, Nietzsche acknowledges how the image 
of Rousseau educates by emphasizing his influence for political revolt against injustice.  In a 
                                                            
186 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Trans. Donald A. Cress. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992, p. 38.  In his Émile, Rousseau’s initial 
assumption from which he begins his inquiry into the transition from individual to society is this: 
“Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the 
hands of man.”  See his Émile: or, On Education. Trans. Allan Bloom. Lebanon, NH: Dartmouth 
College Press, 2010. 
187 See Books II and IV of Rousseau’s The Social Contract. 
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sense Rousseau echoes Nietzsche’s own worries about the individual being consumed and 
suffocated by the majority (“the herd”).  Nietzsche states, “From the first there has proceeded a 
force which has promoted violent revolutions and continues to do so; for in every socialist 
earthquake and upheaval it has always been the man of Rousseau who, like Typhon under Etna, 
is the cause of commotion.”188  Nietzsche understands Rousseau to be a source of inspiration for 
those who are being oppressed by “arrogant upper classes” or those with “merciless wealth.”  
These revolutionaries, their will being omitted from the general will, would find themselves 
dissatisfied in the “unnatural” state, and they would wish to return back to “light, sun, forest and 
mountain.”  Nietzsche would be somewhat amenable to this attitude of such revolutionaries, yet 
he cannot fully advocate such a merely impulsive “return to nature” because they have failed to 
thoughtfully reflect as to what this “nature” actually is. 
If one were to find inspiration only in this first image of a perfected will to power, 
however, then one would be ultimately doomed to failure.  Firstly, it is not possible to return to a 
natural state that was prior to our present socially-conditioned state of existence.  Secondly, in 
such a pursuit one would be operating under the dubious assumption that the natural state of 
humankind is one of goodness, untarnished by the corrupt aspects of society.  There simply is not 
sufficient evidence to know that humankind is naturally good.  Such a claim is colored with a 
moral prejudice, for we pronounce it from a socialized and moralized standpoint.  Most 
importantly, the deficiency with the first image is that represents action but without honest 
contemplation of one’s own “nature.”  It is not so much human nature that ought to be the object 
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of contemplation; an individual ought to contemplate who he as an individual is if he is to realize 
the higher self within him.189   
 The image of the man of Rousseau symbolizes a worthy yet incomplete attempt at the 
realization of one’s higher self.  Keep in mind that self-realization is not an all-or-nothing 
accomplishment.  There can be various gradations of the level to which an individual has 
realized a self.  The man of Rousseau symbolizes a high level of self-realization in that such a 
person has satisfied the need for devotion by fighting the injustice of a corrupt aristocracy.  This 
figure addresses the needs for rootedness and effectiveness through the mobilization of 
oppressed segments of a population—spontaneously creating the spark that lights the fire of a 
revolution.  However, the man of Rousseau has “mis-contemplated” his own nature, for he 
assigns what is “bad” in humanity as having its origin in the artificial constructs of society, 
property and wealth, and he assigns what is “good” in humanity as originating in human nature 
itself.  This faith in opposites inverts the metaphysical/religious faith in opposites where what is 
“good” is of some supernatural world and what is “bad” is of this world: the inverted error of an 
error.  We might think that the man of Rousseau is taking a step in the right direction, yet he is 
still operating under the error of putting his faith in any opposites at all.  What results from this 
error for the man of Rousseau is a feeling of shame for his attempts to transcend animality.  This 
sense of shame directed towards political corruption spurs one into action, but it is an action that 
does not grow out of a real sense of contemplation.  The apparent nature of the man of 
                                                            
189 Nietzsche’s holding genuine action to be a necessary condition for the possibility of self-
realization finds expression in a letter from 1882, roughly the same time he wrote “Schopenhauer 
as Educator.”  To Lou Salomé, Nietzsche says in a self-contemptuous tone, “I am inexperienced 
and unpracticed in all matters of action; and for years I have not had to explain or justify myself 
to others in anything I have done” (95) in the Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche.  Ed. & 
Trans. Christopher Middleton. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1969.  
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Rousseau’s contemplative moment exposes itself through an inability to satisfy the existential 
need for unity.  He cannot unify his animality with his wished for transcendent state from such 
animality, and he cannot unify contemplation and action into a synthetic whole because his 
“contemplative” attitude suffers from falling into the error of having a faith in opposites.  In a 
sense, the man of Rousseau does experience a healthy form of self-contempt, but he is like an 
arrow flying through the air that has no target—for he has not given himself his target.  So we 
see that the man of Rousseau achieves a “half-measure” of self-realization, bringing to fruition 
the moment of action but action without its counterpart of beautiful contemplation.   
 The image of the man of Goethe represents contemplation divorced from action—the 
opposite of the man of Rousseau.  Nietzsche characterizes Goethe as one who lives through the 
image of Faust, the central character in his literary magnum opus.  Because Faust chooses to sell 
his soul to Mephistopheles for his assistance in attaining genuine satisfaction with life, there is an 
important sense in which Faust has renounced his higher self and is no longer capable of genuine 
agency.  He cannot undertake genuine action because there is no real “he” there to act.  Only a 
shadow of a self remains, one that is externally moved and guided, i.e. by Mephistopheles.  So 
there is a two-fold sense in which there is only contemplation without action: Faust, a learned 
man in science, art and religion, suffers from his overly developed ability to contemplate and his 
inability for genuine action, unaided by supernatural forces; and Goethe, a learned man in 
philosophy, science and the arts, suffers from genuine inaction because he has only “acted” 
through his characters, mere images who themselves are merely semblances of genuine action, 
which can only emanate from a higher self who fulfills self-imposed duties.  Nietzsche expounds 
this image in the following way: 
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The man of Goethe is…the contemplative man in the grand style, who can avoid 
languishing away on earth only by bringing together for his nourishment everything great 
and memorable that has ever existed or still exists and thus lives, even though his life 
may be a living from one desire to the next; he is not the man of action: on the contrary, 
if he does ever become a member of any part of the existing order established by the men 
of action one can be sure that no good will come of it…and, above all, that no ‘order’ will 
be overthrown.190   
The “bringing together” of central problems of the human condition from the landscape of 
human history is a praiseworthy project, but funneling “everything great and memorable that has 
ever existed or still exists and thus lives” into a mere character that can only exist “in the world 
of the theatre” generates the insufficiency of this second image for realizing one’s higher self.  
As Nietzsche indicates, acting under the inspiration of the first image of Rousseau lies too close 
to the danger of becoming a Catilinist, and acting under the inspiration of the second image of 
Goethe lies too close to the danger of becoming a philistine.  I interpret “Catilinist”, for 
Nietzsche, as one who acts with passion (and perhaps for a just cause) but does so with a sense of 
recklessness and without an intellectual conscience to guide his actions.  I interpret “philistine” 
as one who lives under a veil of complacency and stagnation, who engages in a kind of 
counterfeit form of contemplation, who suffers from an illusory form of self-sufficiency and 
completeness because he fails to realize genuinely creative contemplation into action.  It is not 
necessarily that case that Nietzsche is characterizing Goethe himself as a philistine, but as a 
symbolic voice registering the less-than-successful and apathetic nature of such a type, for he 
states, “What is a philistine?  An empty gut,/full of fear and hope./May God have mercy!”191 
 Thus the image of the man of Goethe also achieves only a “half-measure” of self- 
realization.  His strength is his rich contemplation of all that is beautiful and great in humankind, 
                                                            
190 UM, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4, p. 152. 
191 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. Gedichte. Berlin: Aufbau, 1966. 
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but his weakness is his inability to satisfy his need for effectiveness.  The man of Goethe stops 
short in the moment of being a “world-traveler” and cannot transfigure himself into a “world-
liberator.”  The man of Goethe does satisfy his need for devotion, for he is “a devotee to the 
gospel of nature with his whole loving heart.”192  Through proper contemplation, this figure 
develops a good understanding of the tragic nature of humankind.  Nietzsche holds the character 
of Faust to be an excellent representation of the hunger for life, the discontent and longing 
associated with such hunger, and the character’s traffic with the demons of his heart.  Whatever 
existential needs the man of Goethe satisfies, they remain incomplete and prohibit a more full 
degree of self-realization because this figure does not transform his moment of contemplation 
into a moment of action.193   
 The image of the man of Schopenhauer symbolizes the synthesis of action and 
contemplation.  At first blush, this is curious because Schopenhauer was not active in the 
practical or political sense throughout his entire life.  This leads us to believe that Nietzsche must 
be thinking of a peculiar kind of action that is associated with the Schopenhauerean ideal.  In 
what way does the Schopenhauerean image of man educate us?  What does this third image 
capture that the Rousseauean image and the Goethean image fail to teach?   It is the form and not 
the content of Schopenhauer’s stance toward his truths that Nietzsche praises in the third image 
given to us in modernity.  Truthfulness is the primary virtue that is associated with the image of 
the Schopenhauerean man, but it is a being truthful to oneself even in the face of the suffering 
that such honesty may cause.  Adopting a truthful attitude entails the possible forsaking of loved 
                                                            
192 UM, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4, p. 151. 
193 See HAH, Sec. 228 where Nietzsche describes the traveller with the highest energy as one 
who absorbs all that he experiences and sees and “bodies it forth” again out of himself in works 
and actions as soon as he returns home. 
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ones, of institutions and even of justice, recognizing that being truthful means one is always 
limited by one’s perspective.  However, taking on the suffering of being truthful can lead to a 
transfiguration of oneself if it is brought to full realization in words and deeds [logoi and erga].  
Nietzsche even goes on to say that this “overturning and conversion of [the Schopenhauerean 
man’s] being” is “the real meaning of life to lead up to.”194  Nietzsche goes on to further endorse 
the virtue of truthfulness as the mark of distinction for the Schopenhauerean man when he says 
that   
…being truthful means: to believe in an existence that can in no way be denied and which 
is itself true and without falsehood.  That is why the truthful man feels that the meaning 
of his activity is metaphysical, explicable through the laws of another and higher life, and 
in the profoundest sense affirmative…always offering himself as the first sacrifice to 
perceived truth and permeated with the awareness of what sufferings must spring from 
his truthfulness.195 
This conception of being truthful seems very Platonic in that such a one believes in an 
undeniable existence which is “itself” true; be that as it may, the truthful man does not know that 
the meaning of his activity is metaphysical and profoundly affirmative.  The truthful man [der 
Wahrhaftige] feels [empfinden] that the meaning of his activity is metaphysical because of the 
profound affirmation of that which must be conceived as valuable in and of itself.  We might say 
that the image of Schopenhauer teaches us to cultivate an honest attitude toward the self-imposed 
struggle to transcend our bare condition of animality—to bear a truthful stance toward the 
seemingly insurmountable task of transfiguration.  Near the end of Nietzsche’s account of the 
image of the Schopenhauerian man, he makes several allusions to Plato’s allegory of the cave, 
albeit in an altered form.  In Plato’s allegory the prisoner who escapes the cave of mere shadows 
is enlightened by the sun, which symbolizes the Good: the principle which makes it possible to 
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see the pure forms of things clearly.  The problem with Plato’s allegory, Nietzsche thinks, is that 
the Good is the only criterion for measuring the value of things and this overlooks the role that 
the self must play in his own perfection.  In Nietzsche’s version of the allegory, the “heroic 
human being” who ascends from the cave of mere shadows is enlightened, not by the sun, but by 
his own higher self that lies above him.   
The philosopher (Schopenhauer), the artist (Goethe) and the saint (Rousseau) should be 
viewed as three character-types that meld into one image: the image of the genius.  As 
philosopher, one has the capacity to evaluate and destroy old values.  As the artist, one has the 
capacity to create new values, thereby beginning the process of self-enlightenment.  As the saint, 
one recognizes oneself as the particularity (a particular specimen of nature) that stands in a 
relation to the universality (the wholeness of nature).  As such he loses his ego as it exists 
“unperfected” and becomes the bridge between here and there.  Nevertheless, the artist and the 
saint are in a sense half-perfected models that are stepping stones to the more fully-perfect model 
of the philosophical genius.  Nietzsche says that believing in culture (and being able to realize 
this belief through action) is nothing else than believing in the perfecting of oneself as a part of 
humanity: 
‘I see above me something higher and more human than I am; let everyone help me to 
attain it, as I will help everyone who knows and suffers as I do: so that at last the man 
may appear who feels himself perfect and boundless in knowledge and love, perception 
and power, and who in his completeness is at one with nature, the judge and evaluator of 
things.’196 
The striving toward one’s higher self is shared with “the mighty community” of others who also 
have the potential for perfection and thus it does not have to be a solitary mode of existence.  The 
cultivation of one’s own higher self bears an interdependence with that of other possible higher 
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selves.  The philosopher is transfiguring himself from a mere becoming into one who is 
knowledge and love.  The artist in oneself transfigures himself from a mere becoming into one 
who is a boundless perception and power.  And the saint in oneself transfigures himself from a 
mere becoming into one who is one with nature.  Adopting the attitude towards oneself whereby 
one “feels” oneself to be one’s higher self and allows oneself to emotionally adopt a “happiness 
of contemplation and action” makes it possible to realize one’s higher self.  Thus, the 
philosopher, the artist and the saint can serve as exemplars who are the goals of nature; yet, they 
are goals who forget themselves as such because they have embodied the activity of giving birth 
to new goals. 
 
Schopenhauer as Exemplar of the Will to Power 
Does the model of the Schopenhauerean image of man serve as a model of a figure who 
exemplifies the will to power?  If the Schopenhauerean man exemplifies the will to power, then 
he must undergo the process of achieving a high degree of self-realization.  If he is to realize a 
self, then he must satisfy the cluster of existential needs that constitute the achieving of self-
realization.  And if a “true human being” is to be created, then those needs must be satisfied for 
the sake of the beautiful, which serves as the norm of satisfaction for the needs.  Remember that 
the comprehensive set of existential needs that we possess are the following (in random order): 
the need for a frame of orientation; the need for devotion; the need for unity; the need for 
rootedness; the need for effectiveness; the need for excitation; and the need for self-love.  Upon 
showing that the image of Schopenhauer satisfies each of these needs, it will be evident that 
Schopenhauer not only serves as Nietzsche’s educator but also as a self who exemplifies the will 
to power.   
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 We begin with the existential need whose satisfaction in the appropriate way is the least 
difficult to undergo, yet by no means is task that is easy to perform—namely, the need for a 
frame of orientation.  Schopenhauer satisfies his need for a frame of orientation through his 
development of his understanding of the two-fold existence of the world as will and 
presentation.197  Schopenhauer’s map of the world lies in its having two modes of existence: the 
world exists as a presentation to a subject, and the world exists as the will.  The will manifests 
itself in the world with different levels of reality, and humanity as individuated subjective 
cognizance possesses the most immediate degree of accessibility to the will.  In the second 
volume of WWP, Schopenhauer describes this interiority:  
Consequently, a path is open to us from inside to that proper self and inner essence of 
things to which we cannot penetrate from outside.  It is, as it were, a subterranean 
passage, a secret alliance that, as through treachery, transports us at once into the fortress 
that could not be taken from outside….In fact our willing is the only opportunity we have 
of at the same time understanding an externally manifesting occurrence in terms of its 
inner being, hence the only thing known to us immediately and not, as with everything 
else, given merely in presentation.198 
The fundamental difference between Schopenhauer’s will and Kant’s thing-in-itself is that for 
Kant we can never have knowledge of the thing-in-itself whereas for Schopenhauer each 
individual has immediate access to the existence of the (noumenal) will through her own first-
                                                            
197 The German term Vorstellung has a variety of meanings in English.  The most common 
translations are “idea”, “representation” and “presentation.”  Along with Richard Aquila, I will 
use “presentation” to denote that object in the world which “presents itself” to a subject.  
“Representation” has the added sense of possession and of being internal to the possessor; 
however, for Schopenhauer, “No object without subject,” and “No subject without object.”  The 
translated “idea” also bears a similar sense of possession.  See Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World 
as Will and Presentation: Volume One. Trans. Richard E. Aquila. New York: Pearson Longman, 
2008.  (Future references to this work will be abbreviated as WWP and line numbers will be 
used.) 
198 WWP, Vol. II, 219-220. 
135 
 
person experience, even though the will does not emerge entirely naked.199  So, apprehension of 
the world begins with an individual’s will and with her body, which is the objectification (and 
individuation) of the will.  The manner in which Schopenhauer satisfies his need for a frame of 
orientation illustrates a kind of elegance and beauty, for he comprehensively interweaves four 
dimensions of human experience into an organic whole. He begins with an epistemology of how 
we experience the world through presentations conditioned by the principle of sufficient ground.  
Each thing as presentation exists within the conditions of time, space and causality—each 
presentation falling under the principium individuationis, or the veil of Maya.  Schopenhauer 
moves from epistemology to metaphysics and reveals the essence of the world to be will.  We 
experience ourselves in a two-fold way: as the exterior body which is presented to us under the 
Principle of Sufficient Ground, and as the interior will which presents itself to us as our essence.  
Schopenhauer analogizes the human body with all corporeal bodies in nature, and he claims that 
even though we are conscious only of other things as presentations, if we were to strip away the 
“presentation” of any object, then what would remain would be will.  According to 
Schopenhauer, to think that human beings exist differently than everything else in the world 
would be to fall into theoretical egoism.  For the theoretical egoist, objects only exist as 
presentations, but this would mean that the presentations that we experience would have no 
objective existence in the world.  Schopenhauer admits that there is no proof against this 
position, but to adopt it as a serious conviction, one would place oneself in a madhouse.200  He 
suggests that it is not a proof that is needed against solipsism but “a cure.”  He undergoes this 
                                                            
199 According to Schopenhauer, the I is not absolutely simple but consists of that which is 
cognizant (intellect) and that which is cognized (will).  In self-consciousness, even though there 
is a kind of immediate access to the will, that access is still mediated by the intellect.  Thus, the 
will is not “through and through intimate to itself,” but somewhat “remains a riddle to itself.”  
See 221-224 in Volume II for a discussion of the will’s relation to itself in self-consciousness. 
200 WWP, Vol. I, 125. 
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curative exposition of the world through an aesthetic and an ethical lens.  So to restate, 
everything in the world differs only in the degree of objectification of the will, but everything is 
part of the same essence of the world—namely, the will.  Schopenhauer moves from the 
metaphysics of nature to aesthetics, where he broadens his understanding of the higher levels of 
objectification of will in objects of art.  The essence of the world is will, and the will does 
nothing other than will its own existence through a blind and unending striving.  So, to be will is 
to be desire, and to be desire is to exist in a perpetually painful state of wanting.  Thus, viewing 
the world as will and presentation explains “the twin evils” of suffering and death.  However, 
through pure will-less subjective cognition of art, an individual can experience a temporary 
reprieve from the pain of willing.  Such moments of will-less existence occur in a kind of pure 
contemplation of Platonic Ideas, which true art presents to us in a seemingly timeless fashion.  
Thus, art becomes one means of transcending existence as will, if only momentarily.  
Schopenhauer moves from aesthetics to ethics when he re-focuses his attention on how the will 
manifests itself through human action.  He does not provide any sort of systematic ethical theory, 
but he does claim that compassion is the singular and fundamental “virtue” of the ethical sphere.  
Since each human being exists as a manifestation of one and the same will, when one causes 
another to suffer, one causes himself to suffer and shares the victimization.  Similarly, when one 
suffers by the hand of a perpetrator, the victim shares the guilt of the offense.  Attaining the 
recognition that all human beings, and all of nature, are part of the same whole produces the 
effect of a kind of “oneness” with objectifications of the will.  Ultimately, it is only the full 
denial of the will in death that allows a permanent and complete unification with the will.  
Schopenhauer says that in death one becomes nothing and everything—nothing as individuated 
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presentation and everything as will to life.201  He concludes the ethical dimension of the world 
with the acknowledgement of a paradox.  What is paradoxical is that the will, objectified as a 
human being, ultimately wills its own nothingness.  Schopenhauer clarifies by saying that 
redemption from the world consists in one’s willing itself into nothingness as presentation, but 
that same “step” is also a step into a becoming of everything, i.e. the will.   
 The need for stimulation is satisfied by Schopenhauer through his active engagement 
with Immanuel Kant, Plato, the Upanishads and the Vedas.  Kant was Schopenhauer’s hero in 
that he captured the bifurcated nature of the world as appearance and as thing-in-itself.  One of 
the fundamental philosophical questions for Kant was, “How is human experience possible?”  In 
attempting to address this question, Kant recognized the limitations and conditions that are 
necessary for the possibility of human experience.  Schopenhauer shared this insight into the 
experiential distance between subject and object and the interdependent relation between each 
subject and the objects that she experiences.  Schopenhauer was stimulated by this insight and 
developed a more organic and less systematic philosophy which sought to explain the two-fold 
nature of existence.  Schopenhauer’s epistemology and metaphysics have strong roots in Kant’s 
epistemology and metaphysics, yet Schopenhauer’s thoughts on these two dimensions of the 
philosophical attitude did significantly deviate from his hero.  The unknowability of the thing-in-
itself becomes the immediate certainty and knowledge of the will, which is the interiority of an 
individual’s experience of herself.  Appearances that also exist as things-in-themselves become 
presentations that also exist as objectifications of the will.  In addition to Kant’s model of human 
experience, Schopenhauer appropriates Plato’s conception of Ideas (also known as Forms).  His 
                                                            
201 Schopenhauer, Arthur. Essays and Aphorisms. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1970, pp. 73-76. 
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use of Plato’s “bifurcation” of the world into Ideas and sensible particulars is present throughout 
his works, but Plato qua stimulator plays a large role in Schopenhauer’s conception of art.  
Again, Plato’s model of the nature of art is not strictly mimicked by Schopenhauer but is 
appropriated in an interesting way.  For Schopenhauer, art makes possible the subjective will-
less experience of the Ideas, a kind of transcendent experience that breaks though the veil of 
Maya and outside of time, space and causality, even if only for a transitory few moments.  The 
experience of the sublime and the experience of beauty are only different in the degree to which 
resistance from presentations disrupts the apprehension of the will, the former being a more tense 
and rough experience of oneness and the latter being a more full and smooth experience of 
oneness with the world.  The third set of sources of stimulation for Schopenhauer was Buddhism 
and the Hindu sacred texts of the Vedas and the Upanishads.  Two Hindu notions that 
Schopenhauer appropriated were the dreamlike quality of existence as presentation and the 
sought-for oneness of the individual with the world as will.  The world experienced as 
presentation is similar to that of a dream, one from which we hope to awaken when we 
ultimately achieve a complete denial of the will.  Even before an individual’s death, the 
recognition that others are part of the same will that you yourself are can be a guiding thought 
one the way toward full denial of the will.  The Buddhist notion of Nirvana is virtually the same 
as Schopenhauer’s idea of the denial of the will.  In Nirvana the will is silenced and there is only 
a perfect cognition that birth, old age, sickness and death do not exist—we are shown “that 
complete stillness of the sea of spirit.”202  Schopenhauer believed that he had an understanding of 
the nature of reality, one that had roots in the oldest of world religions.  By tracing certain core 
tenets of Hinduism and Buddhism through the history of ideas up to his own philosophical 
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endeavor, he satisfied his need for stimulation and such satisfaction resulted in the fruits of his 
philosophical labors.   
 His actual writings shed light on how he satisfied his existential need for effectiveness in 
the world.  Schopenhauer satisfied his existential need for effectiveness in and through his 
philosophical writings.  He wrote his works to an as yet unknown audience, yet he wrote always 
as if his understanding of humanity’s relation to the will would result, not merely in his reader’s 
adoption of his conclusions, but in his reader’s mode of existence being purposively affected.  
The answer to the question, “How should I live?” ought not to be simply contemplated.  The 
“effect” of that question is to be action.  Such a hoped for result of one’s writings is difficult to 
envision, for it is not immediate and it may never even come to exist within “the cause’s” 
lifetime.  Nevertheless, the satisfaction of Schopenhauer’s existential need did in fact realize 
itself, particularly by Nietzsche whose own effectiveness has had exponential growth, like the 
subtle shifting of a tectonic plate under the ocean has the effect of tidal waves on lands afar.   
 How did Schopenhauer satisfy his need for devotion?  He was an atheist and did not 
believe in any god.  He never engaged with political issues of his day and did not strongly 
identify with any national state.  We cannot be certain what the object of his devotion actually 
was, yet even if we cannot know the content to which he devoted himself there is strong 
evidence that he did partake in the activity of devotion.  In the beginning of his magnum opus, he 
expresses an attitude of conviction:  
What is to be communicated through [this book] is a single thought.  Nonetheless, despite 
all efforts, I could find no shorter way to communicate it than this entire book.—I take 
the thought to be that which has been sought at great length under the name philosophy, 
and whose discovery has been, precisely for that reason, held by the historically 
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cultivated to be as impossible as that of the philosophers’ stone, even if Pliny has already 
told them: Quam multa fieri non posse, priusquam sint facta, judicantur?203   
This “single thought” is that to which Schopenhauer has devoted himself, and this “single 
thought” is that which gives meaning and purpose to Schopenhauer’s activity of doing 
philosophy.  When one reads this introductory remark in The World as Will and Presentation, 
one expects Schopenhauer to provide an answer at some point in the following pages.  
Unfortunately, an explicit answer never surfaces.  Even in the last section of WWP, 
Schopenhauer reiterates the claim that his work constitutes “the entire development of that one 
thought whose communication was my purpose.”204  At first this unanswered question presents 
itself as a source of frustration, for we would like to know to what Schopenhauer has devoted his 
very existence (as an individuated presentation).  Some have suggested that the single thought is: 
“The world is will’s self-cognizance,” yet it is not clear that this is specifically what the single 
thought is.205  The expression of the single thought culminates with the ethical significance of 
human action in Book IV of WWP, and there we discover a kind of interdependence between 
self-cognizance and action.  In his discussion of virtue, Schopenhauer claims that genuine 
goodness of disposition can only arise “from an immediate and intuitive cognizance,” but that 
such a disposition can also only find “its true adequate expression…in deeds, in action, in the 
course of a person’s life.”206  Looking at the quote from Pliny at the beginning of 
Schopenhauer’s first preface, the idea being expressed is that the possibility of something often 
cannot and does not enter into one’s understanding of ‘what is possible’ until an action is “done” 
                                                            
203 WWP, Preface, viii.  The quote from Pliny is the following: “How much is judged to be 
impossible, until it is done?” 
204 WWP, 484. 
205 Cartwright, David E. Schopenhauer: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010, p. 334.  See also Schopenhauer’s Manuscript Remains, Vol. I, p. 512.   
206 WWP, 437. 
141 
 
[factum = deed, act, exploit, achievement].  It is reasonable to think Schopenhauer’s underlying 
single thought, the single thought of his magnum opus and the single thought to which he has 
devoted himself, unfolds through a synthesis of self-cognizance and action.  This may only get 
us part of the way toward knowing what the single thought actually is and thus what his object of 
devotion actually is, yet perhaps this illustrates that the particular object of devotion is less 
significant than the activity of devotion itself.   
 Schopenhauer satisfies his existential need for rootedness in a rather artful manner.  At 
first glance (or even second glance), there does not seem to be any sort of community that 
Schopenhauer ever rooted himself within.  While he did have some friends, Schopenhauer did 
not experience the kind of sense of belonging that we might generally think of, for his father died 
when he was young, he had a disastrous relationship with his mother and he had two children 
that died in early infancy.  Thus, he never created a family of his own.  So in what way did 
Schopenhauer “feel at home in the world”?  Thinking of the world only as presentation leaves 
everything in it, including Schopenhauer himself, individuated by the Principle of Sufficient 
Ground.  However, by also conceiving of the world as the will for life in which everything is an 
objectification of one and the same will, he has effectively rooted himself in the metaphysically 
superlative community of all possible communities.  According to Schopenhauer, his existence 
as will is what gives him the feeling of rootedness in some whole that is larger than his 
individuated self.  He gives a good characterization of what the will is in the Second Book of 
WWP:  
A phenomenon means a presentation and nothing beyond that: every presentation, of 
whatever sort it may be, every object, is a phenomenon.  But thing in itself is solely will.  
As such, it is altogether not a presentation but toto genere distinct from it; it is that of 
which all presentations, all objects, are the phenomenon, the visibility, the 
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objectivization.  It is that which is innermost, the core of every individual thing and 
likewise of the whole: it makes its appearance in every blindly effectual natural force; it 
also makes its appearance in the reflectively considered actions of human beings.  The 
great difference between the two concerns only the degree to which it makes its 
appearance, not the essence of that which is making its appearance.207 
So all objects are objectifications/manifestations of the will for life, and human beings possess 
the highest level of reflectivity for entities whose essence is will.  So no matter how much 
suffering Schopenhauer experiences at any point in his life, he is always “connected in being” to 
every other individuated object in the world.  He thereby annihilates any possibility of isolation 
throughout his entire life, and even in death he loses all individuation and thereby becomes one 
with the will.  Let us put aside the question whether the will to live is something real or apparent 
for the moment and consider the way in which Schopenhauer satisfied his need for rootedness.  
He conceptualized an ontologically monistic world where all objects and subjects only differ in 
the degree to which the will makes its appearance.  So for Schopenhauer there is a kind of 
metaphysical rootedness that makes other forms of rootedness like friendship, family and 
political community seem to pale in comparison. 
 A more difficult existential need to satisfy is that of self-love, especially for 
Schopenhauer.  According to him, egoism and malice are the two anti-moral incentives of human 
actions, and contrarily compassion is the only incentive of moral worth.  Schopenhauer considers 
egoism to be the desire of one’s own “weal and woe” and that such a desire is boundless.208  He 
oddly assumes that egoistic and morally worthy actions are mutually exclusive: either one must 
act in one’s own interest or one must act in the interest of another/others.  His hero Kant 
postulated that there are duties to ourselves, but Schopenhauer more stringently conceives of 
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actions of moral worth as only possibly being done for the interests of others.  Arguing against 
the duty of self-love, Schopenhauer holds that self-love is a kind of self-evident given and that 
morality here “finds its work already done and comes too late.”  He makes reference to 
Christianity and complements it for getting at least one thing right: “The impossibility of 
violating the duty of self-love is already presupposed by the supreme commandment of Christian 
morals, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ according to which the love that each cherishes 
for himself is assumed beforehand as the maximum and the condition of all other love.”209  His 
conception of the self-orientation of human beings is that everyone already does love himself for 
each individual is fundamentally a manifestation of the will to live.  The error here is that he 
inappropriately identifies the will to existence, which can more plausibly be attributed to human 
nature as such, with self-love; however, developing and maintaining an attitude of love towards 
oneself is much more an achievement rather than an attitude that can be possessed automatically 
and without effort.  This highly dubious conception of the impossibility of a duty of self-love is 
continued in his discussion of the ethical dimension of WWP where he addresses the possibility 
of compassion for oneself.  Schopenhauer equates crying with compassion for oneself, but he 
claims that the phenomenon of crying takes “a double detour” from the mere presentation of 
one’s own suffering to the possibility of another experiencing that same suffering back to a 
feeling of pity towards oneself.  In other words, he claims that crying is caused by another’s 
suffering.  Through imagination we can envision another person’s endurance of some piece of 
suffering that oneself experiences—that there is a necessarily other-oriented “projection” that we 
experience when we suffer.  He expresses this unconscious psychological process as follows: 
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That is, one passes from the pain that is felt, even when it is corporeal, to its mere 
presentation, and then finds his own state so deserving of compassion that he is firmly 
and sincerely convinced that, were another person enduring it, he will come to his aid full 
of compassion and love; only it is oneself that is now the object of one’s own sincere 
compassion.210 
This explanation of the phenomenon of crying may be more insightful than we realize at first 
glance.  One piece of evidence that he provides to support his claim is the fact that children who 
suffer a pain usually cry only when someone “commiserates” with them and not over the pain 
but only over its presentation.  For example, think of a child who falls flat on her face when she 
thinks no one is around but who is being watched from a distance.  The child certainly feels pain 
from smacking her face on the ground, but often does not cry.  When adults are present and the 
child falls flat on her face and feels the ground brush against her flesh, it is only upon the child’s 
recognition of the adults’ recognition of her smacking her face that she cries.  This does not only 
take place with the physical suffering of infants.  We may wonder how far this supposed 
necessity of otherness in the phenomenon of crying extends into other kinds of suffering 
experienced by human beings.   
 Does this picture of compassion for oneself make it possible that Schopenhauer did 
successfully satisfy his need for self-love?  I think it does, but it is possible that Schopenhauer 
did not become conscious of the implications of his argument.  There does seem to be at least 
one form of self-love that represents the satisfaction of an existential need.  Through our faculty 
of imagination, we are able to put ourselves in the shoes of others.  Here one focuses on one’s 
own experience of suffering and the possibility that another could experience this first-personal 
suffering.  It may be too strong to say that this is a necessary condition of all instances of crying.  
To counter such a claim, we might look for examples of crying where one’s suffering is not 
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“replicated in reflection” or “vividly transported” to others.  However, finding such an example 
proves to be rather vexing.  Regarding the need for self-love, I think it fair to conclude that 
Schopenhauer did leave a space (albeit small) for himself to develop a relation of self-love, even 
though he requires his compassion for himself to be mediated by otherness. 
 Finally, how does Schopenhauer satisfy his existential need for unity?  In what way does 
he attain the particular kind of inner unity in which there is a harmony arising out of discordant 
drives and perspectives?  We can uncover this unity amidst diversity through the paradoxical 
conclusion of Schopenhauer’s comprehension of the world as will and presentation.  
Schopenhauer’s starting point for philosophical investigation was how the human being 
experiences herself as presentation: both as that to which the world presents itself, and as the one 
who presents herself to the world—existing both as the theatre and the actor within the theatre.  
There is a dialectical movement from the individual’s existence as presentation to the 
individual’s existence primarily as will, and then there is another dialectical step to the 
individual’s experience of objects of art, which serve as temporary palliatives to existing as the 
suffering will, and climactically a final movement toward the individual’s existence as will, 
whose existence is fundamentally that of desire and suffering.  Schopenhauer’s conclusion is that 
ultimate redemption from an existence burdened by desire and suffering is the complete denial of 
the will.  Paradox thus enters the stage: How and why does the will both will itself to live and at 
the same time will itself to be denied—to nothingness?  This is the primary expression of the 
tension between inner perspectives within Schopenhauer, one of which he is quite conscious.  
Another way of articulating this paradox is this: Why does the world as will ever begin its “other 
existence” as presentation in the first place?  Schopenhauer might argue that world as 
presentation has its origin in the world as will’s desire for self-knowledge, yet this will not 
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suffice.  Before the world exists as presentation, there are no desires, for the world as will 
without objectifications has no desires, no beliefs, no hopes, no mentality or consciousness at all.  
Schopenhauer says that it is impossible to remove this one objection to his account:  
It is that, once our considerations have finally arrived at the point where, in complete 
saintliness, what we have before our eyes is denial and abandonment of all willing, and 
precisely thereby redemption from a world whose entire existence has shown itself to be 
suffering, precisely this appears to us now as a passage into empty nothingness.211 
The tension becomes clearer when we recall the true nature of the world as expressed earlier in 
his work: 
The will that, considered purely in itself, is incognizant and only a blind ceaseless 
pressing, such as we see also appearing in inorganic and vegetable nature and its laws as 
well as in the vegetative part of our own life, obtains with the arrival of the world of 
presentation, developed for its service, cognizance of its willing and of that which it is 
willing, namely, that it is nothing other than this world, this life, precisely as it stands 
before it.  For this reason we called the phenomenal world its mirror, its objectivization.  
And since that which the will always wills is life, just because the latter is nothing more 
than a display of that willing with respect to presentation, it is all the same and only a 
pleonasm if, instead of simply saying “will,” we say “will for life.”212 
The tension between the will’s willing life and the will’s denial of life does not have a crystal 
clear resolution.  A sure-fire solution to this tension is not necessarily what is needed because in 
order to satisfy the existential need for unity, one needs a unity of opposition between 
perspectives.  A certain kind of harmony does arise from Schopenhauer’s discordant inner 
perspectives.  There are two ways in which this occurs.  The first is that from an investigation of 
his magnum opus we find a reasonable amount of evidence that Schopenhauer himself actually 
satisfied his need for the complex unity that Nietzsche describes.  The satisfaction of this need in 
tandem with the (non-systematic) satisfaction of the other existential needs made it possible for 
Schopenhauer to achieve self-realization.  He became a real human being: not merely a 
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disorganized collection of fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents.213  The second way in 
which this harmony out of discord occurs is in Schopenhauer’s consecrating himself to culture.  
According to Nietzsche, there are two steps in this process: 
Thus only he who has attached his heart to some great man receives thereby the first 
consecration to culture,…that one has a feeling of sympathy for the genius who again 
and again drags himself up out of our dryness and apathy and the same feeling in 
anticipation for all those who are still struggling and evolving,…so that the men we live 
among resemble a field over which is scattered the most precious fragments of sculpture 
where everything calls to us: come, assist, complete, bring together what belongs 
together, we have an immeasurable longing to become whole.214 
And 
I now have to describe the effects of the second consecration [to culture]…For now we 
have to make the transition from the inward event to an assessment of the outward event; 
the eye has to be directed outwards so as to rediscover in the great world of action that 
desire for culture it recognized in the experiences of the first stage just 
described…culture demands of him…finally and above all an act, that is to say a struggle 
on behalf of culture and hostility towards those influences, habits, laws, institutions in 
which he fails to recognize his goal: which is the production of the genius.215 
It is not so much that Schopenhauer attached his heart to Plato or to Kant or to the Buddha, but 
that he attached his heart to the genius that dragged himself up out of his own barrenness and 
apathy.  The tension between the various inner perspectives of Schopenhauer’s conception of 
reality produced a harmony, but a harmony having a concrete effect in the world.  
Schopenhauer’s inward event of genius-production was externalized into an outward event.  The 
product of that outward event was Nietzsche.  Through the satisfaction of his existential needs, 
from the need for unity through the need for a frame orientation, Schopenhauer achieved self-
realization and thus exemplified more than just the will to live.  He exemplified the will to 
power.   
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Chapter Five 
Nietzsche’s Account of Friendship as a Mean Condition 
 Does Nietzsche present an account of friendship?  I believe that we can find an account 
of friendship within Nietzsche’s thought, albeit one that presents the status of friendship as a 
kind of mean condition [mesotês] between various types of vices.  I characterize the phenomenon 
of friendship as a mean condition for three reasons.  Firstly, friendship understood as a mean 
condition best articulates its “what-it-is” by reference to what it is not—i.e. certain vices.  I use 
the notion of vices rather broadly to indicate those dispositions that exemplify loss of self, 
fragmentation of self, psychological sickness, deformity of “soul”, life-negation, alienation from 
self and/or escape from self.  These vicious conditions usually are somewhat more easily 
apprehended than the more elusive virtue of friendship of which we ultimately wish to gain a 
better understanding.  Secondly, friendship should be understood as a mean condition because 
characterizing it in this way illuminates its built-in relativity.  Friendships take many forms and 
many shapes, from one culture to the next and even within the same culture between sets of 
individuals.  Even authentic friendships, which are the kind we are interested in, appear to have 
some level of variability.  Despite this variability, Nietzsche does have an account in which he 
presents what the essence of friendship is—an essence that is universally instantiated in genuine 
friendships.  In other words, the characteristic essence of genuine friendship allows for some 
variation of expression, albeit still with the confines of the human structure of such relationships.  
Thirdly, the virtue of friendship will have a plurality of corresponding vices where each set 
surrounded the mean condition of friendship on different continua.  Just as other virtues, such as 
courage, have more than one set of vices with more than one continuum, friendship will also 
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display this structure.  The fact that there is a plurality of continua of vices for friendship (or 
other virtues) is not a problem for this virtue ethical account of friendship, for Aristotle says that 
“it is possible to go wrong in many ways…, but there is only one way to get something right 
(which is why the one is easy and the other is difficult, it being easy to miss the target and 
difficult to hit it); so for these reasons excess and deficiency belong to vice and the mean 
condition belongs to virtue.”216  Given such a plurality, we can see that there is more than one 
way to fall out of the harmonious and balanced mean.  Such a view recognizes that the emotions 
and actions of the human psyche are not limited to just one continuum with only two opposing 
poles.  From an inquiry into the tension between the vices that oppose friendship (and that 
oppose each other), we will discover what this essence of friendship is. 
   
Sameness and Difference  
In the attempt to engage in friendship, there is a tension between the drive for sameness 
and the drive for difference.  Accomplishing the virtuous mean of friendship requires one to 
avoid manifesting either of these drives in their vicious extremes.  One who entertains the 
possibility of another person becoming a friend, or who has already established some degree of 
friendship with another person, often operates from the drive to find as many similarities as 
possible with the identity of the friend.  One has the hope that the other will see the world the 
same way that he does.  There is the wish that the other will feel the same way about social and 
political issues.  A friend hopes that he shares a similar aesthetic taste with the other: “Are we 
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moved to tears by the same kinds of films?  Do we both feel inspired by the same music?”  The 
drive at hand can easily shift from a desire for mere similarity to a desire for sameness, i.e. 
“sameness of being.”  It is often thought that such a desire only occurs in erotic relationships, but 
the desire for the “merging of souls” can be present in friendship as well.  The difficulty with the 
satisfaction of such a drive is that in reality this sameness does not exist, despite love’s attempts 
to annihilate the feeling of being other in a relationship.217  In recognizing the nonexistence of 
sameness between self and other, one moves closer toward the mean condition of friendship.  In 
order for the friendship to thrive, the specific wish for sameness needs to be overcome, and each 
member of the relationship must respect the individuality of the other.  This respecting of the 
other’s individuality is a kind of keeping distance from the other, which might be regarded as a 
form of respect for his autonomy and self-expression.  Such autonomy and self-expression might 
be contaminated if impressed upon too often or to too high a degree.  This idea of respect as 
keeping distance finds expression in Nietzsche when he compares the contamination of the 
other’s individuality with the smearing of a good engraving: 
If we live together with another person too closely, what happens is similar to when we 
repeatedly handle a good engraving with our bare hands: one day all we have left is a 
piece of dirty paper.  The soul of a human being too can finally become tattered by being 
handled continually; and that is how it finally appears to us - we never see the beauty of 
its original design again. - One always loses by too familiar association with friends and 
women; and sometimes what one loses is the pearl of one’s life.218 
Just as it is possible for an individual to improve and preserve the good condition of the friend 
through a sharing of lives, it is also possible for one to wear thin “the beauty of its original 
design” by intruding on the other’s self-chosen projects—projects that may require a measure of 
strict solitude.  A good example of this kind of tattering is the premature forcing of oneself into 
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the other’s most intimate secrets.  The other must give a person permission to enter her 
innermost world of thoughts and feelings, yet the drive to sameness can cause one to easily and 
hastily overlook the need for such freely given consent.   
Another form of resistance to genuine friendship is the presence of the opposing drive for 
difference.  There will likely be a moment in the formation of a friendship where someone 
realizes that he does not want his friend to be the same person as he is.  The drive for complete 
similarity between friends is opposed by the drive for difference.  Although it may appear to be 
counterintuitive, Nietzsche claims that this drive may do even more good than the opposing drive 
for sameness: “…it is as though [those who are gentle, reflective and possess a relaxed 
friendliness] were gazing out of the windows of their castle, which is their fortress and for that 
reason also their prison—to gaze into what is strange and free, into what is different, does them 
so much good!”219  Such is the manner in which one can relate to another but do so through the 
recognition of difference rather than a recognition of some similarity.  Seeing “what is different” 
in the friend preserves one’s own individuality and helps to solidify one’s identity in 
juxtaposition to the identity of the other.  Nevertheless, in the construction of a friendship an 
individual still experiences the inner demand to identify with the other in terms of what they find 
agreeable.  Because the struggle to bring forth one’s self into the world has such potency, the 
tendency to individuate oneself from the other always resurfaces.  Nietzsche acknowledges this 
phenomenon stating, “It is not in how one soul approaches another but in how it distances itself 
from it that I recognize their affinity and relatedness.”220  We might say that one deficiency of 
friendship is complete difference between self and other, and we can say that one excess of 
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friendship is complete sameness.  It is not terribly important which is the excess and which the 
deficiency because each can be viewed as either “excessive” in one way and “deficient” in 
another.  Each vice will be “out of proportion” and prohibit the creation of a friendship as a kind 
of work of art, whereby the subtraction of anything or the addition of anything would destroy its 
beauty.  What is important is that friendship aims at some mean condition between total 
sameness and total difference, a condition in which the participants look to what is beautiful.   
 Nietzsche’s conception of how friendship exists somewhere between sameness and 
difference is similar to Socrates’ solution to the problem of friends being neither “like to like” 
nor “opposite to opposite.”  Near the end of his discussion of the nature of friendship with Lysis 
and Menexenus, Socrates introduces the notion of kinship.  For one to be akin [oikeion] to 
another is “to feel at home with,” for oikeion is related to oikia, which means “house,” 
“household,” or “home.”  This feeling at home of two friends is a kind of relationship that is 
neither one of complete sameness nor one of complete difference, yet partaking somehow of 
both.  Socrates explicates:  
“And therefore,” I said, “if someone desires another, boys, or loves him passionately, he 
would never desire, nor love passionately, nor love [as a friend] unless he happened to be 
akin in some way to his passionately beloved—either in his soul, or else in some 
character of his soul, or some of its ways, or some aspect of it.”221 
On this understanding, friendship depends on one friend being akin to in some way, or feeling at 
home with in some way, the other, not entirely but feeling at home with some character or aspect 
of the other’s soul, or some of its ways.  The desire that a friend experiences for his loved one 
does not have to be a desire for the whole being of the other.  The loved one could have one 
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particular passion or virtue that he possesses that draws the friend in, even while having an 
aversion or being indifferent to other aspects of the other’s soul.   
But might not one object that genuine friendship requires there to be a connection with 
the other person as a whole?  This requirement is too strong, for a couple of reasons.  For one, 
the kind of wholeness that Nietzsche is interested in is a unity within manifoldness, in which a 
single soul embodies a potentially wide range of perspectives, moralities, values, etc.  Friendship 
need not require one to have a connection with all parts of the other’s inner diversity-based unity.  
Secondly, a connection with the whole person seems to involve a near complete knowledge of 
the other or a near full identification of one’s feelings and attitudes with the affective states of 
the other.  Such knowledge of the other in his wholeness may not be psychologically possible, 
even in the most intimate of friendships.  To strive to achieve this type of connection might also 
cause one to neglect the values of mystery and unfathomability of the other in friendship.  So, the 
desire for a connection with the whole person is best associated with a kind of excessive 
condition that fails to hit the target of genuine friendship.   
  We can see, then, how this picture of friendship as kinship-to-some-aspect-of-soul bears 
a strong resemblance to Nietzsche’s understanding of friendship, for both Plato and Nietzsche 
comprehend the tension between sameness and difference surrounding friendship and seek a kind 
of mean condition between extremes in which it can exist.  In replacing sameness with a more 
precise notion of ‘being akin,’ Nietzsche expresses this ideal of kinship in terms of his 
connection with certain thinkers who have posthumously augmented his joy of living on this 
earth, “If I were set the task, I could endeavor to make myself at home in the world with 
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[Montaigne].”222    Part of the reason that Nietzsche feels this kinship with Montaigne is that he 
is honest as a writer and a thinker.  However, honesty has an opponent: dissimulation, which 
leads us to another important aspect of the mean condition of friendship.  From the sameness-
difference tension, then, we must turn to the related honesty-dissimulation tension that surrounds 
friendship, which seeks to occupy a mean condition between honesty and dissimulation.   
 
Honesty and Dissimulation 
The problem of how much of one’s self should be disclosed to another looms large in 
Nietzsche’s writings.  On the one hand, Nietzsche praises honesty [Redlichkeit] as “the youngest 
virtue” and as a virtue still in the process of becoming.  Honesty is an active condition where one 
is truthful towards the needs and drives that move one’s actions and that substantiate one’s 
beliefs.  On the other hand, Nietzsche praises dissimulation as a discriminatory ability that the 
genuine friend should possess.  With such praise, Nietzsche suggests that a certain degree of 
dishonesty should be present in friendship.  How can we unravel this apparent contradiction?  
First, how does Nietzsche characterize honesty, not as a virtue, but as a vice of excess?  Honesty 
is not only honesty with oneself but also an active condition especially directed toward one’s 
friends.  Nietzsche begins to follow Ralph Waldo Emerson’s account of friendship, for Emerson 
also holds honesty to be one of the two elements that go into the composition of friendship:  
I am arrived at last in the presence of a [friend] so real and equal, that I may drop even 
those undermost garments of dissimulation, courtesy, and second thought, which men 
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never put off, and may deal with him with the simplicity and wholeness with which one 
chemical atom meets another.223 
Such a virtue finds a place in Nietzsche’s “good four” along with courage, magnanimity and 
politeness.224  In a letter to Mathilde Maier, Nietzsche expresses the value of a friend whose 
honesty is double-directed, at self and other: “I can endure only human relationships which are 
absolutely genuine.  I avoid half-friendships and especially partisan associations; I want no 
adherents.  May every man (and woman) be his own adherent only.”225  I find this conception of 
genuine friendship quite compelling.  Nietzsche promotes the idea that only human relationships 
that are absolutely genuine are actually the most human of relationships.  This attitude displays 
integrity and courage—to accept nothing less than whole friendships and to forego those “half-
friends” who would be mere followers rather than engage in the relationship through choice.  
Concerning both the attitude toward wisdom and the attitude toward one’s friend, a mere 
follower is one who only reveres and idolizes the wise and similarly who only reveres and 
idolizes the friend.  On the other hand, one who adheres to himself lives his aspiration to wisdom 
as a philosopher of life and puts his reverence toward the friend into his living deeds.226  It is this 
double meaning of friendship, ‘being a friend to wisdom’ and ‘being a friend to another’, that 
Nietzsche expresses in his letter to Maier.  The thought also echoes the priority of the project of 
self-realization in that each individual should only follow himself.   
However, the drive for honesty finds strong resistance from the drive for dissimulation.  
If one cares for the feelings of a friend, then a certain level of dissimulation is necessary in order 
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to respect the tenderness of his affections.  Nietzsche suggests that we often have to practice “a 
benevolent dissimulation” especially toward those with whom there is a possibility of friendship, 
for we may have to pretend we do not see through the motives of their actions.227  This 
suggestion implies that the motives behind our actions are often not what they appear to be.  This 
does not necessarily mean that our motives are always harmful or malicious, although sometimes 
they may be.  What I think Nietzsche is getting at here is that our “motives” are really our 
existential needs that are constantly present in the split between our consciousness and our 
instincts.  Our needs are forever pressing towards the realization of a self.  This underlying 
process may appear to be a threat to what is conventionally required for genuine friendship: 
loving the other for her own sake.  However, the goal of self-realization does not undermine such 
human relationships because the struggle to realize a self does not necessarily threaten the love 
that is felt toward the friend.  The acceptance of the particularity of the friend and the eventual 
loving attitude that is developed toward the other opens up otherwise closed avenues for self-
discovery and self-creation.  There seems to be a higher stage of freedom associated with higher 
levels of self-realization, which also would appear to involve a higher degree of self-
consciousness.  Nietzsche is not the only thinker to recognize that human relationships 
exemplifying mutual commitment can increase the autonomy of both.  In the development of 
freedom from abstract to more concrete forms, Hegel found such a commitment in the institution 
of marriage.  Whereas Hegel takes marriage to be one moment in the movement toward absolute 
Freedom in human society—a moment that makes a higher level of liberation of both parties 
possible “because in it they attain their substantive self-consciousness,”—Nietzsche sees that 
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friendship is not simply a condition, but the unique social condition of excellence that makes a 
higher degree of liberation possible—a liberation to a fully realized self.228  
  Zarathustra’s recommendation that some degree of illusion is needed alongside honesty is 
consistent with friendship’s status as a mean condition.  He poses the question whether some 
degree of dreamlike illusion is needed in order for one to spark the friend’s longing for the 
overman inside himself: “You do not want to put on anything for your friend?  Should it be an 
honor for your friend that you give yourself to him as you are?”229  Zarathustra suggests that an 
individual who makes no secret of himself puts his friend into a rage and that there is some 
reason for one to fear nakedness.  He also advises that one cannot groom oneself too beautifully 
for one’s friend and that a friend must not want to see everything.  So we have an image of a 
friend, but one who partakes in forms of dissimulation: secrecy, illusion and clothing oneself in 
beauty.   
But why is such dishonesty needed when honesty also is needed in friendship?  There 
must be something valuable about the mysteriousness of the friend, a kind of mystery that helps 
both self and other to be mutually supportive in the realization of selves.  When Zarathustra says, 
“O my friend, man is something that must be overcome,” he means that what must be overcome 
is that being which is not yet a fully realized self.  Just a step later, Zarathustra says that if what 
you love in the friend is “the glance of eternity,” then some level of mystery must remain to 
preserve that higher ideal.  Why is it important to possess some degree of unfathomability as a 
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friend?  Why should the friend conceal his compassion under a hard shell?  How does the 
concealment of that compassion make it full of “delicacy and sweetness”?  Compassion must be 
somewhat hidden because of the human lust for possession.  The drive to possess, especially the 
possession of others, is an extension of both the existential needs for effectiveness and for active 
stimulation; however, we might consider it to be potentially harmful to a possible or actual 
relationship.  Particularly with relationships based on erotic love and with friendships, the 
phenomenon of boredom provides some evidence that a lover or a friend should not entirely 
reveal himself (all the manifestations of his compassion) too soon.  Think of how often and how 
easily two spouses, having formerly been true lovers, exhaust the full range of what they are 
capable of and what constitutes their inner life.  Two friends can just as easily grow fatigued of 
each other, if one allows himself to be completely possessed by the other.  If a relationship is to 
not fall prey to boredom, the inner life of the other should be a kind of endless well of bits and 
pieces of the other’s revelations of compassion.  One party in a friendship should discretely 
disclose himself so that there is always something novel to discover.  Also, think of how much 
fascination a friend or lover can embody when draped with a certain quality of mystery.  Only 
one who has the ability to discriminate when to feign and when to disguise parts of himself will 
properly occupy this mean condition between honesty and dissimulation.  Regarding the nature 
of possession in erotic love, Nietzsche says, “Our pleasure in ourselves tries to maintain itself by 
again and again changing something new into ourselves; that is what possession means.  To 
become tired of some possession means tiring of ourselves.”230  The lust to possess someone is 
the desire to expand one’s self outward to encapsulate the other, but there is a danger in the 
satisfaction of this desire.  Suppose one actually succeeds and comes to possess a lover.  The 
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complete possession of the other causes one’s drive for self-expansion to be stifled.  As 
Nietzsche says, once one tires of the other, he will tire of himself.  This process that occurs in 
erotic relationships also can occur in friendship.  The same lust for possession exists with the 
friend as it does with the lover.  Zarathustra’s cautions the friend to make a secret of himself, to 
beautifully groom himself and to conceal his compassion in order to prevent complete possession 
of the other.  To further explicate Zarathustra’s idea that man is something that must be 
overcome, we ought to consider this lust for possession as that part of man which must be 
overcome.  It must be overcome for two reasons: in order to experience friendship and in order to 
realize selves. 
   
Betrayal of Confidence and Neglect of Praise 
Concerning the next set of opposing elements to genuine friendship in Nietzsche’s 
account, one extreme is the vice of betrayal of confidence, and its counterpart vice is something 
like a failure to praise the strengths of the friendship (and the friend).231  The corresponding 
mean condition is friendship but that aspect of friendship that is concerned with trustworthiness.  
Each of these vices stems from humankind’s nature as “the great esteemer,” particularly the 
activities of blaming and praising, in which one vice consists of saying too much to the wrong 
people and the other vice consists of saying too little to the friend (How much to say?  To whom 
to say it?).  The betrayal of confidence is excessive in the sense that one discloses to others 
outside the friendship what is intended to be kept in secrecy inside the friendship.  Such a 
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betrayal is a failure to revere the trust that has been place in oneself by the friend, and is rooted 
in the human tendency to blame the base actions and weak qualities of others, especially those 
intimate ones that are kept secret for everyone except the friend.  On a separate continuum, the 
vice of failing to praise the strengths of the friendship (and the friend) is deficient in the sense 
that one neglects the excellence aspects of the friendship and the strengths of the other, even if 
those strengths surpass one’s own.  One may recognize them, but recognition is not enough.  
Vocalization of that recognition is an important way to let the friend know that that there is a 
recognition and an appreciation of her merits.  So, on one continuum we have an excess of blame 
and a deficiency of blame (where one fails to manifest the strength of keeping the other’s 
confidence), and on another we have an excess of praise and a deficiency of praise (where one 
fails to exemplify proper pride regarding the friend (and friendship)).  Experiencing enough 
comfort inside a relationship to freely disclose oneself to the friend seems to be the mark of the 
genuineness of a friendship.  It is easy to reveal what a friend has said to oneself in confidence; 
however, it takes a significant amount of strength of character to be “a confidant” to the other—
to treat what is given in secrecy as a gift from the other.  Of a friend’s secret, Nietzsche says, 
“There will be few who, when they are in want of matter for conversation, do not reveal the more 
secret affairs of their friends.”232  The human desire to engage in gossip comes to mind, for the 
activity of gossiping is usually associated with a feeling of moral superiority and is an 
opportunity for gossipers to voice condemnations and judgments upon others.  However, the 
gossiper usually only experiences the feeling of moral superiority and does not possess any 
actual superiority of will or character.  Such a person often speaks out of flagrant ressentiment 
for the target of ridicule.  On the flipside, a genuine friend has the ability to take in the secrets 
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given by the other and can be trusted to treat such secrets as gifts and as little windows into the 
fortressed soul of the other.233  So when Nietzsche advises his reader that one should not talk 
about one’s friends, otherwise one will talk away the feeling of friendship, he recognizes the ease 
with which one is able to violate a friend’s trust by placing a new trust in a new acquaintance.234  
However, because the new “trust” is a violation of a previous secrecy, its dishonesty cancels both 
the old trust and itself out. 
 Nietzsche’s thought that genuine friendship can be exemplified by oneself in an agonistic 
but cooperative dialectic with the other is significant, especially in the sense of a friend standing 
as one’s enemy.  The full quote on “Self-observation” from HAH just referenced states:  
Man is very well defended against himself, against being reconnoitered and besieged by 
himself, he is usually able to perceive of himself only his outer walls.  The actual fortress 
is inaccessible, even invisible to him, unless his friends and enemies play the traitor and 
conduct him in by a secret path.235 
In order to “play the traitor,” a friend must have the willingness to be his friend’s spiritual 
enemy.  There are many ways in which a friend can assist in solidifying the other’s self through 
intellectual contestation.  Some modern salient examples of such enemy-enemy relationships are 
the Republican-Democrat, the Christian-Atheist, the Vengeful-Merciful, the Objectivist-
Relativist (regarding morality), the Capitalist-Socialist and the Absolutist-Perspectivist 
(regarding Truth).  While these are just a few among many ways that two individuals can 
intellectually and emotionally oppose one another, they are some of the most enduring and 
salient oppositions.  One manner in which a friend can help one to realize a self “by a secret 
path” is to occupy the position of spiritual enemy—to lure him into a philosophical dialogue by 
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willfully being his interlocutor.  It is possible that two friends already occupy opposing positions, 
yet a friend’s intentional and willing placement of himself as the other’s enemy seems to be a 
way in which an individual’s self can be brought into clearer focus—to observe the self.   
 
Permanence and Change 
For Nietzsche, friendship also requires accomplishing a mean between the opposing 
forces of permanence and change.  In friendship there is the drive for the relationship to have a 
kind of permanence throughout the lives of each friend.  Once engaged in a committed 
relationship with another, the intuition quickly develops that the relationship must be life-long, 
for any sort of break in the relationship might be considered a failure or be viewed as an inability 
to participate in genuine friendship.  Nietzsche warns against the feeling of this kind of bad 
conscience.  He recognizes that some individuals achieve a great measure of self-transformation 
but that some people are not capable of such a process: “If we greatly transform ourselves, those 
friends of ours who have not been transformed become ghosts of our past: their voice comes 
across to us like the voice of a shade—as though we were hearing ourself, only younger, more 
severe, less mature.”236  What I take Nietzsche to mean here is that an individual ought not to 
feel obligated to maintain a friendship if he has achieved a full degree of self-realization but the 
other has not “matured.”  If the other is still a friend to a former self that no longer exists, then 
one ought not to sacrifice his own process of self-realization.  In other words, do not be a friend 
to a ghost of your past.  Sometimes fate forces two friends to be separated from each other for a 
period of time, yet the two friends refuse to recognize that the other has become a different 
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person than who he once was.  Nietzsche acknowledges this inner defiance of the world of 
becoming:  
When old friends meet again after a long separation it often happens that they feign an 
interest in things mentioned to which they have in fact grown quite indifferent: and 
sometimes both of them notice this but dare not lift the veil—from a sad apprehension of 
what they might see.  Thus conversations arise like those in the realm of the dead.237 
However, it does not necessarily have to be because one friend has failed to realize a self while 
the other has created a self that a friendship should only have a temporary existence; nor must it 
be the case that they have grown indifferent to their new interests.  In a more broad sense, 
friendship must find its place between its drive for permanence and the reality that each 
individual changes over time.  This sought-for mean condition is reminiscent of the adoption of 
the attitude of amor fati, but in this case it is a love of one’s own fate that is expanded to include 
a love of the fate of the friend.  Nietzsche illumines this condition in a section entitled “Star 
friendship.”  As we will see, the meaning of a star friendship proves elusive unless carefully 
digested: 
We were friends and have become estranged.  But this was right, and we do not want to 
conceal and obscure it from ourselves as if we had reason to feel ashamed.  We are two 
ships each of which has its goal and course; our paths may cross and we may celebrate a 
feast together, as we did—and then the good ships rested so quietly in one harbor and one 
sunshine that it may have looked as if they had reached their goal and as if they had one 
goal.  But then the almighty force of our tasks drove us apart again into different seas and 
sunny zones, and perhaps we shall never see each other again; perhaps we shall meet 
again but fail to recognize each other: our exposure to different seas and suns has 
changed us.  That we have to become estranged is the law above us; by the same token 
we should also become more venerable for each other—and the memory of our former 
friendship more sacred.  There is probably a tremendous but invisible stellar orbit in 
which our very different ways and goals may be included as small parts of this path; let 
us rise up to this thought.  But our life is too short and our power of vision too small for 
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us to be more than friends in the sense of this sublime possibility.—Let us then believe in 
our star friendship even if we should be compelled to be earth enemies.238   
A lot is going on in this passage.  It begins with the possibility of becoming strange [fremd] or 
alien to each other, a possibility from which friends often seek to immunize themselves.  From 
this desire, a more-than-human standard is generated and then when the friends find themselves 
in their all-too-human existence of change and becoming, it is likely that they will feel ashamed 
or guilty.  To clarify, the desire to be overcome is the desire to look for selfhood in a permanent 
union with another individual.  In seeking the kind of immutable quality sought under such a 
wish, one assumes that there is an already-existing soul substratum underneath the individual.  
To make this unwarranted assumption is to negate life as it truly exists, in the Heraclitean 
thought, as a river that is ever-changing and which, as the same river, cannot be stepped into 
twice.  But according to Nietzsche here, these feelings of guilt and shame should be overcome.  
These emotions foreshadow what Nietzsche will later refer to as a “bad conscience” in the 
Genealogy of Morals.  It seems that Nietzsche is already wrestling with the question of whether 
and how it is possible for one to be the same person over time, to stand security for one’s own 
future, as the sovereign individual does.239  While Nietzsche does think it possible for an 
individual to realize such a power over oneself and over fate, he insinuates that most human 
beings do not posses such an ability and that such an expectation should be significantly 
tempered by natural and social pressures that alter our character and temperament.  Nietzsche 
proposes that each ship has its own goal [Ziel] and implies that there is not one single goal for all 
ships.  It would make sense to think of each individual’s goal to be his realized self (a kind of 
universal form ascribed to the selfhood which is sought), which is unique and different from 
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individual to individual (and thus each goal is different insofar as its particular content is 
concerned).  Moments where friends are sharing their lives, especially in the activities of resting 
together and feasting together, may make it seem as though they share the same goal, but the 
danger here is losing the self—the realization of which is the ultimate goal.  Nietzsche says that 
it is the almighty force of the friends’ tasks [Aufgabe] that then must drive them apart.  There 
does seem to be a kind of necessity or fatal aspect of what each individual’s “tasks” or “roles” 
are.  If we apply the notion of amor fati to this notion of “duties,” we might say that each person 
has a duty to be and accept the life in the world into which fate has thrust him.  Each ship is thus 
cast out and must submit to difference and change.  As Heraclitus says, not only can we not step 
into the same river twice, but because we are temporal beings who are part of a world of 
becoming, each ship is always a somewhat different ship than it was in its past or that it will be 
in its future.  So when Nietzsche makes the seemingly strange statement, “That we have to 
become estranged is the law above us,” he has a two-fold meaning: Because we are necessarily 
temporal beings of becoming, we are forced to always be (somewhat) alienated (1) from our own 
past and (2) from possible shared pasts that have intertwined with loved ones.  That is “the law 
[Gesetz] above us.”  However, Nietzsche advises his reader that he ought to adopt the attitude of 
amor fati even toward a past that appears fleeting and sometimes almost seems as if it didn’t 
really happen.  A friendship in which the friends’ fates are at some point forced to travel on 
different seas and under different suns still ought to inhabit a “venerable” [ehrwürdig] and 
“sacred” [heiliger] attitude toward their past friendship.  The finite quality of those friendships 
that are genuine should not diminish their excellent quality. 
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Individuality and Shared Lives 
 The last part of the “Star friendship” section leads into the final tension within which 
friendship must seek out a mean condition—the tension between individuality and the sharing of 
lives.  On the one hand, there exists the human drive to exemplify one’s individuality, to 
individuate oneself from everyone else.240  On the other hand, there is also a drive to share one’s 
activities and one’s life with others, especially in friendship.  (This drive has its origin in the 
existential need for rootedness.)  In his portrayal of his friendship with Etienne de la Boétie, 
Montaigne holds that the unison of souls is a fundamental feature of genuine friendship:  
In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely 
that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again….Everything actually 
being in common with them—wills, thoughts, judgments, goods, wives, children, honor, 
and life—and their relationship being that of one soul in two bodies, according to 
Aristotle’s very apt definition, they can neither lend nor give anything to each other.241 
It is tempting to attribute such an idealistic quality to genuine friendship.  Both Montaigne and 
Aristotle characterized the friend as “another self” or as the blending of two souls into one.  
Nietzsche warns us that such a mingling of selves/souls may not be a psychological possibility, 
however, and that such a desire could be harmful to one’s self.  The problem thus raises its head: 
How can one possibly retain one’s individuality while at the same time blurring the lines of that 
individuality by sharing one’s activities, self and life with others?  Is it paradoxical to say that 
                                                            
240 One might object that the value of individuality is not universal to humanity but only to 
modernity or only to Western liberal-democratic cultures.  I concede that individuality is more a 
value in contemporary society and is more a value in the West, but we might wonder whether the 
drive to individuality has been suppressed because of political institutions that have been in place 
for generations—for example, in certain Asian nations such as China and North Korea.  For my 
purposes, I will assume that some degree of the drive for individuality exists even in Chinese, 
Vietnamese and other Asian cultures.   
241 Montaigne, Michel. The Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters. 
Trans. Donald M. Frame. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1948, “28. Of friendship,” pp. 
139-141. 
167 
 
both drives can be tended to simultaneously?  Through the use of metaphorical imagery in his 
conclusion of “Star friendship,” Nietzsche illuminates how to resolve this paradox.  Nietzsche 
supposes the existence of an ideal: “a tremendous but invisible stellar orbit” in which each 
friend’s “very different ways and goals” might possibly all become parts of the one single stellar 
path.  With a hopeful attitude, Nietzsche beckons his reader to lift himself up to such a thought.  
Insofar as we are able to acknowledge the limitations of our humanity, this very ideal—this 
“sublime possibility”—may be the limit of how two friends can each preserve their individuality 
and yet exist together in a star friendship.  To further complicate matters though, Nietzsche 
warns that some authenticity between self and other may have to be sacrificed in order to 
preserve individuality in friendship.  According to him, one feature of a good friendship is that 
“one party knows how to facilitate the association by adding to it a delicate tinge of intimacy 
while at the same time prudently withholding actual and genuine intimacy and the confounding 
of I and Thou.”242  Thus it seems that the opposite practice, the possibility of having to be honest, 
not so much in the brutal sense but perhaps with a certain mixture of gentleness and brutality, is 
what is sometimes required to preserve one’s individuality.  For example, one may find oneself 
being swept up and being carried along by the strong political beliefs of one’s friend—suppose 
that the friend believes that Republican Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, should be the next 
President of the United States—and because of this tightening of grip by the other’s political 
beliefs, which are perhaps antithetical to one’s own position, one feels one’s individuality 
slipping away.  This is where authenticity and honesty would appear to be required in order to 
confess to the other that his beliefs are not shared.  Another example: suppose that one 
unexpectedly discovers that one’s friend is a huge fan of Dave Matthews Band and that the 
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friend is about to ask one to go see D. M. B. live in concert.  Suppose further that this 
unfortunate discovery horrifies one (and rightly so) because the friend’s Dave-Matthews-Band-
ness is going to potentially infect oneself.  What should be done here to keep one’s integrity as 
an individual who is a separate self from others?  Should one be brutally-yet-gently honest in the 
expression of difference in aesthetic taste?  What are we to make of this?  The mean condition of 
friendship results from a dialogic process whereby shared activity enhances each other’s 
individuality and, vice versa, each person’s individuality enhances his own capacity to share his 
life.  Such sharing of lives and activities ought to not necessarily be a complete sacrifice of one’s 
individuality though, nor should it be sacrificial of the rootedness that can be obtained in shared 
experiences.  Friendship here is an active condition in which each person is in a kind of 
equilibrium between opposing extremes.  One possible solution to ‘how much’ and ‘in what 
way’ we can find the target between individuality and the sharing of lives is through friendship’s 
nourishing quality.  In a parent-child relationship, the egoism/altruism dichotomy is sublimated.  
The parent nourishes the child emotionally, intellectually and physically for the child’s own 
sake; however, the child’s hoped-for flourishing is in a sense constitutive of the parent’s 
flourishing.  The significant difference between the nourishment that takes place in the parent-
child relationship and the friend-friend relationship is the lack of equality in the former and the 
presence of equality in the latter.  The recognition of the otherness sought for its own sake but 
still recognized as an otherness that is a constitutive element in one’s own process of becoming a 
self is what makes such sublimation possible.  Along with Nietzsche, we assume that each 
motive is interest-laden—i.e. interested in realizing a self.  If it is true that there are no such 
things as disinterested motives and that all altruistic actions are sublimated egoistic ones, then 
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attempting to be more intimate than humanly possible will result in failure and self-loathing, 
potentially destroying the friendship.  In his re-centering of human motivation, Nietzsche claims: 
Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions are coarsened, brutalized good ones.  
It is the individual’s sole desire for self-enjoyment (together with the fear of losing it) 
which gratifies itself in every instance, let a man act as he can, that is to say as he must: 
whether his deeds be those of vanity, revenge, pleasure, utility, malice, cunning, or those 
of sacrifice, sympathy, knowledge.243 
The underlying motive-force that both pushes an individual and pulls him forward is the drive to 
enjoy the self as a fully realized self.  Just as an individual’s deed can be one of vanity, malice or 
cunning in the interest of accomplishing such a realized self, that same individual’s deed of 
sacrifice or sympathy is also motivated by this framework of self-becoming.  Specifically in 
friendship, actions of sacrifice and/or sympathy can be authentically performed for the other, but 
only insofar as the other’s good exists as part of the self’s good.  So, upon the completion of a 
sacrificial deed, the self-enjoyment that a friend experiences is the nourishing relation that 
promotes healthy growth of the other qua individual and qua part of a self’s ultimate flourishing.  
This way of conceiving selfhood is counterintuitive to the commonsense way of thinking, and 
therefore, such relationships may sometimes require the slight feigning of intimacy.  Keep in 
mind that such feigning should be interpreted as a kind of practical wisdom that one possesses 
toward being intimate in the right way, at the right time, to the right extent, etc.   
 
Envy and Schadenfreude   
 Another opposition of attitudes circling the virtue of friendship is that between envy and 
schadenfreude.  I refer to them as affective states, and not vices, because in each experience one 
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seems to be in the grip of an emotion or feeling, rather than as the occupying an active condition; 
however, this distinction may not be terribly significant.  At a minimum, they are affective states 
that condition actions that emanate from them.  Nietzsche spends a significant amount of time 
examining the feelings of envy [der Neid] and schadenfreude (sometimes referred to as “malice” 
[die Böswilligkeit]), and each emotion appears to represent some sort of sickness of soul, 
especially one that prohibits participation in friendship.  What exactly are envy and 
schadenfreude?  In terms of pleasure and pain, envy is the experience of being pained by the 
fortune of others, and schadenfreude is the experience of pleasure (or joy/delight) at the 
misfortune of others.  In terms of power, envy is the feeling of inferiority caused by the fortune 
of others, and schadenfreude is the feeling of superiority caused by the misfortune of others.  
Envy is an affective experience toward which human beings have a strong tendency, yet despite 
its frequent occurrence it displays a weak and fragmented character.  In envy there is a distance 
between an individual’s desire and that which is coveted that cannot be traversed.  There is a 
sense in which such an emotion just happens to one and as such is out of one’s control; 
nevertheless, to say that the experience of envy “just happens” would not be entirely correct.  
What and who one envies will be conditioned by what he takes to be valuable, but through 
introspection some rational control of such an experience is possible.  The fact that we do blame 
people for being envious of other’s fortune supports such a claim.  However, Nietzsche does 
think that there is some way in which an individual can transform his feelings away from envious 
orientations, even if it is not done on a fully conscious level.  In describing such an instance of 
nobility, Nietzsche says, “Man involuntarily conducts himself nobly when he has become 
accustomed to desiring nothing of men and always bestowing gifts upon them.”244  This process 
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of accustoming oneself to want nothing of others but to accustom oneself to instead bestow gifts 
upon then is one mark of nobility.  The discord between envy and friendship is more specifically 
addressed when Nietzsche remarks that “[a] lack of friends may be put down to envy or 
presumption.  Many owe their friends only to the fortunate circumstances that they have no 
occasion for envy.”245  This comment both recognizes envy as an obstacle to friendship and as an 
obstacle whose presence or absence partially depends on circumstances that are out of our 
control.  Sometimes it just happens to be the case that a friend doesn’t have much of which to be 
envious—an instance of fortune (for the friendship).  Other times it is the case that a friend has 
much good fortune of which to be envious—an instance of misfortune for the friendship.  
Regarding the individual who has experienced good fortune (especially the friend), Nietzsche 
says that he should perhaps mask his happiness in order to preserve the friendship:  
We must display our unhappiness and from time to time be heard to sigh, be seen to be 
impatient: for if we let others see how happy and secure in ourselves we are in spite of 
suffering and deprivation, how malicious and envious we would make them!—We have 
to take care not to corrupt our fellow men; moreover, they would in the instance referred 
to impose upon us a heavy impost, and our public suffering is in any event also our 
private advantage.246  
In order to prevent both envy and malice in a friend, Nietzsche advises that one should disguise 
one’s happiness and security in oneself with a veil of “public suffering,” for one’s good fortune 
and self-satisfaction has a strong tendency to cause a feeling of inferiority in the other.  That 
feeling of descent in the other can potentially give rise to pain felt toward one’s good fortune or 
pleasure at one’s misfortune.  Because such emotive attitudes are not fully within our control, 
such cautionary measures need be taken by one who wishes to preserve (potential or actual) 
genuine friendships.   
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In addition to these practical methods for preventing the friend from experiencing such 
friendship-destroying emotions, however, the friend himself is able to control these emotions to a 
certain degree.  Because of the duality (and multiplicity) of the self, there is an inner dialogue 
that takes place, and it is this dialogue that allows us to adopt higher order affective and rational 
responses to those feelings that simply take hold of us.   
The existence of this intermediate condition of the dialectical process between emotion 
and emotion, or between intellectual conscience and emotion, is a kind of ethical autonomy akin 
to deliberative choice [prohairesis], but a process of choice which is conditioned by 
temperament, attitude and the more fine-grained emotions.  We ought to conceive of that ethical 
autonomy that is achievable by us as something less free than the traditional notion of “free will” 
but as something more “autonomous” than mere causal determinism.  Along with Nietzsche, we 
should recognize that absolutely free will is a fiction but also that strict causal determinism is a 
misuse of cause and effect.247  Such a stance is pertinent to how we think of an individual’s 
relationship to his emotions and feelings.  Since we do have some measure of control over 
envy—though not complete freedom—how do we fend it off?  Should we fend it off if we can?  
Is envy always a destructive drive?  In keeping with his tendency to complicate strict good/bad 
dichotomies, Nietzsche notes that when envy is generated by a condition of contest, then it can 
be the spark that ignites the furthering of self-improvement and self-realization.  For example, 
when another’s good fortune serves as a challenge to go beyond her success, then the pain that 
one feels at her good fortune can possibly be transformed into a drive to self-improvement.  So 
when there is a prevailing outlook on the praise or blameworthiness of some facet of society—
e.g. the all-too-easily-abused nature of some piece of technology like television or the Internet–
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then the common opinion which is apparently the best position on the issue may be challenged, 
forcing one to look more critically at how and whether that piece of technology improves or 
hinders the possibility of human flourishing.  Alternatively, the kind of envy that Nietzsche 
negatively criticizes is one that causes strife that is purely destructive of the other and the self—a 
mere expression of cruelty.  This more common form of envy, in which one is pained at the 
fortune of another and which can be expressed in a wish for her demise, is that which stands 
opposed to friendship.   
 Schadenfreude also presents itself as an obstacle to genuine friendship, and it has a dual 
origin: in the demand for equality between one individual and the next, and the demand for 
equality between virtue and happiness.  If an individual experiences the general feeling of 
“unwellness,” then seeing the harm that befalls another will make that person his equal: it 
appeases his envy.248  Similarly, if an individual feels perfectly well, then he “gathers up his 
neighbor’s misfortune in his consciousness as a capital upon which to draw when he himself 
faces misfortune.”249  According to Nietzsche, schadenfreude is what “restores” equality 
between self and other.  Taking pleasure in another’s misfortune expresses the drive to equalize 
the suffering of another with one’s own suffering.  Since some amount of suffering is inevitable 
for each person, an individual will retain the present suffering of another “as capital” for his own 
potential future suffering.  In characterizing schadenfreude as the appeasement of envy—joy in 
another’s misfortune as compensation for pain at their good fortune—there is a sense in which 
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envy and schadenfreude are two sides of the same coin.250  Because the demand for equality can 
never be perfectly satisfied in the world and because equality itself is something of an apparition, 
the striving for such and the associated schadenfreude results in a fragmented and sick soul.  
This demand for equality, or feeling of righteous indignation in the face of inequality, seems to 
represent a weakness of character that is somewhat different from the deeper weaknesses of 
character that exemplify envy and schadenfreude.  So in the broader political sphere, justice 
demands the equal and fair treatment of citizens.  It also demands that acts of injustice are 
punished where the punishment is proportional to the wrong committed.  While these demands 
of justice may be conditions that make friendships within a community possible, there is a sense 
in which such demands fall away within the boundaries of genuine friendship.  To exemplify 
righteous indignation toward a friend who has not paid back a debt of some kind, especially a 
debt that can be overlooked, would express a certain weakness of character.  To exemplify 
righteous indignation toward unequal treatment between two friends would also represent a weak 
character, for the true friend would recognize that it is a more beautiful thing to do good for 
friends than to demand that the same amount of good be received from the other.  Thus within 
friendship there is a sense in which justice should not be sought.  This is different than situations 
where a pure justice simply cannot be found.  Such kinds of contexts where a demand of justice 
might represent weakness of character might be the possession of a chronic medical disorder or 
the death of a loved one due to some catastrophe.  In cases like these, the inability to overcome 
the demand for equality would be such a weakness.  On the other hand, there could be contexts 
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envious “for when someone is distressed at the acquisition or possession of something, he 
necessarily rejoices at its deprivation or destruction.” 
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where the demand for equality (qua justice) where some kind of fair practices or fair laws can be 
instantiated could represent strength of character.   
There is also the kind of schadenfreude that expresses a drive for equality between vice 
and unhappiness.  The herd operates under the wish that those who are vicious be the victims of 
misfortune and unhappiness.  This demand for equality between vice and unhappiness, and the 
corresponding demand for equality between virtue and happiness (typically in the afterlife), is 
also a point of origin for schadenfreude.   
 This brings us to the question: What exactly is the mean condition between envy and 
schadenfreude?  At first we supposed that it is friendship, but we must be a bit more precise.  
The mean condition between the two “sick” emotions is not righteous indignation.  Righteous 
indignation can be defined as the feeling of pain toward the undeserved misfortune of others or 
the feeling of pain toward the undeserved fortune of others.  As such it expresses the desire to 
reward the virtuous with happiness and the desire to punish the vicious with unhappiness.  
However, such equality can never be perfectly realized in the world, meaning that righteous 
indignation is also a pathological attitude.  So what kind of attitude, or mean condition, should 
we strive for—especially regarding friendship?  We should not think of the mean condition as 
one of pain felt toward the undeserved misfortune of others (unless one is reasonably capable of 
exemplifying justice and can do so without harboring a vengeful attitude on a global scale).  
Instead we ought to characterize the mean condition as one of pleasure/joy felt towards the 
fortune of others, and in a sense we should do so regardless of whether the other’s good fortune 
is deserved or undeserved.  While there is some sense in which a person can be said to deserve 
whatever fortune or misfortune comes about in his life, there is an even larger sphere of human 
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existence in which one’s fortune or misfortune is outside of one’s control.  In other words, we 
must tear ourselves away from the strict demand for desert and replace it with an attitude of 
amor fati, especially as a precondition for friendship.  This is what Nietzsche means when he 
says of friendship, “Fellow rejoicing, not fellow suffering, makes the friend.”251  One must 
develop and posses the capacity to rejoice with a friend over his good fortune.  So, the mean 
condition underlying friendship is pleasure in another’s fortune, which is opposed to pain in 
others’ fortune (envy) and pleasure in others’ misfortune (schadenfreude), and it is a mean 
condition that is not enslaved to the oppressive demand of equality.  Nietzsche summarizes this 
opposition by contrasting two character types that he calls the retarded man and the anticipatory 
man: 
The unpleasant character who is full of mistrust, consumed with envy whenever 
competitors or neighbours achieve a success, and violently opposes all opinions not his 
own, demonstrates that he belongs to an earlier stage of culture and is thus a relic: for the 
way in which he traffics with men was the apt and right one for conditions obtaining 
during an age of club-law; he is a retarded man. 
And conversely,  
Another character who readily rejoices with his fellow men, wins friends everywhere, 
welcomes everything new and developing, takes pleasure in the honours and successes of 
others and makes no claim to be in the sole possession of the truth but is full of a 
diffident mistrust—he is an anticipatory man striving toward a higher human culture.252   
 Through this investigation into the vices that oppose each other and that oppose 
friendship, we now have the capacity to paint a picture of the complex and elusive nature of 
friendship.  So what is friendship?  The virtue of friendship is a mean condition that exists 
between sameness and difference, honesty and dissimulation, envy and schadenfreude, 
permanence and change and individuality and the sharing of lives.  The fragile place that 
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friendship occupies between these sets of vices, which might be described as inhuman absolutes, 
gives us a clue to why it is considered to be a form of excellence.  Through this interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s account of friendship, we can now decipher why friendship is the virtue that can best 
support the exemplification of the will to power.     
 
Potential Objections to Nietzsche’s Account of Friendship     
 Is it possible to say more than what has been said about the essence of genuine 
friendship?  Through an inquiry into the vices, or extremes of excess and deficiency, we have 
gained a better understanding of how the virtue of friendship exists as a mean condition; yet, is it 
possible that the very word “friendship” (and its corresponding concept ‘friendship’) violates 
friendship’s qualities of uniqueness and irreplaceability?  At various points in Nietzsche’s 
corpus, he identifies the problem of consciousness as one in which conscious concepts and the 
language by which we express those concepts only capture “what is common” and “what is 
communicable.”  In other words, all our actions, including and especially those in friendship, are 
“altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual… [b]ut as soon as we 
translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be.”253  If language fails to convey the 
true essence of each particular friendship, then the Nietzschean account of friendship would itself 
fail to capture the essence of friendship in all its particularity.  Does Nietzsche have a reply to 
this?   
I believe that he does, and a rather interesting one at that.  Nietzsche would concede that 
through language we cannot fully secure how an individual experiences the feeling of friendship 
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from the inside.  Nevertheless, he would admit that we can identify those dispositions that fail to 
hit the target of friendship’s bulls-eye.  The extreme dispositions that are in tension with each 
other and that are in a metaphorical sense “opposite” to friendship are conditions that are 
pervasive in the human condition.  We might not be able to provide an exact description of what 
a particular experience of friendship is like from the inside, for each instance of friendship is 
personal, unique and infinitely individual.  However, because of friendship’s constitutive 
importance in self-realization and in human flourishing, it seems necessary to be able to provide 
the best account that we can of such a phenomenon.  And doing so by way of a description of the 
opposing vices appears to respect its importance while acknowledging its resistance to 
description. 
 A related objection to Nietzsche’s account might be that it does not really address the 
elusive character of friendship as experienced from the first person perspective itself.  In his 
essay on friendship, Montaigne illumines the paradox between the certainty of friendship and its 
unknown “what-it-is-ness.”  In order to clarify what Nietzsche’s position is regarding the elusive 
nature of friendship, it is worth further attention.  On the one hand, Montaigne expresses the idea 
that when he has been in the grip of such a relationship, that he has been certain of the reality of 
friendship: 
It is not in the power of all the arguments in the world to dislodge me from the certainty I 
have of the intentions and judgments of my friend.  Not one of his actions could be 
presented to me, whatever appearance it might have, that I could not immediately find the 
motive for it.  Our souls pulled together in such unison, the regarded each other with such 
ardent affection, and with a like affection revealed themselves to each other to the very 
depths of our hearts, that not only did I know his soul as well as mine, but I should 
certainly have trusted myself to him more readily than to myself.254 
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In a “real” friendship, Montaigne claims that one feels certain as to what the friend’s intentions, 
judgments and motives are—the entire inner contents of his soul.  If one has this kind of 
certainty about the contents of the friend’s soul, then it would seem that one also feels certain of 
the reality of the friendship.  One feels that the “unison of souls” is not a mere appearance but 
that the relationship has a kind of authenticity that is indubitable.  Montaigne elucidates this 
seeming knowledge of the other quite well, and his attitude of certainty appears to be more than 
just an intuition.  But is such certain knowledge of the “what-it-is” of a particular friendship 
possible?  Earlier in his essay, Montaigne voices his worry about the inexplicable nature of 
friendship: 
If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by 
answering: Because it was he, because it was I.  Beyond all my understanding, beyond 
what I can say about this in particular, there was I know not what inexplicable and fateful 
force that was the mediator of this union.  We sought each other before we met because 
of the reports we heard of each other, which had more effect on our affection than such 
reports would reasonably have; I think it was by some ordinance from heaven.255   
Montaigne poses the curious question that any individual who has thought himself engaged in 
friendship poses to himself: Why do I love my friend?  What are the reasons why I love him?  
The only answer that he can give is “because it was he” and “because it was I.”  At first glance, 
this answer may seem uninformative, but I believe that such an answer accentuates the 
inexplicable quality of friendship.  One may object to this and argue that it is indeed possible to 
verbalize the characteristics that a friend possesses and that these are “the reasons” for my love.  
If then asked, “Would you be a friend to just anyone who possessed such characteristics?” then 
one might reply: Well, it’s not just my friend’s set of characteristics, but it’s how he uniquely 
and particularly expresses such a set.  Perhaps one could be pressed further and asked, “What is 
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it about how your friend exemplifies his humor or how he exemplifies his generosity that causes 
you to love him?”  At some point in the line of questioning, it is probable that such a person will 
take Montaigne’s position.  If one is pressed to describe the essence of one’s friendship, I wager 
that he will ultimately come up empty-handed for an answer, or at least be forced to resort to: 
“Because it was him.  Because it was I.”  Because of its unknown, and possibly unknowable, 
essence, Montaigne proposes the idea that “fate” must have had a role to play in his friendship 
with Etienne or that their union came into existence “by some ordinance from heaven.”  Both the 
appeal to fate and the appeal to the divine are attempts to explain the inexplicable quality of a 
genuine friendship.  In spite of this desire, it may just be the case that the essence of friendship 
cannot be rationally articulated because it is not a rational phenomenon.  So what do we make of 
this strange tension between certainty and unknowability?  It appears that one engaged in 
genuine friendship is certain that it exists and has an apparently indisputable knowledge of his 
own motives, judgments and intentions: the stuff that is constitutive of one’s own identity.  
However, the same friend in the same friendship at the same time is incapable of rationally 
articulating “the why” of the friendship: the cause/reason for its existence is unknown.   
Is this paradoxical tension between certainty and inexplicability a problem for 
Nietzsche’s account of friendship?  He does not appear to be explicitly aware of it in his 
writings, but perhaps that is because the paradox is only apparent and not real.  Nietzsche would 
reply that friendship is explicable through a proper understanding of the vices and attitudes of 
excess and deficiency that oppose friendship and threaten to destroy it.  What may forever 
remain inexplicable is the rational articulation of ‘the why’ of a particular friendship, but that is 
okay because friendship, and the love substantiating it, is not a completely or even a mostly 
rational phenomenon.  Nietzsche could also agree that what is certain is ‘the that’ of a friendship: 
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it is possible for one to know that one loves the friend but not know why or from whence one’s 
love originates.   
 A third objection that one might raise against this account of friendship is that it 
necessarily involves a kind of injustice.  If friendship of the kind described essentially involves 
an injustice, then there is something intrinsically unethical about friendship.  Inequality is the 
particular kind of injustice associated with friendship, for the friend is partial to the loved one 
and acts accordingly.  Is this not a form of injustice against all those who are not one’s friends?  
Nietzsche would have two replies to this worry.  First, there may be no way to resolve the 
ongoing conflict between friendship and justice.  The kind of individual who possesses the talent 
for friendship will likely also have the practical wisdom to know that there is no perfect 
instantiation of justice in the world: punishments and rewards are never perfectly equal to their 
corresponding actions.  Such a figure capable of friendship might also recognize that there can be 
no perfect equality even between friends, and as discussed above will be able to rejoice at the 
other’s good fortune, even when it surpasses her own.  Secondly, because justice has been 
traditionally conceived as the hallmark “virtue” of traditional morality, Nietzsche would say that 
it too is something that must be overcome—especially when the drive for revenge exists under 
the guise of justice.  Thus, his concluding thought on such a worry would be: “Whatever is done 
from love always occurs beyond good and evil.”256 
 Another objection to Nietzsche’s account of the virtue of friendship as a mean condition 
is the charge of egoism.  The project of self-realization (i.e. exemplifying the will to power) and 
the virtue of friendship are supposed to be mutually supportive; however, there is a sense in 
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which the on-going process of becoming a real self has a certain primacy to it.  If that is so, then 
it could be objected that friendship is merely being used as an instrument for the larger goal of 
self-becoming, and the friend is not loved for her own sake but only insofar as he reflects or 
serves my own self-directed project.  This is a small-scale version of the broader charge that is 
often raised against the connection between the virtues and human flourishing.  So does the 
striving for one’s own human flourishing undermine the other-orientation of (most of) the 
virtues?  Does the overarching project of striving to exemplify the will to power undermine the 
genuineness of friendship?  The objection at hand rests on a misunderstanding of the target of 
action done from virtue and the relationship between virtue, beauty and flourishing.  Since we 
are claiming that friendship is a particularly complex form of excellence that contributes to 
human flourishing, let’s consider exactly how its practice relates to human flourishing.  For an 
action to be virtuous, an individual must act for the sake of the virtue, but this phrase has two 
meanings, both of which apply: for the sake of the virtue itself and for the sake of the target of 
the virtue.  So in the case of friendship, when one acts virtuously, one acts for the sake of 
friendship and for the sake of the target of that virtue, namely the friend.  One could also say that 
the target of such a virtue is the friendship itself and not just the friend, for each friend by him or 
herself is a mere part of a larger whole.  In this sense, activities that are shared and performed 
both for the sake of the friend but also for the sake of the friendship, in which the telos is “the 
we,” and neither merely “the other” or “the self.”  Although given what we have already said 
about the extremes of sameness/difference and individuality/sharedness, the Nietzschean version 
of “the we” is one that recognizes and treats both members of that union as separate individuals, 
keeping each person’s individuality intact.  Now, through the spiritual nourishment that takes 
place in friendship, which leads to contemplation and action, each friend’s trajectory toward a 
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more fully realized self is enhanced.  One may or may not recognize how the virtue of friendship 
supports self-realization, but perhaps we are mostly concerned with the cases where one is 
conscious of this fact.  As we have pointed out, an action done for the sake of the friend, or for 
the sake of the friendship, is performed as a mean condition that is a healthy balance between a 
plurality of continua of vices that are destructive to selfhood.  How does friendship become an 
active condition that is also done “for the sake of the beautiful”?  Beauty is both created and 
discovered in friendship in its unfolding amidst the complex web of vices that exist and into 
which there is a tendency to get trapped.  However, neither beauty nor flourishing is a conscious 
target of action when acting for the sake of friendship.  To compare, think of the virtue of 
sympathy.  The target of sympathy is the putting oneself into the shoes of another—to show 
another that you understand what they feel, especially a feeling of despair or hopelessness.  The 
hitting of that target is not consciously done for the sake of the beautiful nor for the sake of one’s 
own flourishing.  Nevertheless, the hitting of that target constitutes an action that is done for the 
sake of the beautiful, and such a performance is also a constitutive element in a life of 
flourishing.  A similar relation to flourishing exists for other virtues as well, each of which is a 
form of excellence.  The courageous individual does not exemplify courage for his own 
flourishing.  He does so because he recognizes the need to overcome some danger that threatens 
something valuable, yet his courage does play a constitutive role in his flourishing.  The 
courteous individual does not exemplify courtesy for his own flourishing.  He does so in order to 
respect the human dignity in others, yet his courtesy does play a constitutive role in his 
flourishing.  The honest individual exemplifies his virtue in his having the strength to face up to 
the realities that are of the utmost importance, especially those aspects of the world that have 
deep ramifications for how one may or may not choose to live.  Such honesty toward a friend has 
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as its target the accurate representation of one’s inner spiritual content, not one’s own 
flourishing.  Nevertheless, honesty is one constitutive element in an individual’s flourishing.  So, 
there is a sense in which genuine friendship can be engaged in and this engagement is for the 
project of self-realization, but actions done for the sake of friendship (or any other virtue) has its 
own target that is independent from yet constitutive of the ultimate goal of flourishing.  
Flourishing, in my case, should be taken to be equivalent to exemplifying the will to power, or 
achieving a high degree of self-realization.    
 
Crossing the Footbridge between Friendship and Self-Realization 
 The virtue of friendship and the will to power mutually support each other’s 
exemplification, in which there is a kind of bi-directionality to the relation.  Concerning the 
manner in which friendship supports the exemplification of the will to power, if this virtue does 
play the role of midwife to the will to power in a particular individual, then it must also enhance 
the process of achieving self-realization.  If this is the case, then friendship is able to assist in the 
satisfaction of the existential needs and do so for the sake of the beautiful.  As I will show, the 
engagement in genuine friendship does play this role in regard to all seven existential needs: the 
need for a frame of orientation; the need for devotion; the need for rootedness; the need for 
unity; the need for effectiveness; the need for excitation/stimulation; and the need for a relation 
of self-love.  Bear in mind that the existential needs are grounded in humanity’s contradictory 
nature where humankind’s instincts have diminished to a minimum and humankind’s 
consciousness, reason and imagination have expanded to a maximum—i.e. where man has fallen 
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out of nature.257  So we are less and less creatures run by instinct and increasingly conscious 
beings.  However, despite the development of consciousness in the human species, we seem to 
be less and less conscious of our “selves.”  But we must be clear what we mean by “conscious of 
our ‘selves’.”  For Nietzsche, consciousness is inextricably tied to our social or herd nature, but I 
take this to represent two possible modes of consciousness.  Consciousness could be called forth 
by one’s need to communicate either with the herd, in which one will “know” less and less 
because our words only allow to communicate the most superficial and worst parts of that which 
wants to be communicated; or consciousness can be employed in one’s need to communicate 
(socially) within the community of one’s peers or friends.  A related distinction that Nietzsche 
makes is that between knowledge (or consciousness) as reducing the strange to the familiar and 
knowledge (or consciousness) as understanding or comprehension.  The former sense of 
consciousness is broader in that all knowing is merely a taking what is strange and making it 
familiar, yet the latter sense of consciousness is not necessarily present when the former is 
operating.  Of those philosophers who have claimed to have found “knowledge,” Nietzsche says:  
Even the most cautious among [the men of knowledge] suppose that what is familiar is at 
least more easily knowable than what is strange, and that, for example, sound method 
demands that we start from the “inner world,” from the “facts of consciousness,” because 
this world is more familiar to us.  Errors of errors!258 
It is not necessarily the case that something’s being “not-strange” and familiar means that it is 
therefore known, or has become something of which one is now conscious.  Familiarity does not 
necessarily imply knowability, or a thing’s capacity to be an object of consciousness.  
Nietzsche’s comments here should be interpreted as regarding knowledge or consciousness of 
the self.  Two Nietzschean character-types quickly come to mind, the blond beast of prey and the 
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man of ressentiment who is ensnared within his own slave morality.  The blond beast represents 
a figure that embodies pure action but one whose “goodness” is “free from all social constraints” 
and who lacks the mirror of consciousness generated by the development of the phenomena of 
responsibility, guilt and bad conscience.  As such the blond beast has a kind of pre-cultural 
existence and cannot experience the inward turn of slave morality.  Conversely, the emergence of 
the bad conscience seems to be a condition for the possibility of one’s intellectual conscience—
“a conscience behind your ‘conscience’”—but such a contemplative self-grasping can only be 
transfigured into self-realization by sublimating the active attitude of the master or overcoming 
the reactive attitude of the slave.  Thus, the model of a synthesis of contemplation and action that 
we found in Nietzsche’s third untimely meditation remains at-work in the Genealogy’s 
movements of “morality.”  Despite consciousness’ late emergence in the human species, we are 
more conscious of ourselves in that we feel as though we are familiar with ourselves, but we are 
less and less conscious of our ‘selves’ in that we do not fully comprehend what it means to be a 
real self.   
Remember though that mere self-consciousness is insufficient for the realization of a self.  
In order to accomplish a full degree of self-realization, it would then require that an individual 
attain a kind of wisdom about himself.  We might give it a new name: self-wisdom.  Despite 
what Nietzsche says about the antithesis between wisdom and action, wisdom, especially about 
the self, seems to be inherently directed toward the promotion of living well as opposed to 
knowledge, which can often be inimical to life as it manifests itself in an individual.259  That 
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wisdom does merely seek to know, then it is hostile to life and a kind of unwisdom.  If wisdom 
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being said, we now must explicate how friendship specifically supports the satisfaction of each 
of the existential needs.   
  We begin with the existential need for unity, particularly the kind of inner unity between 
the varying drives and perspectives that reside within an individual.  Unlike the rest of the 
animals in nature who get along with their perceptions, feelings and instincts, human beings have 
the additional phenomenon of consciousness.  Specifically, we have the capacity to be conscious 
of our thoughts, feelings and instincts.  Self-consciousness is strange because it engenders an 
inner division between a subject who can be conscious and an object of whom one can be 
conscious, yet the subject and the object appear to be one and the same entity.  Alternatively, we 
might say that they are parts of the same whole, yet the mere inner split of “the whole” puts its 
whole-ness into question.  When we look at human experience, we discover that the self’s 
closeness with itself makes self-observation rather difficult.  The fact that an individual can ask 
himself “Who am I?” and the fact that such a question remains open-ended and continuously 
presents an invitation to be pondered cause us to wonder whether self-consciousness (and self-
wisdom) is not something already given but a step in the achieving of self-realization.  Aristotle 
explicates this observation about the hiddenness of oneself from oneself in the Magna Moralia:  
Since then it is in fact a very difficult thing, as even some of the wise have said, to know 
oneself, and a very pleasant one (for knowing oneself is pleasant), we will not therefore 
be able of ourselves to gaze at ourselves.  –And that we cannot of ourselves do this to 
ourselves is clear from the way we blame other people and do not notice ourselves doing 
the same thing.  This happens because of kindly disposition or passion; these things 
darken correct judgment in many of us.260 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
seeks to use knowledge for the purpose of realizing a self through action, then it is not 
antithetical to life.   
260 Aristotle. Magna Moralia. Trans. Peter Simpson. 
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The fact that we blame other people for certain actions and do not at the same time notice 
ourselves doing the same things is a strong piece of evidence for the Nietzschean idea that we are 
unknown to ourselves.  While we should agree with the first part of Aristotle’s claim here, we 
have good reason to disagree with the idea that knowing oneself is pleasant, at least a good 
portion of the time for most people, for the uncovering of one’s own vices, weaknesses, 
inadequacies and deficiencies is probably not a pleasant experience.  Because of our incapacity 
to gaze at ourselves, an individual requires some other to mirror that which cannot be gazed 
upon.  The friend is that other who can serve as this rough and imperfect mirror that can best 
reveal oneself to oneself.  How does the friend assist in one’s satisfaction of his existential 
need for unity?  Recall our brief remarks earlier about the friend qua enemy and our initial 
puzzlement over this idea. What does it mean to for one’s friend to also be one’s best enemy?  
Why does Nietzsche consider the capacity to wage war as an essential part of having a friend?  
The openness to different perspectives is the quality that Nietzsche is emphasizing here that is 
required for friendship to be genuine.  Nietzsche says, “If one wants to have a friend one must 
also want to wage war for him: and to wage war, one must be capable of being an enemy,” and 
“In a friend one should still honor the enemy,” but he cautions us with the question, “Can you go 
close to your friend without going over to him?”261  This warning reminds us that friendship 
exists somewhere between a complete identification with the other and a total differing from her.  
It is in how one distances oneself from his friend that one discovers the connection between 
them, especially the distance that surfaces in philosophical disagreement betwixt perspectives.  
So the kind of war that one should want to wage for one’s friend is a spiritual war: to wage war 
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for one’s thoughts and to be a warrior for knowledge.262  When the friend serves as one’s best 
enemy by taking an opposing perspective in intellectual battle, she thereby opens up the 
possibility of the kind of philosophical dialectic that can help one fortify his own perspective.  
This appears to be the primary way that friendship can assist in satisfying the existential need for 
unity, especially the kind of unity amidst diversity of opposing perspectives.  This wholeness 
amongst manifold of perspectives also satisfies the norm of beauty.  To conceive of oneself as a 
“pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject” is to occupy a shameful condition whereby 
one violates the perspectival nature of reason, humanity and life.  Such arrogance represents an 
extreme and imaginary form of absolute objectivity that betrays the conditioned nature of a 
perspective.  However, beauty can be achieved through the capacity to harmonize and to master 
a plurality of perspectives, in which a sense of balance (a mean condition) can be obtained, not to 
hold each perspective on an equal footing, but to consider each perspective’s merits and demerits 
in order to decipher which are the better interpretive stances and which are the worse.  Nietzsche 
captures this active condition in the third essay of his GM:  
…to see differently in this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline 
and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter understood not as 
“contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to 
control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a 
variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge.263 
An individual who has achieved such mastery thus has the ability “to dispose” of those 
perspectives that may be useful as foils for a period of time but that ultimately turn out to be 
defective, but he also has the ability “to control” the plurality of Pro’s and Con’s not simply in 
the service of knowledge but also in the service of life.   
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 In a similar way, friendship can facilitate how an individual satisfies his need for a frame 
of orientation.  In a genuine friendship a friend has a somewhat intimate understanding of one’s 
current frame of orientation, usually one that has come into being from his socio-cultural 
upbringing.  Because of such an intimate understanding of what the other’s frame of orientation 
is, he has the ability to call into question, and make the other call into question, the status of his 
frame of orientation.  The three primary kinds of status that ought to be revalued are whether a 
frame of orientation is life-affirming or life-negating, whether a framework is spiritually healthy 
or sick and whether a framework is occupied for the sake of the beautiful or exemplifies 
deformity or ugliness.  One manner in which to make such an evaluation is for the friend to assist 
one in holding up his current frame of orientation side-by-side by other frames of orientation that 
originate in other cultures and possibly in other ages.  So, for example, in a genuine friendship 
the other can “trigger” a Catholic’s intellectual conscience and force him to do two things: (1) 
critically reflect on the tenets of the Catholic doctrine and their historical developments and (2) 
contrast Catholicism with the plurality of other frames of orientation, such as Judaism, 
Buddhism, Hinduism, atheism or ancient Greek paganism.  It is not impossible that a person 
could develop the ability to control her own Pro’s and Con’s of various perspectives.  
Nevertheless, an individual only possesses one set of eyes, and even if those eyes are highly 
perceptive, they may fail to see the reality of certain features of the world.  A friend who has hit 
the mean condition between dissimulation and honesty will be a balanced counterweight to an 
individual, one that understands when and how to be honest at the right times (e.g., assisting one 
to recognize the reality of something when the instinct of fear is causing one to be blind to it) and 
when and how to be deceptive at the right times (e.g., playing devil’s advocate for a particular 
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position that one does not really hold).  In genuine friendship, such a dialogue is performed for 
the sake of the friend.   
The friend has the capacity to play a similar role in assisting the other in satisfying his 
need for devotion.  Within the parameters of genuine friendship, an individual will give the other 
permission to ask the formidable question: “Who or what do you worship?”  This question can 
be the stimulus causing one to reflect on what or who exactly his object of devotion is and on 
whether he should in fact devote himself to such an entity.  A good example of a deformed and 
misshapen mode of need-satisfaction (for devotion) is the pursuit and worship of a corporate 
entity that sees its army of workers as mere means of labor-power as opposed to human beings.  
Wal-Mart comes to mind as such a corporate entity.  It is probable that there are countless Wal-
Mart employees that devote themselves to Wal-Mart as if it were a kind of god of capitalism.  In 
order to be dislodged from such a strong form of devotion, it would take the kind of honest 
contestation of an individual’s mode of need-satisfaction that only a genuine friend can provide.   
 Friendship plays a helpful role in the satisfaction of the existential need for rootedness—a 
role that other relationships fail to play—because of the feeling of kinship essentially 
experienced between two friends.  Such kinship makes possible a feeling of being at home in the 
world that is absent in many other kinds of human relationships.  Because in modernity our 
capitalistic mode of production treats people less and less as ends in themselves, and more and 
more as replaceable employees, the employer-employee relationship will almost always result in 
experiences of alienation within the sphere of business.  The presence of choice is also much less 
existent when it comes to what occupation one currently has and what occupation one might 
possibly find.  The social and economic conditions that radically limit what an individual can 
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“choose” for himself become extremely pronounced here.  A similar kind of absence of choice 
exists in familial relationships in that grandparents, parents and siblings are part of the 
dimensions of an individual’s existence which is beyond his control.  One might argue that there 
is a certain “blood rootedness” in family ties that can satisfy an individual’s need for rootedness.  
When it comes to the relation between family members, it is possible that the other can be a 
force in the process of achieving self-realization, but when this does occur, it will be in virtue of 
the family member being a genuine friend and not due to the fact that the two are blood kin.  
While the existence of a friendship may not be wholly chosen, for two friends may encounter 
each other totally due to chance, the moment of choice must continually renew itself for the 
friendship to endure for as long as it can.  It is that ongoing revaluation—deliberative choice—
present in genuine friendship that allows an individual to transcend nature (e.g. family) and 
which can pave the way to the satisfaction of other existential needs, especially the need for 
effectiveness - to which we now turn. 
 If we remember correctly, the existential need for effectiveness stems from our 
powerlessness and our experience of ourselves as powerless in the world.  There are several 
ways that friendship helps the satisfaction of this need and hence assists the process of self-
realization.  The first is the very friendship itself.  The friend can serve as a piece of evidence for 
an individual that he does have a concrete effect on at least one part of the world: i.e. the friend.  
Through this kind of reminder, an individual can recognize that he has an active effect on who 
the friend is and on who she is becoming.  This reminder can be voiced directly by the friend, or 
her presence as a being who has been affected can be simply recognized through perception.  
The second manner in which the friend can assist the process of self-realization is by bringing 
new avenues for effecting into an individual’s consciousness.  A third manner in which efficacy 
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can be revealed is through the possibility of joint-action performed by friends.  The performance 
of some activities cannot exist without another person who is just as much invested in the 
activity.  Such is the case with games.  Without at least one opponent, the game cannot be 
played.  Gaming is a good example of how joint-action displays effectiveness because one must 
retain one’s individuality qua player in order to compete well, as is the case with poker, chess, 
Risk or whatever.  Also, the doing of an activity with a friend, where it is both done for the sake 
of the activity and for the sake of the friend, concretizes it reality.  Through the friend’s 
recognition and participation in a shared activity, one’s performance, including his desires, 
intentions and hopes, enhances the realization of both friends’ selves.  This introduction of new 
possibilities by the friend is a crucial form of spiritual nourishment that is the essence of genuine 
friendship, which brings us to how friendship enhances the existential need for 
stimulation/excitation.    
 Zarathustra’s thoughts in the section “On the Friend” furnish what I take to be the 
essence of genuine friendship.  Interestingly enough, this turns out to be an embodiment of what 
have been considered to be traditionally feminine qualities.  In the previous section of this 
chapter, the ‘what-it-is’ of friendship remained somewhat elusive, in that we were able to pin 
down what excessive and deficient vices were that surround friendship (the ‘what-it’s-not’) but 
were not quite able to verbalize its core.  In Zarathustra, however, Nietzsche is more explicit in 
his claim that the core of friendship is the activity of nourishment, a kind of nourishing for the 
sake of the other that is modeled by the mother-child relationship.  The mother-child serves as 
model for the kind of friendship that Nietzsche praises because it demonstrates how one can love 
the other person for his own sake and also have that love and that particular other be a 
constitutive element in one’s own flourishing.  Nietzsche again draws a parallel with Aristotle on 
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this mother-child model for genuine friendship.  In Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle says, “For people consider a friend to be someone who wishes for and does good 
things, or things that seem good, for the sake of the other person, or who wants the friend to be 
and to live, for the friend’s own sake, which is the very thing mothers feel toward their children, 
and which friends who are in conflict feel.”264  Just as a mother wishes for and does good things 
for her child, a friend wishes for and does good things both for the friend’s own sake (for him to 
be and to live) and for one’s own flourishing.  In Book VIII Aristotle also stresses the active and 
other-oriented aspects of friendship by reference to the mother-child model:  
But friendship seems to be present in loving more than in being loved.  A sign of this is that 
mothers delight in loving, for some of them give up their own children to be brought up, and feel 
love just in knowing them, not seeking to be loved in return if both are not possible; it seems to 
be sufficient for them if they see their children doing well, and they love them even if the 
children, in their ignorance, give back nothing of what is due to a mother.265 
Even though the mother-child model here described does not contain the reciprocation involved 
with friendship, it does illustrate the kind of nourishing activity that ought to be present in 
friendship.  Nietzsche also emphasizes the activities of loving and nourishing as definitive of 
what the virtue of friendship is.  In order for one to be a friend, and not simply have friends, one 
must spiritually nourish the other, where spiritual nourishment involves producing both affective 
and cognitive growth.  Zarathustra asks his reader, “Are you pure air and solitude and bread and 
medicine for your friend?  Some cannot loosen their own chains and can nevertheless redeem 
their friends.”266  To be ein Erlöser—a liberator—of one’s friend is to be capable of liberating or 
redeeming the friend from some kind of fettered state of being.  The fettered state of being from 
which one wishes to be liberated is that of being merely fragments and limbs and dreadful 
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accidents, and the condition toward which one wishes to be redeemed is that of realized 
selfhood.  What is crucial to notice here is that someone may be better suited to help his friend 
achieve self-realization than he is to achieve it himself.  This process of liberating the friend is 
portrayed as an activity of nourishment, specifically one that brings the other toward a state of 
spiritual health.  One must be “pure air” and “bread” and “medicine” and “solitude” to 
successfully be a friend to the other, each of those images symbolizing means toward greater 
health.  In saying that a friend must be solitude as a means of greater health for his friend, 
Nietzsche confirms that the kind of solitude he is advocating is a solitude shared by two friends, 
as opposed to a complete isolation from everyone.  Nietzsche praises this type of solitude 
elsewhere when he warns of the future disappearance of the contemplative life because of the 
breathless haste of work and industriousness saying, “Soon we may well reach the point where 
people can no longer give in to the desire for a vita contemplativa (that is, taking a walk with 
ideas and friends) without self-contempt and a bad conscience.”267  Similarly, Nietzsche 
implicitly distinguishes between the solitude of friends and the unclean quality of associating 
with society.  Near the end of the section “What is Noble” in BGE he states 
And to remain master of one’s four virtues: of courage, insight, sympathy, and solitude.  
For solitude is a virtue for us, as a sublime bent and urge for cleanliness which guesses 
how all contact between man and man—“in society”—involves inevitable uncleanliness.  
All community makes men—somehow, somewhere, sometime “common.”268 
According to Nietzsche, association “in society” involves inevitable uncleanliness, but on the 
contrary association with the friend with whom one can sympathize, on the contrary, is a form of 
human association that is “clean.”  Such an unspoken implication seems warranted given the 
inclusion of sympathy as one of the virtues of the noble soul.  So, the friend’s role as 
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philosophical interlocutor aides his friend’s process of incorporating as much truth (or as many 
perspectives) as possible in order to enrich and deepen his spiritual health, which thereby 
beautifully satisfies his need for active stimuli.  For Nietzsche, the norm of beauty is satisfied 
through an individual’s becoming a poet or an artist or being the stimulus to this process for a 
friend.  However, the work of art or the poem that is created does not have any distance between 
it and its creator.  What I think Nietzsche has in mind in stimulating or being stimulated for the 
sake of the beautiful is for one to become a poet of one’s life, or for one to simultaneously be 
both artist and work of art.  More precisely, active stimulation serves as the impetus to begin (or 
to continue) to recognize and become a creator and not merely be a creature.   
 Finally, how does the virtue of friendship support the existential need for a relation of 
self-love?  For, on the contrary, it has been argued by some that one is closest to oneself and that 
the relation that one first has with oneself will be a model for the relations that one bears to 
others.269  So, for example, if one is a friend to oneself, then one will be capable of being a friend 
to another and one will treat the other as another self.  Conversely, if one feels contempt toward 
oneself (let us say for being weak-willed or vicious in some way), then one will externalize this 
self-orientation outward toward others.  According to this line of thought, being a friend with 
oneself, or developing and possessing a relation of self-love, will support and enhance how one’s 
exemplifies the virtue of friendship with another.  However, we were interested in how 
friendship supports the satisfaction of the need for self-love, not vice versa.  The key to 
understanding the relation between friendship and the possible satisfaction of the existential need 
for self-love lies in the mutual reciprocity of both activities.  Nietzsche expresses the idea that 
learning to love some particular others may strengthen an individual’s ability to love himself.  In 
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other words, engaging in genuine friendship with another, where one spiritually nourishes the 
other for her own sake, can also serve as a model for how one might become a friend to oneself.   
This possibility gains credence especially when we question the Aristotelian assumption 
that a person is closest to himself.  While this may have been more true in the ancient Greek 
polis, our social and political conditions in modernity have made the chances for finding and 
creating a sense of self very difficult.  While it has had its benefits, the rise of capitalism has 
created an economic atmosphere where competition and profit take priority over the treatment of 
workers as human beings.  While religious freedom and religious toleration have also have their 
benefits, those benefits have been overshadowed by the life-negating and self-negating effects of 
such institutions.  And despite the advantages of liberal democracy, such a form of government 
has embedded the values of equality and individual liberty so far into the core of our being that 
they cannot be seen as anything other than absolute by nearly all.  Thus, the tendency for an 
individual to have the experience of himself as alien, or as something other than what he is, has 
become widespread.   
Zarathustra’s teachings on the friend may lend the best understanding between friendship 
and the realization of a self.  In the First Part of Zarathustra’s journey, he makes a transition from 
the more populated towns such as The Motley Cow, which are filled with neighbors, to the more 
isolated and secluded forests, where only Zarathustra and his friends/disciples are present.  The 
three themes that permeate the first part of his journey are the will to power’s possible 
production of the overman (or in my language: the realization of a self), the strange manner in 
which the friend can buttress such self realization and the way that neighbor-love fails by serving 
as an escape from self rather than a movement toward its creation.  In the First Part of 
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Zarathustra’s speeches, these three themes collide in the following sections: “On the Friend,” 
“On the Thousand and One Goals,” and “On Love of the Neighbor.”  In order to understand the 
contrast between neighbor-love and friendship, and how the former fails and the latter succeeds 
in being supportive of self-realization, we must analyze these three sections and view them as a 
kind of whole that represents the general movement of Nietzsche’s account of friendship and 
selfhood.    
  
Distinguishing Erotic Love, Neighbor-Love and Friendship   
 The remainder of the section “On the Friend” complicates Zarathustra’s (and 
Nietzsche’s) feminine account of friendship, for in it Zarathustra suggests that there is an 
essentially feminine quality to genuine friendship, yet he raises the possibility that woman, as she 
now exists, is not yet capable of experiencing such friendship.  Zarathustra asks us two questions 
which set up conditions for the possibility of friendship, “Are you a slave?  Then you cannot be a 
friend.  Are you a tyrant?  Then you cannot have friends.”270  At first glance, what this appears to 
mean is that one cannot be a friend if one is less-than-human, or a mere tool of one’s owner, and 
that one cannot have friends if one is unjust and oppressive, treating others as mere tools.  
However, the very next line forces us to give much more precise meaning to the slavishness and 
tyranny that prohibit friendship.  Zarathustra says, “All-too-long have a slave and a tyrant been 
concealed in woman.  Therefore woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knows only 
love.”271  What could Zarathustra possibly mean in declaring that it is woman who has all-too-
long concealed both a slave and a tyrant inside her?  The way to unravel this peculiar claim is to 
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figure out Nietzsche’s interpretation of how woman has historically and socio-culturally been 
both a slave and a tyrant.  Regarding Nietzsche’s claim that woman is a slave, woman is slavish 
in so far as she has been considered the second sex while man has been considered to be the 
superior sex.  Because woman is perceived as the inferior sex, especially by man, social 
conditions have made her into a mere instrument of man.  The slavishness that is concealed in 
this perception of woman renders her fundamentally unequal and lesser than a whole human 
being, which would make impossible the kind of equality that is traditionally understood to be 
necessary for friendship.  While such inequality based on sex is clearly a misperception of the 
reality of woman’s ability to engage in genuine human relationships, such an interpretation of 
woman’s subordinate role has not yet been fully overcome.  Regarding Nietzsche’s claim that 
woman is a tyrant, woman is tyrannical in the sense that she has been the primary caregiver, 
nurturer and educator of the child throughout history.  Her primacy as ruler of the child can 
perhaps be seen as oppressive and dominating not in that woman has prohibited man to 
participate in the upbringing of the child but that because of woman’s traditionally given role as 
primary caregiver and of man’s lack of participation in the family, she was allowed to develop a 
kind of tyrannical role over child-rearing.  This result may have been and may still be 
unrecognized by man.  Because he has historically forgone the position of primary care-giver, he 
has likely weakened his ability to reclaim this position.  We might say that woman has ruled the 
realm of childrearing—with an iron fist!  The concealment of this kind of tyrannical stance 
would engender another kind of inequality where woman is fundamentally superior to man due 
to his inability to nurture and care and superior to the child due to the child’s complete 
dependence on woman.  I take this to be a brief analysis of Nietzsche’s beliefs on how “woman” 
figures into his account of friendship.  Regardless of whether Nietzsche’s gender role analysis is 
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completely accurate, we can hopefully gain a better understanding of Nietzsche feminine 
dimension of friendship through it.  So at this point, we might say that it is in the above senses 
that woman up till now has concealed both slave and tyrant within her and that this has put her in 
a rather paradoxical position where there is a two-fold sense of inequality that prevents her from 
engaging in genuine friendship. 
If this description of woman is correct, then would woman be incapable of engaging in 
friendship with other women who conceal both slave and tyrant?  Though Nietzsche suggests 
otherwise, it would seem that two women who are tyrannical and slavish in the same way would 
have a kinship to each other that enabled friendship.  Those individuals who can understand each 
other’s conditions of oppression or servitude would share the same pain together and likely 
would desire to nourish each other back to spiritual health.     
 Zarathustra concludes, however, that the only kind of love that woman knows is erotic 
love, which necessarily involves an inequality between lover and beloved.  This appears to be the 
kind of love with which Zarathustra is contrasting friendship.  Woman’s incapacities for 
friendship—and conversely her ability to only experience erotic love—now include “injustice 
and blindness against everything that she does not love.”  But why blame such injustice and 
blindness against everyone other than the object of her love?   When in the grip of eros, doesn’t 
the lover necessarily place the beloved on a pedestal high above everyone else?  Is Zarathustra 
here negatively criticizing “the assault” and “the lightning” and “the night along light” that are 
associated with the love of a woman?  Zarathustra’s tirade of criticisms against woman here 
constitute a kind of argument claiming that up until this point in the history of humankind, 
woman has valued erotic love over friendship, and as she centers herself with this love, she is 
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still operating from the drive to be possessed (or possibly also the drive to possess).  Operating 
within the bounds of mere possession makes it impossible to achieve the higher ideal of 
friendship, in which self and other are not fettered by “sick selfishness.”272  If we were to 
attribute a conclusion to Zarathustra’s teaching on friendship, it would be: Because society has 
made woman into a fundamentally unequal being—sometimes a slave and sometimes a tyrant 
and always only capable of an unequal love—she is not yet capable of friendship.  If this were 
the final conclusion, then it would seem still possible for man to partake in that which woman 
cannot do.  But Zarathustra continues, declaring, “But tell me, you men, who among you is 
capable of friendship?  Alas, behold your poverty, you men, and the meanness of your souls!”273  
It turns out that neither woman nor man is yet capable of friendship, for man’s soul is empty and 
has no riches in it to give.  One may even claim that Zarathustra is intimating that man is even 
less capable of friendship than woman is because he is even more fettered by the chains of erotic 
love and possesses an inner nothingness due to his desire—even more so than woman does.274  
So, in that way man is slavish, but in his oppressive stance toward woman he also appears to be 
tyrannical.  We are left to wonder just how possible it is for either man or woman to be capable 
of friendship since both appear to conceal slave and tyrant, but in different ways.     
In her analysis of Nietzsche’s notion of woman as friend, Denise Schaeffer analyzes his 
notion of friendship as a higher ideal in sections 14 and 61 of the GS claiming, “Friendship is 
presented as higher than the self-destructive proximity of love’s lust for possession, and as 
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higher than the absolute distance required for complete self-sufficiency.”275  Given Nietzsche’s 
critique of erotic love, and both man and woman’s up-to-present bondage to it, and his claim that 
solitude stemming from one’s bad love of oneself turns such solitude into a prison, it is correct to 
say that friendship is “higher than” both extremes of proximity and distance, especially if we 
think of its relation as a mean condition between them.    
The thought that man’s soul is poverty-stricken and mean does indicate that a particular 
kind of self-orientation is needed in order to be able to engage in genuine friendship.  Zarathustra 
opposes neighbor-love to friendship, and he argues that neighbor-love involves a kind of 
selflessness that makes friendship difficult if not impossible to achieve.  So he states that “your 
love of the neighbor is your bad love of yourselves,” which signifies that neighbor-love (also 
known as universal love) is an escape from self.276  Zarathustra recognizes that the Judeo-
Christian imperative of “the you” has reigned supreme for centuries and has been pronounced 
holy; nevertheless, he adopts a hopeful attitude that “the I” will replace “the you” in some future 
time.  The section “On the Love of the Neighbor” details just how neighbor-love is not 
conducive to self-realization and how friendship is the best midwife for the birth of a self.  
Because of the absolute and unconditional quality of neighbor-love, it does not demand the 
growth and perfection of the self that is constitutive of a will to power.  Neighbor-love does not 
demand that one satisfy one’s existential needs by the norm of beauty, for in neighbor-love there 
is a continual disintegration of self.  So when Zarathustra recommends love of “the farthest,” he 
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is advocating a love of that highest self which is farthest away and still unrealized.  Zarathustra 
again seduces his reader by challenging him: 
Higher than love of the neighbor is love of the farthest and the future; higher yet than 
love of human beings I esteem the love of things and ghosts.  This ghost that runs after 
you, my brother, is more beautiful than you; why do you not give him your flesh and 
your bones?  But you are afraid and run to your neighbor.277   
There is a rough synonymy between “ghost” ≈ “spirit” ≈ “self” ≈ “the farthest” ≈ “the future”, 
and understanding these entities as meaning approximately the same entity renders a more 
intelligible reading of this section.  Upon the conscious recognition of the spiritual labor that is 
involved in self-realization and upon becoming conscious of one’s instincts and needs, it is the 
fear of the work necessary for self-realization and the ease with which one can hide from “the 
farthest” that impels one to neighbor-love.  One might ask about the strange temporal alignment 
of “ghost” and “the farthest,” for Zarathustra says that this ghost runs after you.  But isn’t it my 
current self that runs after this ghost?  The most reasonable explanation for this non-linear 
temporal aspect of self-realization is that such a process is circular in nature.  It requires cycles of 
Untergang and Überwindung in which it may sometimes seem that the ghost to whom you are 
striving to give your flesh and bones is behind you, for you have come out of a period of going 
under and approaching a new overcoming.  Another possibility is that this is merely 
metaphorical language depicting an image of circularity that ought not to be taken too literally.  
Regardless, the passage supports the idea that a more fully realized self acquires a kind of beauty 
that opposes the ugliness and deformity of a fragmented self.   
 In his critique of neighbor-love, Zarathustra cites the inability to endure oneself and the 
inability to love oneself as impetuses to escape from self.  In other words, the failure to endure 
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and love oneself is a failure to satisfy the existential need for self-love.  Zarathustra’s teachings 
concerning neighbor-love culminate with the relationship between friendship and the overman:  
I teach you not the neighbor, but the friend.  The friend should be the festival of the earth 
to you and an anticipation of the overman.  I teach you the friend and his overflowing 
heart.  But one must learn to be a sponge if one wants to be loved by hearts that overflow.  
I teach you the friend in whom the world stands completed, a bowl of goodness—the 
creating friend who always has a completed world to give away.  And as the world rolled 
apart for him, it rolls together again in circles for him, as the becoming of the good 
through evil, as the becoming of purpose out of accident.   
-------Let the future and the farthest be for you the cause of your today: in your friend you 
shall love the overman as your cause.   
-------My brothers, love the neighbor I do not recommend to you: I recommend to you 
love of the farthest.278 
When Zarathustra says that the friend should be an anticipation of the overman, he means that 
the friend (if genuine) should be and can be a midwife to the realization of a whole self (an 
overman) that lies within.  However, in addition to being a friend one must also be able to absorb 
(like a sponge) that which the friend has to offer.  Notice that what is being offered in a genuine 
friendship is “a completed world.” Such is a gift that one friend gives to another, and being so it 
is similar to the gift that wisdom gives to the philosopher qua a friend to wisdom, particularly 
when we remember that world-creation is an incomplete and preliminary stage in self-creation.  
This idea is confirmed in Zarathustra’s clue that one’s “cause” [Ursache] is both the future and 
the farthest and the overman, and that through friendship it becomes possible to create purpose 
out of accident, and to realize a self out of a collection of needs and instincts. 
 On a final note, it may not be the case that Nietzsche is claiming that neighbor-love has 
no value whatsoever.  It may just be that neighbor-love holds a secondary kind of value to 
friendship because it cannot assist in the project of self-realization the way that friendship can.  
The higher status of friendship then does depend on whether selfhood is actually something 
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valuable.  Throughout, I have been operating under the assumption that selfhood, the realization 
of a self, is something that we ought to value.  However, given the Nietzschean imperative of 
revaluation of all values, it would seem that even selfhood can come under some scrutiny.  
Whether selfhood and its attainment is something that is objectively valuable may be a question 
that has no clear answer—certainly not for a Nietzschean who is skeptical about claims regarding 
the ‘objectivity’ of values.  However, just because it is difficult to determine what kind of value 
selfhood has does not mean that we cannot make an attempt at an answer.  Getting ensnared in 
the falsely dichotomy between objective value and subjective value is not instructive in 
determining why and how we should value selfhood, for the realization of a self is neither 
absolutely and objectively valuable nor does its value merely depend on a subject’s whim and 
fancy.  The former option is not the case because nothing is absolutely intrinsically valuable.  
Nothing has value outside of some perspective which grants it its value; however, the danger 
here is that the gravity of selfhood seems to disappear.  The latter option is not the case because 
selfhood’s value does not depend solely on whether some individual does in fact happen to 
desire it.  Imagine someone deciding that he no longer cares about becoming a real self and 
selfhood’s value just vanishing into thin air, just like that.  Thus, if selfhood is neither objectively 
valuable nor subjectively valuable, then where do we stand concerning the question: Why should 
I care about achieving self-realization?  Perhaps we cannot say that a person “should” or “should 
not” unqualifiedly be motivated to realize a self.  It is possible, and more often the case than not, 
that people are not capable of becoming selves or have no desire to engage in such a process.  I 
believe that we can say that an individual who does become a self expresses a character that is 
more excellent human being, and insofar as a person exists within the appropriate conditions and 
has the needed reflective resources, he will be motivated to realize a self.  As such, the value of 
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selfhood remains integrally connected to the human condition that we occupy, and selfhood’s 
value is only as real as its exemplification by certain human beings.    
 
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have presented a new interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of the will to power.  What it means to exemplify a will to power is to realize a self, a 
process which does not necessarily have a terminus within a single human life.  I have argued 
that the foundation for this view lies in an understanding of human nature as a contradiction 
between instincts and consciousness.  I have explicated the nature of the existential needs that 
arise from human existence as such.  As an advocate of this aspect of Nietzsche’s view, I have 
also argued that beauty is the fundamental norm that can guide how the existential needs are to 
be satisfied, if a person is to achieve the kind of excellence, or virtue, that Nietzsche praises.  By 
paying attention to Nietzsche’s early “untimely” thoughts on selfhood, I have shown that he does 
provide an interesting progression of models for an individual who has attained a high degree of 
self-realization: the saint, the artist and the philosopher.  Insofar as the philosopher is the model 
of the synthesis of contemplation and action, I have claimed that Arthur Schopenhauer serves as 
the penultimate model of one who exemplifies the will to power.  Not only did he satisfy the 
existential needs as they existed within him, but he satisfied them for the sake of the beautiful, 
operating under the fundamental norm of beauty.  I have contended that the particular virtue of 
friendship is that that virtue which can best support the achieving of self-realization, given its 
status as simultaneously other-oriented and self-oriented and given its status as a mean condition 
between different continua of vices.  Taking cues from Nietzsche, I have argued that genuine 
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friendship is a form of excellence that not only supports but also is supported by an 
exemplification of a will to power.   
 With an eye toward the future, it is my hope that this Nietzschean account of human 
flourishing can provide a framework to better understand how a virtue ethical approach to 
normativity can be applied to contemporary moral problems.  I acknowledge that my discussion 
of beauty is a starting point for further examination of what it means to act “for the sake of the 
beautiful.”  I believe that paying close attention to Nietzsche’s early writing can also be fruitful 
in better understanding his providing a positive account of what it means to be an excellent 
human being, particularly regarding expressions of excellence through friendship, honesty, 
courage and generosity.  Finally, I believe that my interpretation of human flourishing, with its 
primary constitutive elements of selfhood and the will to power, can better handle the elements 
of luck, chance and fortune that lie outside of our control, yet serve as conditions for the 
possibility of human flourishing.   
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